










THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
AND UNCERTAINTY IN INDIA 
This book brings together diverse perspectives concerning uncertainty and 
climate change in India. Uncertainty is a key factor shaping climate and 
environmental policy at international, national and local levels. Climate change 
and events such as cyclones, foods, droughts and changing rainfall patterns 
create uncertainties that planners, resource managers and local populations 
are regularly confronted with. In this context, uncertainty has emerged as a 
“wicked problem” for scientists and policymakers, resulting in highly debated 
and disputed decision-making. 
The book focuses on India, one of the most climatically vulnerable countries 
in the world, where there are stark socio-economic inequalities in addition to 
diverse geographic and climatic settings. Based on empirical research, it covers 
case studies from coastal Mumbai to dryland Kutch and the Sundarbans delta 
in West Bengal. These localities ofer ecological contrasts, rural–urban diver-
sity, varied exposure to diferent climate events, and diverse state and ofcial 
responses. The book unpacks the diverse discourses, practices and politics of 
uncertainty and demonstrates profound diferences through which the “above”,
“middle” and “below” understand and experience climate change and 
uncertainty. It also makes a case for bringing together diverse knowledges and 
approaches to understand and embrace climate-related uncertainties in order to 
facilitate transformative change. 
Appealing to a broad professional and student audience, the book draws 
on wide-ranging theoretical and conceptual approaches from climate science, 
historical analysis, science, technology and society studies, development studies 
and environmental studies. By looking at the intersection between local and 
diverse understandings of climate change and uncertainty with politics, culture, 
history and ecology, the book argues for plural and socially just ways to tackle 
climate change in India and beyond. 
 
  
Lyla Mehta is a Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies 
at the University of Sussex, UK, and a Visiting Professor at the Norwegian
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at the Norwegian Institute for Water Research (NIVA) in Oslo, Norway. 
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“From climate change to Covid 19, we are living in a highly uncertain world – 
yet also one of intense politics of life, knowledge and policy around what un-
certainty means and for whom. Unpacking these politics in relation to some of 
India’s most dynamic yet vulnerable places, this volume combines sophisticated 
conceptual analysis with new empirical insights aimed at charting transformative 
future pathways. Compelling reading for scholars and practitioners alike.” 
– Melissa Leach, Director, Institute of 
Development Studies, UK
“This volume deepens our understanding of the tremendous uncertainties that 
climate change is introducing in different ecologies in India. The authors also 
highlight how affected communities are dealing with the impacts of these uncer-
tainties on their livelihoods. It is this micro-level perspective that gives the book 
its distinctive value.” 
– Jairam Ramesh, Member of Parliament and 
former Minister of Environment and Forests, India
“Addressing the existential challenge of climate change is compounded by the 
contested nature of knowledge on climate change impacts and solutions. By in-
terrogating how experts, knowledge intermediaries and everyday people address 
uncertainties about climate change, this book provides a framework for how we 
know, and therefore, communicate, about climate change. Building on empir-
ical cases from India, but with implications for wider geographies, the authors 
powerfully argue for appreciation of diverse ways of knowing and plural rather 
than unitary solutions, thereby contributing both to conceptual literature and 
climate practice.” 
– Navroz K. Dubash, Centre for Policy Research, India
“Climate change is rife with uncertainties, starting from what will change, how 
much and when to how it will affect our day-to-day lives and what can we do 
to adapt to these changes. As an atmospheric scientist, I have always focused on 
minimizing the uncertainty in climate projections with the expectation that it 
will lead to better adaptation strategies. But this book shows us that uncertainty 
is so deeply ingrained in the whole process that is may be better to ‘embrace 
rather than eliminate uncertainty.’ I particularly liked the case study approach 
that allowed me to understand how climate risk is perceived at grassroots level. 
Overall, I strongly recommend this book for climate scientists interested in ex-
panding their understanding of uncertainty in climate change.” 
– Somnath Baidya Roy, Centre for Atmospheric Sciences, 
Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, India
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
As we fnalise this volume during the COVID-19 pandemic, extreme weather 
events such as cyclones, foods and heatwaves have had devastating impacts on 
countries in the global North and South. Clearly, we are living in an uncertain 
world with a lot of politics concerning the causes and impacts of extreme events, 
alongside what uncertainties mean for diferent people in diferent places. 
Uncertainty is a key factor shaping climate and environmental policy at 
international, national and sub-national levels. This book examines the concept 
of uncertainty in relation to climate change and unpacks the diverse discourses,
practices and politics of uncertainty. The starting premise is that scientifc 
projections of uncertainty (the “above”) often overlook the lived realities of peo-
ple who deal and live with this uncertainty on a daily basis (“below”). The 
book demonstrates deep diferences in ways by which diferent actors from the 
“above”, “middle” and “below” understand and experience climate change 
and uncertainty. It argues that diverse knowledges and approaches need to be 
deployed to understand and embrace climate-related uncertainties in order to 
facilitate transformative and socially just adaptation. It also stresses the need 
to promote transformative strategies that take the perspectives and interests of
vulnerable communities who are at the forefront of climate change seriously. 
The focus of the book is on India, one of the most climatically vulnera-
ble countries in the world, which is also characterised by high levels of 
socio-economic diversity and inequality, as well as a range of geographical and 
climatic settings. The book captures this diversity through original empirical 
research from an urban environment (Mumbai, Maharashtra), dryland (Kutch, 
Gujarat) and a deltaic ecosystem (the Sundarbans, West Bengal). The localities 
ofer ecological contrasts, rural–urban/peri-urban diversity, varied exposure to 
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Climate change is one of the most critical development challenges of our times. 
Across the globe, a range of climatic shocks and stressors, often framed as 
1
CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
UNCERTAINTY
Politics and perspectives
Shilpi Srivastava, Lyla Mehta and Hans Nicolai Adam
FIGURE 1.1  A dwelling on the verge of being washed away in Ghoramara Island, 
Sundarbans, India (Photo credit: Shibaji Bose).
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“extreme” or “freak events”, in the form of floods, droughts, heatwaves and 
cyclones are intensifying and slowly becoming the new normal (IPCC 2018). 
Research over the past few decades has demonstrated clearly the links between 
anthropogenically induced emissions and climate change (IPCC 2014, 2018). 
Through modelling and analysis, a range of projections for the future have 
been presented and contested, triggering a new kind of regulatory politics 
on scenarios and pathways (Beck and Mahony 2017). However, despite these 
scientific advancements, uncertainties in climate change projections remain 
particularly high with respect to the scale, intensity and impact of climate 
change (Curry and Webster 2011). These uncertainties, combined with 
economic and political drivers of change, make local-level effects difficult to 
predict (IPCC-SREX 2012) and can also lead to challenges in climate change-
related decision- making (Wilby and Dessai 2010)
Uncertainty is characterised by indeterminacies where not enough is known 
about the probabilities of a particular set of outcomes and where they cannot be 
calculated (Knight 1921). Unlike risk, where probabilities of both outcomes and 
likelihoods are known (Wynne 1992; Stirling 1999), uncertainty is a situation 
where one does not know the odds and the probabilities cannot be calculated 
(Scoones and Stirling 2020). Walker et al. (2003: 5) define uncertainty as “any 
deviation from the unachievable ideal of completely deterministic knowledge 
of the relevant system” and highlight the importance of understanding the 
various dimensions of uncertainty for response and action. Within climate 
change debates, uncertainty is often referred to as a “super wicked problem” or a 
“monster” (van der Sluijs 2005; Levin et al. 2012) and scientists are increasingly 
acknowledging that uncertainty is here to stay and it may not be entirely possible 
to reduce or control (IPCC 2014).
However, there are deep differences in the ways uncertainty is understood, 
communicated and configured in policy- and decision-making around climate 
change (see Chapter 2). More fundamentally, significant gaps remain between 
how uncertainty is dealt within climate science and policy (characterised as 
the “above” in this volume), how it is experienced by people in their everyday 
lives (characterised as the “below” in this volume;) and how it is mediated 
and translated by the “middle” (i.e. the knowledge brokers and intermediaries 
between the two). These issues are the core focus of the book. Introducing the 
heuristics of the “above”, “middle” and “below”, we argue that theorising about 
climate-related uncertainty by experts, modellers and policymakers may have 
very little to do with how local people (men, women, third gender who are, in 
turn, differentiated by age, ableism, class, caste, location and ethnicity) make sense 
of climate change and live with climate-related uncertainties in everyday settings 
(see Figure 1.1). We demonstrate in different empirical settings that the reaction 
from “above” has often been to minimise and control uncertainty and capture it 
through quantitative assessments and modelling exercises. However, global and 
regional climate models are less predictable at the local level, especially because 


















Climate change and uncertainty 3 
change, increasing local-level uncertainties. For example, as discussed in Chapter 
2, climate change models are associated with a “cascade of uncertainties” that 
increase with downscaling. These relate to uncertainties in projections, response 
to changes at global and national scales and the spatial and temporal distribution 
of impacts, thus creating an “envelope of uncertainty” (Wilby and Dessai 2010). 
The empirical chapters on Kutch, the Sundarbans and Mumbai demonstrate this 
cascading view of uncertainty in this volume. 
A growing number of authors have discussed key diferences between how
experts (be they policymakers or scientists) and local people view and experience
climate change (e.g. Hastrup and Skrydrstup 2013; Rudiak-Gould 2013; Hulme
2015; Conway et al. 2019). These authors have attempted to validate the place-
based knowledge and agency of local expertise vis-à-vis climate and its changes
underlining the epistemic contrasts (see García-del-Amo et al. 2020 for Spain;
Das 2021 for India). This book builds on this scholarship and demonstrates deep
diferences in the ways diferent actors understand and experience climate change
and uncertainty. It argues that diverse knowledges and plural approaches need to
be deployed to understand and embrace climate-related uncertainties to facilitate
transformative and socially just adaptation. The voices and experiences from
“below” matter because it is these vulnerable groups living on the frontline – 
and the least responsible for creating climate change – who bear the brunt of
anthropogenic climate change. Thus, their knowledges, experiences and responses
must inform and feed into wider climate debates and strategies. Our research from
India’s drylands, wetlands and coast reveals that, neglecting locally relevant and
bottom-up perspectives can lead to interventions that exacerbate uncertainties and
vulnerabilities of poor and marginalised social groups. 
The book demonstrates that it is important to capture a range of perceptions, 
experiences and responses to climate change and uncertainty (cf. Crate and 
Nuttall 2009; Jasanof 2010; Wynne 2010) to appreciate the diverse dimensions 
of climate and address appropriate strategies regarding both adaptation and 
mitigation that go beyond short-term incremental impacts and address structural 
change. For many vulnerable groups at the forefront of climate change, adapting 
through incremental changes is clearly not sufcient, both because of their limited 
adaptive capacity and the neglect of wider structural conditions of inequity, 
powerlessness and marginalisation which can enable maladaptation and intensify 
structural inequalities and local vulnerabilities (Eriksen et al. 2021). These call for 
deep-rooted structural transformations (O’Brien 2012). 
This volume addresses these challenges and epistemological tensions by 
examining the concept of uncertainty in relation to climate change from various 
vantage points of the “above”, “middle” and “below”, with specifc reference to 
India. It also explores to what extent and how these divides can be bridged so 
that new hybrid perspectives can facilitate more transformative pathways to adapt 
to climate change. Our core proposition is that investigating and unpacking the 
gaps in diverse conceptions of uncertainty can facilitate processes that embrace 
rather than eliminate uncertainty. This is because subjective judgements, multiple 
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knowledges and interpretations around uncertainty tend to be the best way 
forward instead of a singular value or recommendation (Stirling et al. 2007; Leach 
et al. 2010; Eriksen et al. 2015; Nightingale et al. 2020). These can ultimately 
help promote adaptation and mitigation processes that are both socially just and 
responsive to the socio-ecological diversity of contexts. 
Climate change and uncertainty in the Indian context 
India is not only a global hotspot for climate change impacts (Mani et al.
2018) but also has large population sections that are highly vulnerable to the 
impacts from climate variability and change (IPCC 2014). The causes for this 
social vulnerability are manifold. The majority of India’s population remains 
dependent on climate-sensitive livelihoods such as agriculture, fsheries, forestry 
and allied activities. Besides, widespread poverty and growing social, economic 
and political inequalities in both rural and urban areas adversely afect adaptive 
capacities of local populations. A recent IPCC report (2018) warns that if global 
temperatures were to rise beyond 1.5 ℃, India faces the prospect of being hit by 
unprecedented climate extremes and a sharp rise in extreme vulnerabilities of 
its population by 2050, with some areas potentially becoming uninhabitable. In 
2020, 75% of districts sufer from climate extremes, with interchanging foods 
and droughts causing most damages and a spike in such events specifcally from 
2005 onwards (Mohanty 2020). While extreme events are not new to India (see 
the historical analysis in Chapter 3), their frequency and severity have increased 
in recent years. India’s pastoralists, farmers and fshers are severely afected 
because their traditional ways of living and coping with climate uncertainties 
are being tested as new uncertainties – which we term radical uncertainty – are 
threatening their livelihoods further (see Chapters 4–6). When new patterns 
(such as increased frequency or severity of foods) are witnessed in areas that 
are historically, for the most part, exposed to droughts (e.g. Kutch; Chapter 4), 
knowledge uncertainties abound as there is little or no prior experience or data 
to fall back on, giving rise to radical uncertainty. How should India prepare for 
climate action in the context of this radical uncertainty? 
As an emerging economy, India is the third largest contributor to Green House 
Gases (GHGs) emissions globally, while also having one of the lowest GHG 
emissions per capita (Dubash 2019). Development inequalities are, however, not 
limited to diferences between the global North and global South. As a recent 
study highlights in the Indian context (Lee et al. 2021), vast disparities exist 
between a growing middle- and upper-middle class and poorer communities 
in India,1 the former having an up to seven times higher carbon footprint than 
the latter. How India will deal with climate change has consequently profound 
ramifcations for its population and its social, environmental and economic 
policies as well as global climate action. Hence, it is important that development-
focused interventions are implicitly intertwined with climate policy and their 
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At the national level, India’s key strategy papers on climate change are the 
National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) (Government of India 
2008), the State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCC) and, more recently, 
the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) (see MOEFCC 
2015). These documents acknowledge the impacts of climate change on natural 
resources and people’s livelihoods. As we also found in our research in particular 
contexts in Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal, the ofcial plans continue to 
place disproportionate emphasis on mitigation and issues of international equity 
and redistribution, while questions of adaptation, domestic equity and access to 
natural resources remain side-lined (Bidwai 2012; Venkatesh 2018). The NAPCC 
has also been criticised for being ill-suited to the Indian context, doing little to 
balance climate and development concerns and inter-state diferences (Bidwai 
2012; Dubash et al. 2018). The SAPCCs have seen poor implementation and 
limited participation by key stakeholders and practitioners in designing strategies 
and do not acknowledge variations in the ways climate change will play out 
across regions (see also Chapters 4–6) and the relative capacities of diferent states 
to respond to climate change (Dubash and Jogesh 2014; Kumar and Naik 2019). 
This is despite the initial and cautious optimism that SAPCCs could be a base for 
mainstreamed climate concerns into development planning (Dubash and Jogesh 
2014). 
While ofcials discuss adaptation and climate-friendly initiatives, often there is 
insufcient actionable planning and dedicated fnancial allocation for adaptation. 
The MGNREGA (the largest rural public works programme in the world) has, 
for instance, been mainstreamed to include climate adaptation concerns (Adam 
2015). However, the “retroftted” scheme is not tailored for taking on a dedicated 
climate adaptation role, lacking integration of participatory vulnerability 
assessments, planning or addressing of structural power imbalances (Eriksen
et al. 2021). India’s cities have also been found to sorely lack strategic integration 
of climate risks that are informed by principles of sustainable adaptation (Singh 
et al. 2021), as we also examine in Chapter 6 for Mumbai. This refects a 
national trend wherein adaptation funds remain underutilised or diverted for 
diferent purposes (Venkatesh 2018). While India is on track to achieve – or even 
surpass – its ambitious INDCs, which is a positive signal, questions remain on the 
fundamental premise of being closely linked to a green economy discourse that is 
associated with business and market-friendly principles, technological optimism 
and neglect of issues concerning power inequity, marginalisation and resource 
distribution (Unmüßig et al. 2012). 
Srivastava et al. (Chapter 4) discuss how recent mitigation eforts around 
renewable energy parks can contribute to spatial injustice by leading to further 
dispossession of pastoralists in Kutch and elsewhere (also see Yenneti et al. 2016).
Similarly, Adam et al. (Chapter 6) argue that prioritising mitigation in state-led 
discourses on climate change within cities has led to the dominance of market-
driven agendas and business ventures, often in the name of energy efciency and 
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India’s climate policy framework is “fragmented and lacks clarity” (Kumar 
and Naik 2019: 1), displaying the urgent need for a broad-based, inclusive and 
dedicated climate action for the next decade and beyond. These tensions and 
trade-ofs in the “above” need careful analysis and unpacking, as these top-down 
interventions often have dramatic impacts on local livelihoods, people’s agency, 
identity and well-being and, more broadly, on the sustainability of India’s 
development trajectory. 
Wider relevance 
This volume advances critical social science scholarship on climate change by 
addressing these challenges and tensions in a lower-middle-income country. Our 
focus is on marginal environments in India which, despite being ecologically 
dynamic and climatically vulnerable, sufer from historical neglect. We focus on 
an urban environment (Mumbai, Maharashtra), dryland (Kutch, Gujarat) and a 
deltaic ecosystem (Sundarbans, West Bengal) and also analyse their challenges from 
a historical perspective. These localities ofer ecological contrasts, rural–urban/ 
peri-urban diversity, varied exposure to diferent climate shocks and diverse state 
and ofcial responses to climate change and its associated uncertainties. Drawing 
on diverse theoretical and conceptual approaches (see below) and methodologies, 
the book investigates the intersection between local understandings of climate 
change uncertainty with science, politics, culture, history, livelihoods, ecology 
and a wider political economy in India. 
In the past decade, scholarship on climate change in India has increased
signifcantly, indicating the growing interest and importance of climate change
in its wider development politics and practice. Several authors have provided a
rich account of the national policymaking context in India, locating it within
the broader climate and development politics (Dubash 2012, 2018; Taylor,
2014), or within a particular sector or across sectors (Mahdi 2018; Dubash 2019).
Other volumes focus on India’s climate diplomacy (Saran and Jones 2016) and
impacts of adaptation policy (Chattopadhyaya 2014). This is in addition to the
vast literature, journal articles, assessment studies (Government of India 2020)
and newspaper articles (online and print) that continue to explore the local
manifestation of climate change in diferent state contexts and methodological
advancements involving vulnerability assessments that move beyond single
values or indicator-based assessments (Singh et al. 2017; Das 2021). Our book
builds on this scholarship but takes climate-related uncertainty as its starting
point as it connects the global, national and local scales to locate the diverse
politics and practice(s) around uncertainty. Further scholarly and practical
contributions are as follows: 
First, this volume is a signifcant contribution to understanding how climate-
related uncertainty is understood, experienced, leveraged, lived and embodied 
by scientists, policymakers and lay people who are socially diferentiated due 
to gender, class, caste, ethnicity and so on. We respond to Jasanof’s call to 
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synchronise scientifc framings of climate change with “the mundane rhythms 
of lived lives and specifcities of human experience” (2010: 238). In doing so, we 
introduce the heuristic of “above” and “below” and the “middle” to examine 
diferences in understandings, discourses and practices around uncertainty and 
climate change and explore the knowledge politics and socio-economic dynamics 
that shape and alter responses to uncertainty. 
Second, climate-related uncertainty has predominantly been characterised 
as a challenge or a problem that needs resolution. Despite the opening up of 
approaches to uncertainty and a greater acceptance of the need to embrace it, 
ofcial responses to dealing with climate-related uncertainty continue to be 
predominantly driven by top-down, technical and managerial solutions (Beck 
and Mahony 2017; Mehta et al. 2019) which, as the book will demonstrate, often 
falter in the face of complex local realities and can create new vulnerabilities 
(also see Eriksen et al. 2021). Despite a signifcant emphasis on integrating local 
knowledge in climate adaptation and decision-making in recent years, much of 
the scholarship continues to operate within the domain of climate risk (Conway 
et al. 2019; Conway and Vincent 2021; Singh et al. 2021). Within Indian 
scholarship, there is limited engagement with the issue of uncertainty barring 
the work of climate scientists on hydrological resource assessments and planning 
(Bhave et al. 2018; Joseph et al. 2018; Singh and AchutaRao 2019). This book is, 
to our knowledge, the frst attempt at providing a collection of rich empirical 
insights on diverse perceptions and experiences of climate-related uncertainties 
in an Indian context, bringing together macro, meso and micro perspectives. It 
also stresses the need to prioritise transformative strategies that seriously take on 
board the perspectives and interests of vulnerable people who bear the brunt of 
climate change. 
Third, we build on growing calls that focus on the need for decision-making 
under uncertainty (Dessai et al. 2003). In other words, rather than approaches 
that look at climate science alone in guiding policy responses, there is now a 
growing body of work that focuses on bringing together top-down and bottom-
up climate knowledge and assessments (Conway et al. 2019). In line with these 
shifts, new concepts and practices such as adaptive management practices have 
emerged that also embrace uncertainty through scenario planning and social 
learning (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007; Brugnach et al. 2008; Totin et al. 2018; Kale 
and D’Souza 2018), creating a citizen science of climate change (Panda 2016), 
or through assessing the impacts on decision-making and adaptation behaviours 
(Singh et al. 2016). However, this approach of bridging has found very little 
salience in the Indian policy context (see Chapters 2 and 7). Both conceptually 
and empirically, very limited work exists in this domain in the Indian context 
(Panda 2016). Various chapters in this volume show how uncertainty is viewed 
by many actors from the “above” as a form of policy paralysis. We explore these 
various stereotypes and tropes attached to uncertainty while seeking out positive 
ways in which uncertainty can open up pathways to transformative change. 
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uncertain dynamics in ecologically dynamic spaces such as drylands, but these 
have tended to be ignored in mainstream policymaking. Chapter 4 explores 
instead how these can be built on to create potentials for transformative action 
to deal with growing radical uncertainties associated with climate change in 
drylands (Figure 1.2). 
Fourth, the volume contributes to methodological expansion and innovation 
through its creative application of diferent disciplinary approaches and methods 
to study impacts and experiences of, and responses to, climate change and 
uncertainty across diferent temporal and spatial scales. It draws on a wide range 
of epistemic frames, with chapters authored by an interdisciplinary team of 
leading researchers from anthropology, sociology, economics, history, political 
science and the natural sciences. The volume draws on original empirical insights 
from the Indian Sundarbans, Mumbai and Kutch, based on mixed methods (e.g. 
ethnographic research, visual methodologies, participatory mapping and hazard 
ranking, semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and quantitative
surveys) informed by empirically rich, multi-disciplinary and longue durée 
research in three distinct socio-ecological settings. Policy analysis and key 
informant interviews were used to engage with perspectives from “above”, and 
natural science expertise was used to understand climate change trends over time. 
The book also draws on expertise from the arts and humanities. For example, 
FIGURE 1.2 Photovoice engagement with women in a pastoral community in Kutch 
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Chapter 3 is based on original archival work to analyse colonial understandings 
of uncertainty in marginal environments, their impacts then and now, and how 
these inform contemporary climate change debates. In all the research sites, 
researchers used photovoice to allow hidden and marginalised perspectives 
to come to the fore through storytelling and visual images. Finally, we also 
convened roundtables to bridge divides across diferent disciplinary perspectives 
and institutional siloes (see Chapters 2 and 7). While unable to get rid of unequal 
power relations and biases, they at least revealed how these continue to shape and 
perpetuate dominant paradigms and perspectives. 
In the remainder of the introduction, we develop the conceptual framework 
for this volume, setting the chapters in their context and highlighting the links 
across various themes. 
Heuristics of uncertainty 
As discussed, conceptualisations of uncertainties are varied and are embedded in 
diferent realms of knowledge and disciplinary traditions. The largely northern 
focused literature of Science and Technology Studies (STS) has been critical 
in elucidating the narrow ways in which uncertainty is often conceptualised 
by modellers, scientists and planners (e.g. Wynne 1992; Stirling et al. 2007).
Other literatures from an anthropological and sociological tradition, and from 
the perspective of complex ecologies, have demonstrated how local people live 
with uncertainty and how practices have evolved to deal with it (e.g. Scoones 
1994; Vasavi 1999; Adger et al. 2001; Mehta 2005; Marschke and Berkes 2006; 
Berkes and Berkes 2009). A growing literature in the Indian context and beyond 
has highlighted the importance of local perceptions about climate variability 
(Vedwan and Rhoades 2001; Panda 2016; Conway et al. 2019) and resource 
scarcity (Mehta 2005), and their impact on coping and adaptation behaviours; the 
importance of local knowledge in adapting to climate change (e.g. Naess 2013); 
and the wider intersections with local power and social dynamics (Coulthard 
2008; Taylor 2014; Adam et al. 2018). While some gaps are being bridged 
through citizen science of climate change (Panda 2016) and transformative 
scenario planning (Kale and D’Souza 2018; Totin et al. 2018), largely these 
diferent analytical traditions have not spoken to each other. We seek to bridge 
these literatures through the following heuristics on uncertainty with the 
caveat that neither of these three categories is homogenous and there is a lot of 
fuidity across these categories (e.g. scientists can be experts from “above”, take 
on advocacy roles as the “middle” and also experience climate change impacts
from “below”). 
Uncertainty from “above” 
Uncertainty from “above” is represented by climate scientists, policy elites 
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we concede that there will be hierarchies within these and they are not 
homogeneous categories (Mehta et al. 2019). Uncertainty and climate change 
from “above” tend to draw on singular rationalities and may seek out singular 
ways to understand causality (Hulme 2017). At the larger/global scale, the climate 
is usually seen as abstract and invisible (Rudiak-Gould 2013). The standard 
approach for conceptualising uncertainty is to quantify it in terms of probabilities 
(e.g. Sigel et al. 2010) and statistical models that accommodate sophisticated data 
with multiple variables across a range of spatial and temporal scales. Of course, 
as Mehta et al. (Chapter 2) show, many modellers acknowledge the limits to 
models and their predictions due to limited understandings of the climate system 
and challenges with attribution and downscaling (Shackley and Wynne 1996; 
Kandlikar et al. 2005; Stainforth et al. 2007; Curry and Webster 2011; Hulme 
2013). Moreover, models often become “fuid objects” (Hastrup 2013: 13) where 
scientifc uncertainties are used as a rhetorical device for strategic ends or to 
negotiate authority in a disputed domain (Campbell 1985). 
Representations of uncertainty are not a priori; they are constructed and 
rationalised through processes. Therefore, diferent understandings from “above” 
are linked to particular institutions, positions and contextual factors. As is evident 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, scientists also struggle with communicating 
uncertainty efectively to politicians and the public who crave certainty while 
wanting their research to be policy relevant. For this purpose, boundary ordering 
devices such as “people [the middle], texts, maps and ideas” play a strong role 
in science–policy communications as they facilitate the movement of ideas 
across diferent social worlds (Star and Griesemer 1989; Shackley and Wynne 
1996). Mehta et al. (Chapter 2) explore some of these challenges at the science– 
policy interface, where uncertainty is often truncated into risks, producing 
calculative actions and controlling visions that end up closing down possibilities 
for collaboration, mediation and plural framings. Both Mehta et al. (Chapter 2)
and Movik et al. (Chapter 7) discuss the role of bridging devices and hybrid 
knowledges in bringing the perspectives of the “above” and “below” together, 
alongside their challenges. Largely, our research has demonstrated that, most 
often, many of the livelihood practices that intersect with climate change remain 
unrepresented in the language, representations and imaginaries of the “above”, 
at least in the Indian context. Thus, the narrow frame of uncertainty needs to be 
broadened and diversifed to encompass varieties of uncertainties as understood, 
experienced and embodied by the “below”. 
Uncertainty from “below” 
Climate change narratives and perceptions pervade the everyday realities of local 
people whom we call the “below”, especially those who live at the interface of 
climate stressors, risks and shocks. These constitute people living in the squatter 
settlements of megacities such as Mumbai, who are exposed to chronic fooding 
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in Mumbai, Kutch and the Sundarbans whose livelihoods are threatened due 
to changes in climate, commercialisation processes and aggressive patterns of 
industrialisation (Srivastava and Mehta 2017). 
A rich body of literature has elucidated how people attach meaning and 
signifcance to the world they inhabit and, in turn, gain meanings from the natural 
world to understand and live with change (cf. Rudiak-Gould 2009; Hastrup and 
Skydrstrup 2013). Urban studies have also highlighted how uncertainty is an 
essential dimension of urban life itself and has been a focal theme of those engaged 
in planning, building and governing cities (Zeiderman et al. 2015). Thus, many 
indigenous knowledge (IK) systems evolve through adaptive learning based on 
developing a complex knowledge base of the environment and lessons from past 
mistakes – a version of “post-normal” science (cf. Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). 
While the repertoire of local people is rich and diverse concerning ecological 
uncertainties which are also experienced in cultural terms (e.g. Bon Bibi in the 
Sundarbans; Chapter 5), this is also being challenged in multiple ways as we show 
in the subsequent chapters. 
As discussed, climate change and its intersection with other drivers of change 
present a radical uncertainty that can push local people to the limits of coping or 
trigger maladaptation. This can lead to a sense of powerlessness for those whose 
lives and survival are at the frontline of climate change and uncertainty (Hulme, 
personal communication, 2014) and trigger distress diversifcation, as we show 
in the empirical chapters. For example, in all three sites, marginalised people 
are confronted with climate-related uncertainties and the threat of displacement 
(Mumbai and the Sundarbans), difculties in sustaining livelihoods (Kutch, 
Mumbai and the Sundarbans) and the impacts of neoliberal and unequal growth 
patterns. In urban Mumbai (Chapter 6), poor people living in food-prone areas, 
whose lives and livelihoods are entrenched in informality, lack rights to housing 
and basic services. This has increased their vulnerability to climatic events. 
At the same time, they are blamed as “encroachers” that cause food-related
uncertainties for the city in the frst place. In Kutch (Chapter 4), pastoralists 
need to deal with changes in rainfall and a declining grass cover alongside hostile 
government policies and rapid industrialisation that is leading to dispossession
from the commons. Thus, for the “below” in Kutch, Mumbai and the Sundarbans, 
climate change as a cause for change is often used to signify concerns around 
shifts in their cultural, physical, social and economic worlds (cf. Hulme 2017). 
The climate signals are not abstract and distanced but deeply embedded with 
their livelihoods, migration, mobility and everyday decision-making. 
Thus, uncertainty from “below” concerns the framings of lay and local people 
as diferentiated by gender, age, sexuality, class, ethnicity, race and caste. It is 
“experiential”, non-ofcial knowledge, not necessarily played out at the verbal 
or articulated level but instead is a more “practical” or tacit form of knowledge 
(cf. Bourdieu 1977). While our concern is largely with marginalised groups and 
perspectives, this can also be a very heterogeneous group consisting of both rich 
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There are, of course, gendered dimensions of climate change and uncertainty
as experienced by the “below” and these are highlighted across various
chapters. For example, in the Sundarbans (Chapter 5), the growing precarity
and livelihood insecurity, due to the loss of land because of erosion and sea-
level rise, have led to women needing to move to less proftable, more fragile,
risky and marginal activities such as crab catching. This is risky and physically
stressful. While both men and women are afected, the intensity is felt more
by female-headed households, not least due to massive male out-migration.
Also, for many women who are responsible for the health and sustenance of
their families, climate change is not something in the future but very much
experienced in the here and now, in terms of the impacts of extreme events and
stressors on access to safe drinking water, fodder for their animals, availability
of fsh in the sea and so on. Chapter 4 also elucidates, through the photovoice
engagement, many of these gendered, socially and culturally embedded
experiences of uncertainty, which are revealed through the powerful images of
the “invisible” care economy in Kutch. 
Uncertainty and the “middle” 
While there are clear power diferentials between “above” and “below”, with 
the “above” tending to be more powerful, we contend that there is potential for 
collaboration and bridging, usually facilitated by what we have called the actors 
and spaces in the “middle”. The “middle” often plays a critical role in bridging 
gaps between “place-based” experiences and expertise on climate change and 
the most detached expert assessments and solutions (cf. Rudiak-Gould 2013; see 
Chapter 7). 
The “middle” is not a scalar category, but a functional one (Srivastava, 
unpublished). It is constituted by actors who attempt to facilitate convergence 
across diverse interests through mediation and brokerage. However, they can also 
use their agency to block particular pathways of change or maintain the status
quo. In this vein, it is important to identify these boundary actors and unpack
their politics of bridging (Chapter 7). Across various chapters, the “middle” 
is constituted through its functional attributes, and it is embedded in diverse 
formal and informal networks (as civil society actors, politicians, street-level 
bureaucrats) and engages in practices of policy translation, mediation, alliance-
building and gatekeeping, thereby blocking, shaping and encouraging processes 
of change (Srivastava, unpublished). As intermediaries, they bridge or create 
epistemic and institutional divides across the “above” and “below” and facilitate 
or hinder transformative pathways (cf. Stein et al. 2018). Most often, the “middle” 
struggles to translate messages from “below” to the “above” (see Chapter 4). But 
it can also play a key role in reframing and shifting dominant discourses, for 
example, around the so-called unproductive nature of the drylands in Kutch (see
Chapter 4). At times, actors in the “middle” can resort to politicising uncertainty 
for their own ends (see Chapter 5). The “middle” thus performs a variety of 
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functions including translation, bridging and co-production, the latter being 
significantly crucial for facilitating small but emerging alternatives to deal with 
uncertainties that can enable locally led and appropriate adaptation processes.
In response to possible caveats from careful readers, we acknowledge that climate 
change and uncertainty from “above”, “middle” and “below” have different 
relative strengths, epistemological entry points and potential for complementarity 
(Berkes and Berkes 2009; Mehta et al. 2019), and some actors operate across all 
three levels. For example, a scientist can be an expert representing the “above”, 
try to mediate between local communities and the state as the “middle” and also 
experience the changing rhythms of climate change as the “below”.
Dimensions of uncertainty
In this book, we focus on three types of uncertainties: (1) aleatoric or ecological 
uncertainties, namely, ecological systems characterised by a high degree of 
variability and disequilibrium dynamics, thus having unknown effects; (2) 
knowledge or epistemic uncertainties, which refer to indeterminate knowledge about 
changes and their impacts; and (3) uncertainties linked to larger political economy 
conditions, which are unanticipated outcomes due to socio-political interventions 
and intersections and how they are experienced by diverse groups (Wynne 1992; 
Mehta et al. 1999; Walker et al. 2003; Mehta et al. 2019). All these uncertainties 
are experienced, framed and interpreted differently by diverse actors and are 
linked to relations of power that justify different institutional practices and 
responses (Rein and Schön 1993; Mehta et al. 2019). Historical understandings 
of both macro- and micro-level changes are also critical to conceptualising and 
experiencing uncertainty (see Chapter 3). Uncertainty can also be politicised 
and manipulated by powerful actors or used as an excuse to do nothing (Mehta 
et al. 1999; Dessai and van der Sluijs 2007). Configurations and experiences of 
uncertainty are also affected by location-specific contexts. For example, urban 
residents and institutions in Mumbai may experience and relate to weather-
related uncertainties in a different way compared to rural and natural resource-
dependent communities (Kutch or the Sundarbans), where extreme variability 
has a direct impact on their resource access and livelihoods. We now focus in 
detail on these three dimensions which we discuss below.
Aleatoric uncertainty
The ontological roots of uncertainty lie in several disciplines. These perspectives 
recognise the inherent variability of a system, for example, Heisenberg’s 
Uncertainty Principle (Heisenberg 1958), which states that there is a limit to what 
we can know about any given particle at any given point in time. The fact that 
there is ontological uncertainty in physics is sufficient for a scientist to conclude that 
uncertainty is a real phenomenon and not just a deficiency in our ability to observe 
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systems, uncertainty refers to the unpredictable, variable and volatile nature of the
natural systems in which humans interact (Mehta et al. 1999). Ecological systems
are dynamic, non-equilibrium systems that are characterised by a high degree
of variability and volatility (e.g. in the case of extreme weather events). Chaos,
randomness and stochastic processes are the order of the day (Scoones 2004).
Modellers and climate scientists refer to this as aleatory uncertainty – the natural
fuctuations, a high degree of variability and disequilibrium dynamics having
unknown efects (AchutaRao 2016; see Chapter 2). All three sites discussed in
this book are highly dynamic and uncertainty is writ large in their landscapes.
For example, ecological uncertainty is manifested in the ever-changing rhythms
of the river that gobbles up and creates new islands in the Sundarbans; the erratic
rainfall in Kutch; and the impacts of extreme rainfall events, sea-level rise and
fooding on marginal, low-lying lands in Mumbai. 
However, often such endemic uncertainties get framed as risks rather than 
being acknowledged as a fundamental property of the system. Damodaran et al.
(Chapter 3) map this friction by analysing the colonial interventions in marginal 
environments of Kutch and the Sundarbans. They argue that owing to the 
stabilising and normalising instinct pursued by the rulers, these environments 
were often framed as environmental extremes which needed to be normalised 
and tamed. For instance, in Kutch, the colonial administration linked migration 
not to pastoral rhythms and coping strategies but exclusively to rainfall defcit 
and weather uncertainty. Well irrigation, consequently, became the widely 
accepted ofcial response. 
Knowledge politics and uncertainty 
A post-structural understanding of knowledge is essentially grounded in the 
belief that knowledge is socially constructed and inherently plural and partial 
(Haraway 1988). Thus, diferent actors frame uncertainty diferently, and this 
is primarily guided by the knowledge systems in which they are embedded 
and these, in turn, result in knowledge-based uncertainties. This may be due 
to diferent interpretations and diferent normative judgements about a certain 
event or a long-drawn-out process spread across a particular time scale (Weick 
1995; Klinke and Renn 2002). For example, fooding can be viewed as a climate 
event or a failure of governance in Mumbai (Chapter 6) and villagers have 
diverse interpretations of the cyclical nature of droughts in Kutch (Chapter 4). 
These interpretations can be shaped by certain assumptions, value judgements 
about particular resources (e.g. the coastline as a resource frontier for estate and 
industrial development in Kutch and Mumbai vs. a rich ecosystem sustaining 
livelihoods), biases and political commitments as in the sedentary bias associated 
with pastoralism (see Chapter 4). 
These framings highlight how climate realities and futures are socially and 
politically constructed by diferent social groups, communities and institutions, 
and how these constructions often get fed into specifc types of – and often 
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contrasting – responses. Thus, framing uncertainty as a “monster” would entail 
a diferent set of responses (e.g. taming, controlling and reducing it through 
better scientifc modelling; see Chapter 2) as opposed to framings that call for 
“living with uncertainty” and should lead to policies and programmes which 
are more locally grounded with possible socially just outcomes. For example, 
when policymakers in Gujarat often refer to “reducing” uncertainty, they are 
largely referring to the gaps in information, that is, epistemological uncertainty 
(Chapter 4). However, as we show, these notions are also mediated by certain 
knowledge frames and institutional dynamics that eventually shape responses to 
climate-induced uncertainty. 
Several chapters in this book highlight this contrast in diferent sites and spaces. 
For example, Mehta et al. (Chapter 2) and Movik et al. (Chapter 7) highlight this 
divergence at the interface of science and policy, while the ethnographic insights 
from Srivastava et al. on Kutch (Chapter 4), Ghosh, Kjosavik and Bose on the 
Sundarbans (Chapter 5) and Adam et al. on Mumbai (Chapter 6) show how 
these binaries get fed into institutional responses that are too often short-sighted, 
reactive and anti-poor, as well as antithetical to inherent variability intrinsic to 
these environments. For example, in Mumbai, the building of structural defence 
mechanisms and concretisation eforts against fooding are a display of this partial 
approach to addressing complex environmental concerns and uncertainties, with 
the result that fooding proliferates and often worsens the situation (Chapter 6). 
A similar techno-centric approach is driving the embankment politics in the 
Sundarbans (Chapter 5). 
However, uncertainties are not only about the absence of knowledge; they 
also have diverse material and embodied manifestations often articulated through 
cognitive, emotive and behavioural reactions (Scoones and Stirling 2020). In 
this sense, uncertainty is irreducible; something active, present and modulated 
through actors’ “sense of confdence and control” (Penrod 2007: 664). Actors 
attach meanings to certain events, create plots (Hastrup 2013) and conviction 
narratives (Tuckett and Nikolic 2017) to make sense of uncertainty, and devise a 
future course of action. 
Several studies have documented how communities who are highly exposed 
to climate variability adapt to uncertainty (Scoones 1994; Mehta 2005; Rudiak-
Gould 2009; Hastrup 2013). In Kutch, for example, local communities have 
conventionally been equipped to deal with drought-related uncertainties and 
have adopted diverse strategies to cope and live with water scarcity (Mehta 
2005). This is also linked to the practices of anticipation (Hastrup 2013), whereby 
people attempt to predict, forecast and prepare for both immediate and distant 
futures drawing on local cosmologies and indigenous traditions. However, the 
increasingly radical nature of uncertainties is creating manifold challenges for 
these IK systems. 
Although policymakers and scientists tend to concede that more accurate 
information may help “tame” the radical nature of these uncertainties, the 
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unknowns of climate change are massive and these often intersect with other 
“uncertain” drivers of change that compound or cascade into existing problems 
related to environmental conditions, such as water quality, health, and food 
and energy security (Chapter 2; also see Conway et al. 2019). This has also led 
many scholars to recognise that climate is much more than a mere “scientifc” 
fact; it is a combination of social and natural processes (Hastrup 2013). Thus, 
the prevailing scientifc knowledge needs to be understood as a convergence of 
broader processes, coalitions, motivations, meanings, social and ethical framings, 
rather than just a natural scientifc framing (Shackley and Wynne 1996). 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, there is now a growing acknowledgement that 
climate science is better at dealing with uncertainties arising due to macro trends 
such as temperature extremes and sea-level rise than understanding efects at the 
local level due to downscaling challenges and intersections with other drivers 
of change (Bhave et al. 2016; see Chapter 2). These include impacts of land use 
change, water management trends and socio-political and economic processes, 
which can increase uncertainties for local people (see Swart et al., 2009). These 
can be described as the “envelope of uncertainty” (Wilby and Dessai 2010) that 
intersects with social, political, economic, cultural and scientifc drivers that are 
multi-scalar in nature (Gajjar et al. 2018). These drivers also limit the adaptive 
capacity and pathways to address climate-induced uncertainties (Tschakert 2007; 
Solecki et al. 2017). It is for these reasons that the abstraction of climate as an 
objective and a distanced phenomenon has been criticised and the need for more 
nuanced approaches underlined. It is critical to unpack the understandings of 
what counts as climate change, how it is known and unevenly experienced, and 
how power and political economy mediate these interactions (Eriksen et al. 2015;
Nightingale 2016; Watts et al. 2017). 
The political economy of uncertainty 
As much as uncertainty is natural to a system, it is also created and sustained 
as the human, ecological and socio-political systems interact in discreet ways. 
Uncertainties have diferential impacts on local people because these are mediated 
and experienced diferently by axes of diference arising due to gender, ethnicity 
and class, thus exacerbating the vulnerabilities of ordinary people (Adger 1999; 
Tschakert 2007; Lemos et al. 2016). 
In many ways, and to paraphrase Wynne (1992), climate change may not be as
apocalyptic as it is made out to be in the models, or, for some, the “apocalypse”
(caused by other political, social or economic factors and exacerbated by climate
change) has already happened or they have learned to cope or adapt to these
changes. These may be a product of intersectional diferences arising due to gender,
sexuality, age, ableism, caste, class or race, historical or political arrangements
such as citizenship, insecure land tenures as well as ownership and access to
natural resources. Thus, climate change responses and impacts at the local level
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land, water and forests, markets and the economy and institutions and governance
across scales (Puri 2015). For example, Damodaran et al. (Chapter 3) show how
colonial interventions and imaginaries of the environmental “normal” were
experienced and discussed diferently by layers of society, communities, experts
and government ofcials across the colonial and early post-colonial periods. 
Various chapters across the volume explore the diverse range of institutions, 
processes and structures (climate-related and otherwise) which infuence and are 
shaped by ecological uncertainties such as foods, droughts, cyclones, rainfall 
variability and extreme weather events. In all three sites, dominant pathways to 
deal with uncertainty and climate change range between capitalist and growth-
driven trajectories (Mumbai and Kutch) to apathy and neglect of the vulnerabilities 
of poor people (the Sundarbans). To understand these intersections, we build on 
Douglass and Miller’s (2018) conception of compounded disasters, looking at how 
spatial and/or temporal proximity of ecological, epistemic and political economy 
uncertainty can have compounding and cascading efects. For example, in the 
Sundarbans (Chapter 5), slow stressors such as salinity intrusion and coastline 
erosion gradually erode livelihood resources, culminating in varying forms of 
distress diversifcation and leading to compounded uncertainties. This, as we 
elaborate in various chapters, is a diversifcation towards less proftable, more 
precarious and more marginal livelihood activities. 
Most of the research was concluded in 2018, but, wherever possible, we have 
tried to update our fndings in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. In all three 
sites, existing climate uncertainties are compounded as they intersected with the 
COVID-19 pandemic. For example, cyclones Amphan and Yash which struck 
in May 2020 and 2021 destroyed agricultural lands and shelter, and severely 
increased the vulnerabilities of the islanders who were struggling simultaneously 
from the fallout of COVID-19-related measures. Between March and May 2020, 
in particular, the pandemic-induced lockdown phases contributed to reverse 
migration, reduced remittances, food insecurity and livelihood loss by limiting 
trade and reducing employment opportunities across sites. 
Bridging perspectives: towards transformative politics and
pathways 
Various chapters of the book demonstrate how uncertainty has created a form of 
anxiety and alarm for various actors across scales, thus shaping social and political 
responses. Through diferent examples of colonial interventions (Chapter 3), or 
present policy discourses around pastoralism (Kutch), food governance (Mumbai) 
or embankment politics (the Sundarbans), various chapters demonstrate that 
an excessive focus on techno-managerial solutions has provided only limited 
solutions in addressing uncertainties in these marginal environments. Usually, 
the perspectives from the “above” and their solutions prevail and governments 
have largely tended to ignore the more place-based experiences and assessments 
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In Chapter 7, Movik et al. demonstrate how stakeholder dialogues and 
roundtables were organised as an attempt to break down disciplinary and other 
divides and bring diverse actors together (also see Bhatt et al. 2018). However, these 
bridging spaces are also not power neutral and the power imbalances between 
and across the “above”, “middle” and “below” are critical. Methodologically, 
roundtables became an efective way of understanding the discursive, material 
and institutional confgurations that shape the understanding and response to 
uncertainty. Thus, a sustained efort is required in bringing to the fore hidden 
and alternative perspectives, plural ways of valuation and epistemic diversity to 
foster transformative, socially just and inclusive development. 
What does transformative change look like and what practices, politics
and knowledges are required? While there are many diverging views of
what constitutes transformation, a general consensus is that it goes beyond
marginal or incremental change, is non-linear and challenges the status quo of
existing development structures and paradigms (Pelling 2011; O’Brien 2012;
Mehta et al. 2021). How are these changes enacted or facilitated? Scoones et al.
(2020) refer to three approaches to understanding transformation: structural
(fundamental ways in which production and consumption are organised and
governed), systemic (intentional change to steer complex systems towards
normative goals) and enabling approaches (fostering values of agency, justice
and capabilities), and emphasise that embracing enabling approaches is key to
transformative change. 
Building on the notion of systemic change, in this volume, we attempt to 
seek out bottom-up pathways of transformation in marginal environments that 
are characterised by radical uncertainty. Although unequal structural conditions 
shape people’s perception, experience and response to climatic uncertainty 
locking them into maladaptive pathways or distress diversifcation (Chapters 
4–6), we also observe inspiring initiatives that are seeking to challenge incumbent 
knowledge systems and power relations. In this regard, we follow Few et al.
(2017) in underlining transformation as initiatives and practices that go beyond 
incremental changes and challenge systemic inequalities and ultimately resulting 
in a fundamental reorientation of power relations, governance regimes, value 
systems and conceptions of well-being (Pelling et al. 2015). 
In this vein, various chapters discuss the notion of hybrid knowledge (Chapters 
7 and 8) and hybrid alliances from the “above”, “middle” and “below” that 
are emerging to respond to various climate-related uncertainties, by ofering 
alternative pathways that are attempting to bridge perspectives and experiences 
across the domains. Here, the role of the “middle” as interlocutors is key. For 
example, in the Sundarbans, collaborative eforts between NGOs and local 
communities are helping restore deltaic ecology and livelihoods. Similarly, in 
Kutch, civil society organisations and pastoralists are challenging dominant state 
paradigms regarding drylands and pastoralism and working towards ensuring 
livelihoods security while enhancing biodiversity (Mehta and Srivastava 2020; 
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Although such initiatives provide the scope to reframe nature–society relations,
they also involve a delicate power relationship between diferent stakeholders, thus
begging the question of who is imagining what and for whom? Which perspectives
remain hidden and why, and what needs to be done to bring them to the fore?
More importantly, how can bottom-up practices foster socially just pathways in
the face of regressive politics, authoritarianism and shrinking civic spaces? How
can opaque institutional practices of incumbent powers concerning the state,
business and science be opened up and made accountable to the needs of the poor
and marginalised sections? We argue that transformations are by their very nature
multiple and contested and are closely associated and shaped by understandings of
culture, place, identity and contingent conditions within the political economy
(Brown and Westaway 2011; Scoones et al. 2015). For example, while local
communities are afected by the here and now, transformation is usually associated
with changing wider systems that are historically enmeshed in unequal power
relations, landscape imaginaries and ecological changes (Mehta et al. 2021). Thus,
what counts as transformation is not straightforward. It involves critical questions
about scale, attribution, temporality, accountability, responsibility and ethics. 
In this book, we highlight some of these tensions and dilemmas as the “above”, 
“middle” and “below” shape and respond to diferent dimensions of climate-
related uncertainties in diverse settings in India. We also ofer emerging evidence 
on bridging these divides, while being alert to the structural drivers of power 
and inequity. Ultimately such bridging eforts will help facilitate more plural, 
inclusive and decentralised ways of understanding, embracing and living with 
uncertainty that can potentially open up pathways for socially just transformative 
engagement and politics around climate change. 
***************************************** 
Note 
1 Living on $1.9 consumption a day (Lee et al. 2021). 
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FIGURE 2.1 Flooding in Mumbai during the monsoon (Photo credit: Wikimedia 
commons). 
Introduction 
Uncertainty is often considered to be a super wicked problem or a monster by scientists 
and policymakers (van der Sluijs 2005; Curry and Webster 2011). In climate 
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by eforts to minimise and control it, and “attempts to quantify it in one way 
or another” (Hallegatte et al. 2012: 10). This approach has been increasingly 
critiqued for neither providing a useful basis for meaningful policy responses 
nor refecting the lived realities of people (Wilby and Dessai 2010). Alternative 
perspectives have emerged over recent years that have focused on embracing 
uncertainty through “robust” decision-making (Lemos et al. 2016; Kirchhof 
et al. 2015) or engaging with and integrating local or indigenous understandings 
through citizen science (Panda 2016; D’Souza and Kale 2018) (Figure 2.1). 
While there is now quite a rich literature focusing on indigenous experiences 
and knowledges of climate change and uncertainty (Crate and Nuttall 2009; 
Carey 2010; Rudiak-Gould 2013), there are still gaps in how uncertainties are 
understood across a range of actors involved in envisioning climate scenarios 
and models and translating them into policy. In this chapter, we examine how 
uncertainty is understood by climate scientists and policymakers at national and 
sub-national levels considered the “above” in this volume. This complements 
studies of how individuals, households and organisations at local levels (the 
“below”) understand uncertainty and climate change, which is the focus of most 
of the chapters in this volume. We are particularly interested in how uncertainties 
are represented in policy debates and whether conceptualisations of climate-related
uncertainties from the “below” are taken into account in scientifc assessments. 
To do this, we draw on insights from existing literature, complemented by data 
from semi-structured interviews and roundtable discussions in Norway, India 
and the United Kingdom. 
As discussed in the introduction to this volume, conceptualisations of 
uncertainty are varied and are embedded in diferent realms of knowledge 
and disciplinary traditions. Three types of uncertainties are relevant for our 
discussion (see Mehta and Srivastava 2020 and Chapter 1, this volume). Firstly,
aleatoric uncertainties referring to natural fuctuations, high degree of variability 
and disequilibrium dynamics having unknown efects (cf. AchutaRao 2016); 
secondly, knowledge or epistemic uncertainties, which refers to indeterminate 
knowledge about changes and their impacts (Field et al. 2012; Scoones and Stirling 
2020); and thirdly, uncertainties linked to larger political economy conditions, 
including unanticipated outcomes due to socio-political interventions and how 
they are experienced by diverse groups (Wynne 1992; Mehta et al. 1999). All these 
uncertainties are experienced, framed and interpreted diferently by diferent 
actors and are linked to relations of power that justify diferent institutional 
practices and responses (Rein and Schön 1993). 
Uncertainty is at the core of the climate change problem. The IPCC has slowly 
changed its stance on uncertainty. From a preoccupation with reducing and 
mastering uncertainty, it is now focusing more on how to manage and cope
with uncertainty and defnes uncertainty as “[a] state of incomplete knowledge 
that can result from a lack of information or from disagreement about what 
is known or even knowable” (IPCC 2014b: 128). Hawkins and Sutton (2009) 
















Uncertainty from “above” 29 
natural fuctuations or internal variability of the climate system; secondly, the 
fact that diferent models give diferent climate projections to the same radiative 
forcing1; and the third is scenario uncertainty, which are uncertainties around 
future demographic change and emissions pathways. These are sometimes 
referred to as aleatoric, epistemic and policy uncertainty, respectively (Hallegatte 
et al. 2012). For shorter timescales, the two former dominate, whereas for longer 
timescales of many decades, model and scenario uncertainty are dominant. From 
a climate science perspective, the potential to reduce uncertainties in climate 
projections is seen to be only in internal variability and model uncertainty; the 
former only over a decade or so through the integration of observational data 
(Hawkins and Sutton 2009) While aleatoric uncertainty over the longer term 
is, by its very nature, something that cannot be “dealt with” in any meaningful 
sense of the word, epistemic uncertainty can be identifed, acknowledged and 
refected on in policy processes. 
Hallegatte et al. (2012: 4) describe climate change as a situation with “deep 
uncertainty”, namely, where one of the following conditions is met: “(1) a range 
of possible futures without known relative probabilities; (2) multiple divergent 
but equally-valid world-views, including values used to defne criteria of success 
and (3) decisions which adapt over time and cannot be considered independently”. 
They argue that as these uncertainties cannot be eliminated, in either the short 
or most likely longer term, new approaches to deal with these uncertainties are 
needed. This has given rise to a growing “family of approaches” focused on 
providing robust outcomes in the face of a range of possible changes, ranging 
from large computer-based models to qualitative assessments (Interview with a 
climate scientist, UK, January 2017). Approaches include a focus on “no regrets”, 
reversibility and fexibility in the face of uncertainty, building safety margins 
and reducing decision-making time horizons (Hallegatte et al. 2012). Common 
to these approaches is that they acknowledge and “embrace” uncertainty, rather 
than trying to avoid or minimise it and building in planning responses that are 
robust and resilient in the face of a range of possible future climates. 
How climate change uncertainty is understood from the “above” matters
because it is experts, policymakers and scientists who frame how we see climate
change and related policy decisions and funded priority actions. Decisions are
made today that will afect future vulnerabilities – and, in turn, impacts – from
climate change and decisions will have to be made and, indeed, are made, based
on incomplete information. This chapter, thus, explores how uncertainty is
understood and represented by the “above”, by whom and how decisions are
made. We draw on over 30 interviews in India (Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and
Gandhinagar) and 10 in Norway and the United Kingdom. Additionally, we also
draw on insights generated from four roundtable events carried out with scientists,
policymakers as well as representatives from academia and civil society, including
their refections on issues concerning inter- and transdisciplinary working and
social science perspectives (see Chapter 7, this volume). While the roundtables
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all the other interviewees were men, highlighting the need for more women in
climate science/climate decision-making. The fndings are organised around the
following broad questions: (1) how is uncertainty understood by climate scientists
and experts? (2) how is uncertainty presented and represented in policy debates,
including the integration of local knowledges and understandings? and (3) what
are the possible options for generating a more social understanding of uncertainty? 
We hope to demonstrate that while the “above” is deeply aware of the 
challenges of integrating uncertainty in scientifc understandings, most groups 
in the “above” are largely wedded to conventional scientifc assessments such as 
modelling and predictions and “mastering” uncertainty instead of embracing 
uncertainty. The “above” is of course very diverse and this chapter teases out 
this heterogeneity. We also focus on the challenges and frustrations that many 
scientists and experts have with the politics of uncertainty and the challenges of 
communicating uncertainty to decision-makers who do not care for such nuances 
and seek predictability. Finally, despite some attempts to bridge gaps between the 
“above” and “below”, we found that in the Indian context, there is signifcant 
resistance to construct alternative approaches and systems that embrace plural 
knowledges and experiences from “below”. 
Understandings of uncertainty 
The question of how uncertainty is understood by climate scientists, policymakers 
and boundary workers relates not only to whether it is considered as an epistemic 
or ontological issue but also if, and to what extent, local understandings of 
uncertainty are incorporated. We discuss these themes frst by looking at issues 
concerning modelling and parameters and then by investigating the sources 
and nature of uncertainty at diferent spatial and temporal scales. This includes 
challenges concerning downscaling models to fner resolutions as well as dealing 
with uncertainties in long-term projections. 
Uncertain models 
Climate change has traditionally been conceived as a global phenomenon and
conventionally one of the pervasive ways to understand it has been through
computer models. The “globalising instinct” in knowledge making and the
tendency to focus on the global scale can, in part, be attributed to the fact that
the climate system is hugely complex and eforts to gain an understanding of the
dynamics have largely been driven by the construction of General Circulation
Models or GCMs (Edwards 2010). Because Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) infuence
systems of circulation, modellers argue that it is a tricky exercise to scale down
models to lower levels such as the regional or the local. This is the premise on which
the algorithms and parameters underpinning GCMs are based (Lahsen 2005). 
All models, including GCMs, are simplifed representations of complex systems
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2005). At the centre of the scientifc practice is the creation of boundaries and
distinct binaries (Douglas 1986) between the subjective and the objective, between
the abstract climate and the particularities of weather (Hulme 2016; Heymann
2018). The abstract and supposedly “objective” is represented by the hard science
of modelling which can ignore or externalise the subjective dimensions of
uncertainties or neglect their political dimensions ( Jasanof 2009). Such scientifc
approaches are just one of the many ways people anticipate and prepare for the
future and need to be viewed together with the day-to-day strategies of people
who live with the uncertainties of climate (Hastrup 2013, see Chapters 3–6,
this volume). However, a certain politics of knowledge results in particular
domains with so-called hard science gaining authority over the others. Yet, all
forms of knowledge (including so-called expert knowledge) are culturally and
socially embedded and moulded by particular social, power and gender relations
(as demonstrated in previous chapters). Models are also embedded in narratives
and storylines about a future based on certain assumptions (Hajer 1995) but gain
authority over other forms of knowledge through a range of political practices and
boundary-ordering devices (Shackley and Wynne 1996; Heymann 2018). 
These models, however, are ridden with uncertainty as it is a fraught exercise 
to represent the complexity of processes and climate in future. For example, 
GCMs aim to represent the relationship between two fuid and chaotic systems: 
the oceans and the atmosphere. Characterising such systems is virtually 
impossible using current theories of non-linear dynamic systems, particularly in 
situations involving transient changes of parameter values (Dyson 2015; Curry 
2017). Sources of uncertainty include the structure of the model, the selection 
and function of particular parameters included in models as well as uncertainties 
related to the data used which are also derived from a variety of sources. In climate 
change, much uncertainty derives from imprecision, also through attempts to 
deal with disparate sources and sets of data. Furthermore, measuring devices 
and instruments can be unreliable or change over time and these are themselves 
models of a kind. Only 10% of the information gathered is raw data, and the rest 
has been processed through some sort of model, a phenomenon Edwards (2010) 
describes as “shimmering”. Added to these sources of uncertainty is technical 
uncertainty regarding the computational implementation of these models. 
The challenges of modelling such fuid and complex interlinked systems are 
exemplifed by what Dyson (2015) terms “fudge factors” such as clouds and, 
to some extent, aerosols. The stochastic nature of clouds makes it extremely 
hard to incorporate cloud behaviour into models. This was refected in several 
interviews with Indian scientists working on climate change models, who stated 
that even “one cloud in a model is difcult to model” (Interview with scientist, 
New Delhi, May 2017, NCMRF). By contrast, a scientist in the Ministry for 
Earth Sciences was optimistic about gaining knowledge about how “how 
clouds react, develop and interact. While these processes need to be understood 
from a range of disciplines including physics and mathematics, I am optimistic 










32 Lyla Mehta et al. 
source of uncertainty is aerosols. These are “tiny particles in solid/liquid phase 
ubiquitously dispersed in the atmosphere” (Moorthy et al. 2016, 53) and have 
climate forcing potential due to their optical, microphysical and chemical 
properties (ibid.). Aerosols impact climate directly by interacting with incoming 
solar and outgoing terrestrial radiations. They also have indirect efects as they 
alter cloud properties (Srivastava 2017). Their dispersion and efects on climate 
are extremely challenging to model, not least due to lack of data on emissions that 
are a signifcant source of aerosols. According to a scientist in Kutch (Gujarat), 
models have a weak emission inventory in India because emission inventories 
have mainly developed in Europe. In Kutch, for example, industrial expansion 
has led to an increase in aerosols, which, in turn, can increase cloud cover but 
not necessarily more rain. It could infuence the incidence of extreme weather 
events such as tropical cyclones (Srivastava 2017). A scientist from Kutch argued: 
Aerosols are challenging in the Indian context. They are difcult to
understand and need more time and computational models. How are these
particles parametrized with rainfall? If this is not done, predictions are not
possible. The dangers of ignoring this is that prediction reliability is less
than 40% […]. Clouds for example may exist according to meteorological
parameters but if aerosols are not taken into consideration, predictions
could fail. 
(Scientist October 2016, Kutch) 
As stated earlier, the challenge according to the IPCC is to learn to manage
uncertainty. In the Fifth Assessment Report, the IPCC (2014a) acknowledges that 
there are uncertainties that we will never know and that the best response is to 
understand and cope with them. For the IPCC, 
uncertainties arise at the level of observations (measurements for natural 
phenomena and some socio-economic statistics, possibly survey data for 
other socio-economic, political and cultural issues) and from how the data 
from observations are turned into indicators used in the assessment (e.g. by 
combinations of variables, statistical methods) (Swart et al. 2009: 4). 
Scientifc assessments and results are weighed across this spectrum of confdence, 
but here too, there is room for bias and value judgements (Curry and Webster 
2011). Computer simulations are used to represent “aspects of the climate that are 
extremely difcult to observe […] and explore the system that would otherwise 
be impenetrable” (Curry and Webster 2011: 1668). 
The challenges of modelling uncertainty 
Nobody we interviewed denied the problem of climate change. All interviewees 
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own observations of climate change examples. A meteorologist in Norway 
observed that: 
The main characteristic of the weather in Norway is variability and 
temperature diferences can be rather large. From our measurements 
and data over a span of 50 years we see that the temperature is rising, 
and that precipitation generally has increased. Flash fooding and intense 
precipitation over limited areas for 1–3 hours causing a lot of damage has 
also increased. These need to be taken into account for future planning, 
e.g. in cities, drainage etc. The trends we are observing were not there 
earlier, and they are in tune with what is coming out of the IPCC reports. 
(Expert from the Norwegian Meteorological Institute August 2016, Oslo) 
A central question is what can – and cannot – models cover? A crucial choice
that modellers have to make is to choose what parameters to include and how.
Given that modellers cannot capture the whole range of issues and uncertainties
in their models, how do you accommodate the efects of land use changes, for
instance? There are diverse sources of epistemic uncertainty which may cascade
into other types of uncertainty related to models, parameters and assumptions.
A climate researcher in a government institution in Gujarat highlighted this
as follows: 
In research, all predictions are based on projections. My research is on 
Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) and how uncertainty is accounted in emissions. 
The IPCC’s emission scenarios are based on the natural course of emissions 
in the atmosphere and energy (direct fossil fuel burning) accounts for 
70 percent of GHG emissions. But there is a lot of uncertainty in these 
emission scenarios due to the limitations of models and the baselines. So, 
if there is so much uncertainty in the data, methodology and also emission 
factor (e.g. the ash contents are diferent for diferent resources and depend 
on how they are burnt, namely, aerobically, anaerobically or incomplete 
burning), how does it infuence and guide our projections? 
(Interview September 2016, Gujarat) 
Another modeller based at a research institute in Norway told us that the 
uncertainties associated with physiographic parameters, afected by socio-
economic factors such as urban development plans and patterns of land use 
change, will afect modelling; however, tackling them remains challenging: 
We have no idea how diferent development scenarios take place – for 
example, if a hotel will be built on the coast in Greece and how will it 
afect land use changes? All the uncertainty I can deal with is reduced to 
the distribution of non-probability […] We don’t capture change when 
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population dynamics. We make large-scale global assumptions; we don’t 
capture these kinds of (socio-economic) changes. 
(Modeller August 2016, Oslo) 
In India, climate models are a relatively recent development. India’s nodal 
department for weather- and climate-related information and analysis, the 
Indian Meteorological Department’s (IMD) models have only evolved relatively 
recently which limits their applicability in terms of establishing baselines and 
useful, long-term trends. According to two scientists from a forecasting institute 
in New Delhi: 
We want to predict everything, but our models are old and hence our
predictions are based on old models. We are using information from old
satellites from the 1980s and 1990s. Only recently do we have better data
and improved models. Before the 1990s, the IMD only used observational
data and charts, hence the experience of IMD with models has been
very limited. Currently there is a cult like faith in modelling and hence
there is a major demand for our models. However, there will always be
uncertainty. For example, if data is collected within 1 and half hour and
it is 150 km away from Delhi there will be uncertainty. Even with the
best model, surprises can happen even with the best input/data. I am sure
even in 200 years there will be uncertainty. Modelling is not a perfected
science. 
(Interviews May 2017, New Delhi) 
For a climate scientist in Norway, uncertainty stems from models (and 
parameterisation), natural variability and social systems. “Some uncertainties can 
be narrowed down but there are limitations in the modelling exercise. Even 
though models have improved a lot over the past 20 years and are now fner in 
scale, there is still a lot of complexity” (Interview August 2016, Oslo). Despite 
acknowledging these complexities, most climate scientists we interviewed hoped 
that with better knowledge, better modelling and better parameters uncertainties 
could be reduced or addressed since they are keen to provide certainty and data to 
make decisions. Our interviews suggest that many modellers in practice remain 
committed to reducing and mastering uncertainty rather than aiming to have 
models that speak to coping and learning to live with uncertainty. 
The challenge of downscaling 
Climate change models are associated with a cascade of uncertainties that increase 
with downscaling (Wilby and Dessai 2010). These relate to uncertainties of 
future emissions of GHGs and sulphate aerosols as discussed above; uncertainties 
of the response of the climate system to these changes at global and national 
scales and the spatial and temporal distribution of these impacts (Dessai
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and Sluijs 2007). In a scalar view of uncertainty, the cascade of uncertainty 
proceeds from diferent demographic and socio-economic pathways and then 
translates into GHG emissions, gets picked up by models by way of outcomes, 
which then translate into various human and natural impacts that further 
trickle into the adaptation responses (Wilby and Dessai 2010). However, socio-
economic pathways are particularly hard to capture. Thus, the socio-political 
unknowns of climate change are massive, and these often intersect with other 
“uncertain” drivers of change and may exacerbate or snowball into existing 
problems related to environmental conditions such as water quality, health and 
food and energy security (Hastrup 2013). The chapters that follow demonstrate
this cascading view of uncertainty in Mumbai, Kutch and the Sundarbans. As 
noted earlier in this chapter, there has been a distinct “globalising instinct” in 
climate change science, as scientists working on constructing GCMs have mainly 
been preoccupied with the global dynamics of CO2 emissions, circulation and 
efects (Curry 2017). There is another dimension to scaling down as well, what 
Schneider and Walsh refer to as the “politics of zoom” (2019). This emphasises 
how downscaled visualisations of the impact of climate change tend to replicate 
the “hegemonic dynamics of their global sources” and tend to “cancel out 
conficting local data” (Schneider and Walsh 2019: 5). Scaling down to lower 
spatial scales is, therefore, considered challenging. 
The temporal scales in climate change models are another challenge. The 
climate models are made to look at the efects of emissions or scenarios, and these 
diferences only come into play after about 30 years so every uncertainty before 
that is not really dealt with. The models often also do not capture all the changes 
and uncertainties at the local level. There is a fundamental misconception that 
climate models can do anything in the here and now, locally. 
Interviews refect that uncertainties are particularly problematic at regional 
and local scales. For the most part, uncertainties are described in epistemic terms, 
for example, that models and science are “not up to it yet” or that science still 
needs to improve. Uncertainty in models, therefore, can potentially reduce the 
veracity of claims around climate change and limit the potential to meaningfully 
inform policy (see “below”). Most of the scientists we interviewed acknowledge 
the uncertainties associated with downscaling. This is especially true in dense 
urban settings. A hydro-climatologist from Mumbai stated: 
Downscaling from global circulation models to fner resolutions is a failure 
because the science is not properly understood. At a fner resolution they 
are failing at a miserable scale. For example, take Mumbai. There is much 
talk about links between urban island heat efect and extreme rainfall. 
But there are so many multiple factors: the buildings and city structure 
have much to do with this. That Mumbai is getting more extreme rainfall 
due to the urban heat island is actually a wrong hypothesis and scientists 
have started to realise this. When the monsoon starts there is nothing, 
all temperature goes down, so urban heat island doesn’t really level up. 
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What is exactly happening is that there is huge fux of moisture [coming 
in from the Arabian sea and that creates lots of problems because of the 
urban structure (i.e. very tall buildings that change the patterns of wind 
and rainfall). Even two buildings between roads can have an efect on 
urban precipitation. The resolution will be in the range of 2–5 km. But 
in climate models the resolution is more than 100 km. Even if we are 
going for regional models and the range is 4 km there will still be huge 
uncertainty. These phenomena are not really captured in models and even 
if we have the scientifc understanding it is very difcult to represent that 
understanding into models. Diferent models try and parametrize these 
cases in a coarse scale and when we use diferent parameter scales, this also 
leads to sources of uncertainty whilst looking at the urban scale. 
(Interview with scientist April 2016, Mumbai) 
Singh and AchutaRao (2018) highlight the aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties 
inherent in modelling rainfall, especially monsoon (see below) behaviour and 
emphasise the challenges of downscaling especially since GCMs are coarse in 
resolution since they cover up to 200 kilometres in grids. Regional Climate 
Models (RCMs) are supposed to address some of these challenges; however, 
they also add further to the uncertainty existing in GCMs due to the “high 
computational costs resulting in a limited number of simulations being available. 
Also, downscaling further adds to the uncertainty that already exists in the global 
coupled model simulations” (Singh and AchutaRao 2018: 2). For example, a 
scientist from Gandhinagar told us that in India, Gujarat is one state that has 
produced an inventory of regional-level emissions. But she concurs that planning 
regarding adaptation and mitigation can be difcult based on regional-level data, 
as these are not communicated to global bodies. The international organisations 
rely on national-level data and this can be misleading. For instance, the state of 
Gujarat has a diferent emissions scenario from the rest of the country. The per 
capita consumption of electricity is almost double that of the national average 
due to the high number of industries and the very industrialised and developed 
coastline (Scientist September 2016, Gandhinagar). 
These challenges of uncertainty come clearly to the fore in drylands such as 
Kutch, which are characterised by high variability in precipitation and where 
rainfall patterns vary every few kilometres. Global projections on climate change 
are not particularly helpful when it comes to state-level planning, argues an IMD 
scientist in Gandhinagar: 
Though it is projected that there would be an average rise of 1–1.5 degrees 
in the global temperature, that is not helpful for decision-making when 
you have to plan for this kind of warming at local stations. You need to 
make a proper strategy, probably to make people aware of the grilling heat 
that is likely to afect people in coming future. 
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Automatic Weather Stations (AWS) can help provide more locally attuned
forecasts, but there are only three in a large district such as Kutch that
function well (Interview, October 2016, Kutch), while there are about 60 in
Mumbai (Interviews with Bombay Municipal Corporation ofcial, January
2016, Bombay). Due to the massive weather variability and massive changes
happening every 10 kilometres, a dense network is required every 10–15
km to record variability. However, in remote places in areas like Kutch,
poor internet connectivity and limited funding impede the efciency of
AWS. This discussion highlights that global and RCMs have limits when it
comes to predicting impacts at the local level and managing with local-level
uncertainties and variations, especially in highly variable locations such a
drylands. India, at least, is still far of in having robust systems at the local
level to improve weather and climate forecasts in order to provide predictions
and support to agencies working on the impacts of climate change in areas 
such as water security, food security and vector-borne diseases (Interview,
October 2016, Kutch). 
Forecasts and projections: uncertainty in the short,  
medium and long term 
While climate modellers are concerned with the long-term projections of what is 
likely to happen in the future, the science of weather forecasting is dealing with 
the short-term, day-to-day predictions of precipitation patterns, temperature 
changes, wind speeds and other weather features. For meteorologists, weather 
and climate are often considered to be a seamless continuum. An expert from 
the Norwegian meteorological ofce told us: “When scientists talk about 
climate change, they talk about the past and they talk about the future. Weather 
forecasting is a few days in between”. By contrast, lay people rarely distinguish 
between “weather” and “climate” (see quote below). The same meteorologist 
discusses the temporal aspect of climate change and the distinction between 
weather and climate change: 
I talked with a taxi driver some weeks ago. He did not know that I was 
a meteorologist, so he told me that they had had three diferent climates 
that day. It is difcult for lay people to distinguish between weather and 
climate, and I don’t think it is necessary to expend much efort to make 
people see the diference. I think we should rather look at it as a continuum, 
a sort of seamless change between the past climate, the current weather, 
and future climate projections. Of course, we are providing the weather 
forecasts, as professionals, we are distinguishing very much. But in fact, it 
is a seamless change. For me, the analysis of climate change, the weather 
and climate projections for the future are part of the seamless production 
of information and services. 
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While short-term weather forecasting is a less uncertain endeavour than 
speculating about long-term efects of GHG emissions, uncertainty looms large. 
In particular, the problem of resolution is a key issue for many weather forecasters. 
As discussed above, rainfall is intrinsically tricky to predict, due to the stochastic 
nature of cloud cover. Several interviewees also mentioned particular challenges 
in forecasting rainfall, both due to extremes and also the uncertainties around 
the monsoon in the Indian context. The following quote from a Mumbai-based 
scientist captures this nicely: 
There are two challenges when we talk about India: The monsoon is one
and the second one is extremes in rainfall patterns. Temperature is not so
difcult and we get good projections on forecast, but precipitation is tricky.
When we heat corns we know when the temperature is high, we know
what will happen, but we don’t know what will pop up. up[…] Rainfall
is like popcorn […] Over and above the challenges of resolution and
parametrization, we just don’t know which corn will pop up or not. With
temperature there is less uncertainty but with moisture we never know when
it precipitates and how. It could precipitate here or there, now or after 12
hours and these patterns can disturb the entire balance. So from a climate/ 
weather perspective these are the uncertainties we are talking about. 
(Scientist October 2016, Mumbai) 
This often makes forecasting difcult for the IMD, given the challenges in 
predicting the Indian monsoon. The same scientist stated that climate 
models are failing to simulate the monsoon trends and climate projections
thus often do not work. It perhaps makes sense to focus on a shorter scale for
models so that they can be more of user and also lead to decision making. 
(Scientist October 2016, Mumbai) 
This implies, thus, the need to cope and manage uncertainties around the 
monsoon and also communicate them appropriately rather than assuming that 
there is confdence in predicting the longer scale. 
Uncertainty in policy and public debates 
The science–policy interface, that is, how scientifc practice/projections are 
translated into decision outcomes also has implications for how uncertainty 
is addressed. While scientists work with uncertainty in terms of probability, 
decision-makers often like to be certain about the outcomes (Bradshaw and 
Borchers 2000) and governments are typically very unresponsive to uncertainty, 
see Chapter 4 for the case of senior bureaucrats in Gujarat. As discussed earlier, 
decision-making is less about mastering uncertainty prerogative of natural science 































Uncertainty from “above” 39 
real terms, there could be two kinds of paradoxes that policymakers encounter: 
excess of information and the lack of time to determine policy options, or the 
time scale lag between resolution of uncertainty and policy decisions (Schneider 
and Kuntz-Duriseti 2002). 
No one disputes that efective communication between science and policy is
necessary to make informed choices regarding decisions on climate change (Dessai
and Sluijs 2007). One of the foremost challenges of climate change decision-making 
is to “translate” and make sense of the models and integrate this into policy- and
decision-making and justify such decisions. As Dosi and Egidi (1991: 152) argue
that – “with uncertainty, information is imperfect and possibly asymmetric, agents
hold diferent beliefs and ‘priors’, and their knowledge of the future is limited.
They can interpret correctly the signals that they receive (and try to do so), but
they do not [and cannot] receive all the signals necessary to make those optimal
choices that would have been taken under perfect information”. This point relates
to the epistemic uncertainty whereby imperfect knowledge leads to uncertainty.
However, these decisions are often located and embedded in structures and
contexts that function, harness and use information in particular ways. These
may be (1) the epistemic networks, (2) fnancial networks, (3) political networks,
(4) discursive networks and (5) performative networks (Hulme 2013). The focus
on quantitative and statistical uncertainty most often hides or ignores the “policy
relevant uncertainty information about the deeper dimensions of uncertainty that
cannot be quantifed” (ibid.: 5). The uncertainties in forecasting and modelling
lead to difculties in translating these issues into policy and public debates. Several
patterns emerged from the interviews that we outline below. These include: 
• The confation of variability and climate change in popular discourse 
• Critique of relevance of models to policymaking 
• Decision-makers may not accept the forecasts from scientists, especially if 
they are uncertain 
• The media may not present the nuances inherent in the forecasts 
• Approaches like ‘robust decision-making’ or similar tend to be more at the 
academic level and do not seem to be gaining much traction in India 
We now examine these issues in depth with the help of the interview material.
An important distinction, which is often confated in popular discourse as well as
decision-making, is between climate variability and climate change (Hulme 2016).
Local people and decision-makers tend to focus on “the here and now” and on the
variability that they experience, rather than long-term climate change. This can be
frustrating for scientists as expressed by a climate scientist in Kutch: 
Climate change and variability are often confated. We need at least 30 
years of data to talk about climate change and one cannot talk about 
climate change with a few years of data. 
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Many of the scientists interviewed spoke of the problems in translating scientifc 
knowledge to decision-making. 
Ministers and others always push scientists for estimates and fgures 
regarding climate change impacts. Climate change science gives you a 
range but they want a fgure for planning crops, breeding programmes etc. 
This is a problem for us working in climate change. How to deal with the 
complexity in models? 
(Scientist January 2015, Kolkata) 
Largely, policymakers tend to focus on what’s happening in microclimates in 
order to be able to act accordingly. For example, they look at predictions for 
agriculture so that they can provide inputs to farmers regarding decisions to plant 
crops (Social scientist 2014, UK). However, they seem to want a lot of certainty 
which is often not possible due to the reasons mentioned above. 
This often leads to difcult relationships between scientists and ofcials. 
Ofcials complain when forecasts are wrong and fail to understand that 
uncertainty is always embedded in forecasts and that we need to live with it 
and work around it. In part, the problem is also that scientists have failed to 
communicate issues concerning uncertainty to the public, the media and the 
government and the probabilistic nature of forecasts. 
In the roundtable held in Oslo, observations in a similar vein were made: 
We often represent research on climate change as a fower, with the
climate system and changes in the climate system, in the middle. Then
the next circle is about impacts on nature and society, and then there
are the petals of the fower, where we get into more sectoral research – 
adaptation and mitigation in transport, adaptation and mitigation in
agriculture, things like that. There is a danger that this view leads to
climate research being a bit like a drunken man who has lost his keys – he
will look under the light of a lamppost, because that is where he can see
something, but it is not necessarily where the keys are. In the same way,
climate science can say something about probabilities of extreme rainfall,
average temperatures, and so on, but that may not necessarily be what
matters to people. 
(Roundtable discussion August 2017, Oslo) 
A geologist working on climate change in the Sundarbans feels very frustrated 
by policymakers who only focus on short-term gains, whilst ignoring climate 
change and also completely lack long-term thinking and planning: 
In 2002, I started talking about sea level rise in the Bay of Bengal and 
vanishing islands but nobody listened to me. The government said: “it’s 
Uncertainty from “above” 41
under control so the sea cannot rise”. Now with all the plans and data in 
place, they are saying: “let it rise”. Despite sea level rise, islands are still 
forming but this is due to geological factors. Everything is unknown and 
we cannot quantify uncertainty. The monsoon forecasts for the Sundarbans 
have failed miserably since 2008. Farmers are now committing suicide all 
over India due to floods and droughts combined. We cannot fight with the 
sea and nature. Even in Japan the tsunami wall failed. Why are cities being 
built in such vulnerable coastal areas, e.g. Bombay? There is no proper 
long-term planning. The government only thinks 10 km around Delhi. 
They focus on scenarios and on lowering costs and less on benefits. Which 
dams or embankments in the country have given the desired results? Has 
anybody been punished for wasting public money?
(Interview January 2014, Sundarbans)
He also argued that mainstream science in India, including engineering, has 
tended to ignore uncertainty. This is because Indian science tends to focus on 
modifying and controlling nature rather than accepting that “we don’t know 
enough […]”. Observing and experiencing nature are both very important. This 
training is absent in Indian science. To understand a place like the Sundarbans, 
one needs a different orientation or mindset” (Interview January 2014, 
Sundarbans).
Most scientists also complained that there is a marked lack of political and 
bureaucratic will to engage with climate science and research. The scientist 
working in Gujarat comments:
Our research will always have recommendation for the government but 
they keep it and forget it! Even in Gujarat which has all the policies in place 
around climate change, integration is not happening – I think the Climate 
Change Department operates only as fund managers, but the policy has not 
yet come (See also Chapter 4 on Kutch, this volume).
We also interviewed social scientists who work on climate change who feel that 
the problem is that policymakers are always looking for easy solutions and that 
natural scientists and social scientists also often cannot agree about uncertainty. In 
a group discussion with natural and social scientists, a social scientist contended 
that
Natural and social sciences ask completely different questions. Natural 
scientists want to provide information to economists, whereas economists 
ask what decisions to take under uncertainty […] It is very difficult 
to translate a natural scientists uncertainty formulation into decision 
making.
(Interview August 2016, Oslo)
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They all acknowledged that communicating uncertainty is difcult, especially 
when you begin to quantify uncertainties: 
There are cascading uncertainties and we can’t quantify all of them. In 
climate change temperature forecast ranges from 2.5 C – 5 C. We need 
to ignore some uncertainties in order to say anything and don’t want to 
live completely in an uncertainty scenario. Of course, a lot depends on 
communicating what we put in our models and quantifcation is only one 
aspect here. We need better communication. 
(Modeller August 2016, Oslo) 
We try to work within standard errors but there exists a dilemma of how 
much uncertainty one should communicate. Natural scientists bring 
facts-based observations. Economists interpret information and we tell 
policymakers what to do. Too much of focus on whether it is 3, 4 or 5 
degrees (i.e., uncertainty) can distract attention from key issues. 
(Economist working on climate change, August 2016, Oslo) 
Natural scientists told us that social scientists tend to focus too much on 
complexity which does not allow decisions to be taken and does not help 
problems to be solved ultimately. By contrast, social scientists said that natural 
scientists have a too narrow view of what uncertainty is and that there is a need 
to work around “uncertainty” as a problem of communication. In the Oslo 
roundtable, a participant, with experience from the IPCC, argued that there are 
a lot of scientists who think we should just ban the word uncertainty altogether 
and instead talk about “how certain are you”? 
Attribution and the uptake of forecasts and projection 
An issue that came up in most interviews concerned problems in attribution, 
over and above the complexity and uncertainty in forecasts and projections. We 
have already discussed the problems of forecasts around the monsoon; however, 
there are little long-term data and trends that provide sufcient evidence that 
the monsoon has changed in response to climate change in terms of average 
precipitation as evident in this statement from a meteorologist at the IMD. 
We do not see long term trends linking climate change with the monsoon. 
Of course, in diferent Indian states, there are diferences in rainfall 
patterns, e.g. Rajasthan has seen changes in rain frequency. There is an 
increase in monsoonal heavy rain and an increasing number of days with 
heavy rain with lighter and moderate rain decreasing. But still on average 
the totals are still roughly the same. 
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India has organised events related to attribution which are attended by
delegates from other countries in the global South. However, attribution
can also be harnessed for political uses. The attribution of heatwaves and
other climatic events is increasingly becoming a contested area as it deals
with questions of responsibility, equity and justice as well as adaptation (see
below). In an interview with two ofcials at the Ministry of Earth Sciences
(MoESs), we were told: 
We need more research on how to do attribution, at present it is 
experimental. We recently had an African Development Bank meeting 
in Ahmedabad looking at attribution of heatwaves and foods. Attribution 
involves use of all available models and assesses historical data over a 
period of time plus diferent variables related to specifc climate events. 
For example, the recent heat waves are attributed to climate change. India 
is leading research on the question of attribution. The use of outputs from 
attribution science can be deployed also in the global arena. India wants to 
use attribution science in climate negotiations. 
(Ofcials Ministry of Earth Science May 2016) 
Attribution issues, however, seem to matter less at the national, state and district 
level. Policymakers and politicians in India are not necessarily concerned about 
whether a certain weather event is attributable to climate change or not in the 
frst place. What matters is the type and nature of response and displaying that 
the prevailing government/state is in control. Largely, the cause of the event 
does not matter to the local electorate (IIT climate scientist January 2018). This 
again underscores the disconnect between the “above” that still has a tendency to 
reduce and master uncertainty v/s the “below” that is fnding ways to live with 
and manage climate and other related uncertainties. 
Also, in dynamic environments like Kutch and the Sundarbans, attribution 
is more difcult because climate change is one of the many issues that people 
have to grapple with in their daily struggle for survival (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
According to a social scientist working on climate change: 
Usually it’s best not to rush to conclusions regarding climate change though 
of course much depends on how ecosystems change and adapt and a lot of 
other relationships. Locals tend to have a far more nuanced perspective […] 
But NGOs tend to attribute and relabel lots of things as climate change in 
order to access money. All development work is now climate change. By 
contrast, people at the forefront of climate change are less likely to label it 
as such. 
(Social scientist UK, July 2014) 
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Local NGOs are foolish to blame local people for all the problems in the 
Sundarbans, e.g. ‘overfshing’ and forest loss. Locals cannot be blamed for 
salinity and fooding […] Sea level rise is the main reason why the islands 
are disappearing. Even tigers are getting homeless in islands where there 
are no people. We need to convince NGOs that local people cannot be 
blamed for a lot of these changes. 
(Scientists January 2014, Kolkata) 
From a development point of view, such simplistic perceptions are also unhelpful 
because local people are vilifed and often not allowed to pursue their traditional 
livelihoods in the name of climate change, often increasing their vulnerabilities 
and insecurities. 
On a positive note, with respect to disaster management, some government 
scientists are happy about the scope for forecasting and are optimistic regarding 
the potential for further improvements. This is especially the case with respect 
to the usefulness of narrowed down uncertainty (scenario bands), in particular 
predicting cyclones: 
We have done well in disaster prediction and threats are detected even 
though there can be some diference between actual intensity compared 
to prediction. With cyclone Aila in 2009, the trend was diferent from 
prediction though with cyclone Phailin in 2013 we did very well. The 
science has improved a lot and is now part of a co-ordinated system and 
network with disaster management authorities. Disaster management cells 
co-ordinate functioning and there are now far lower casualties than 20 
years ago. Of course, we can still improve the models and forecasting but 
overall, I am optimistic about our progress. 
(Scientist at MoES May 2016) 
Hybrid knowledges and social understandings of uncertainty 
As discussed in this volume, approaches are growing that focus on embracing
rather than seeking to avoid uncertainty. They are based on the realisation that
uncertainty should not, and need not, lead to paralysis in action. Thus, while the
traditional view of uncertainty that we have described so far persists both globally
and in the Indian context, there is now an emerging alternative framing that is
gaining ground. According to one of the leading researchers working in this feld: 
We are looking at frameworks and what options we have that are immune 
to uncertainty. [It] is supported by institutions such as the World Bank, 
Rand corporation and so on (…) there are obstacles still in costs, data 
availability etc., but it is developing. 
(UK Researcher January 2017) 
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The “Decision-making under uncertainty society”2 consists of political scientists, 
modellers and others actors who are trying to move away from the “predict and 
act” framework. Robust decision-making is a group of tools, anything from 
“back of the envelope” tools to RAND corporation’s big dataset approaches 
(UK Researcher January 2017; see also Bhave et al. 2016). From a methodological 
perspective, the alternative framing has come a long way in changing the focus of 
adaptation planning away from scenario-led approaches and towards decision-led 
approaches that emphasises the need for fexibility in future planning (echoing 
responses that we have described from the “below” in many chapters of this 
volume). But it is less clear whether and how much traction these approaches have 
beyond academia. Some argue that approaches like “robust decision-making” 
have very little traction among governments who tend to revert to familiar and 
dominant frameworks based on risk assessment. Another UK researcher put it 
this way: “Climate change is not special […] policy makers are not interested if 
you say you do not have an answer, [you] have to pick a model or a scenario and 
go with that” (Interview, February 2017, UK). 
Heymann (2018) contends that the discursive trend to concentrate on global 
models and averages runs counter to the history of climatology as a discipline 
anchored in local experience of climate and weather. The importance of 
downscaling and validating local knowledge is to “humanise” climatology, 
making it accessible and link it to everyday live, knowledge and practice. We 
now turn to focus on the scope to include forms of knowledge that are often 
overlooked or undervalued by the “above”. These include embodied, emotional 
and tacit ways of knowing and representing the world which requires a pluralist 
sensitivity and appreciation for a persistent diversity of understandings (Stirling
et al. 2018). Social scientists studying the “social life of models” tell us that climate 
modelling takes place according to diverse reasoning and across diferent scales 
(Hastrup 2013). While this so-called hard science has largely gained authority over 
other forms of knowledge, all forms of knowledge (including so-called expert 
knowledge) are culturally and socially embedded and moulded by particular 
social, power and gender relations. Indeed, the preceding sections have focused 
on the diferent scientifc and socio-political rationalities that have moulded the 
“above’s” understandings of climate-related uncertainties. Historically, local 
communities have developed practices and strategies to plan for and live with 
ecological uncertainty and variability (Hastrup 2013). Hastrup (2013) argues 
that dealing with climate change involves practices of anticipation, that is, how 
people anticipate the future and prepare for it. For her, scientifc approaches 
are just one of the many modalities of this anticipation alongside the day-to-
day strategies of people who live with uncertainty or make decisions regarding 
changes in climate. These could be seasonal mobility, crop diversifcation or risk-
averse behaviours to cope with resource fuctuation. 
According to Berkes and Berkes (2009), many indigenous systems have 
developed highly appropriate ways to deal with complexity and uncertainty. 
Indigenous knowledge (IK) evolves through adaptive learning based on 
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developing a complex knowledge base of the environment and lessons from 
past mistakes and is thus a kind of post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 
1993). According to Berkes and Berkes (2009), both kinds of knowledge are 
desirable because they have diferent relative strengths and a potential for 
complementarity. IK can also complement more macro perspectives by flling in 
the local scale. However, as argued in Chapter 4 on Kutch, climate change and 
new radical uncertainties profoundly alter previous indigenous anticipations and 
often test tested indigenous system might not help in tackling the new range of 
unpredictability and unknowns. 
Indeed, climate scientists we interviewed working in an interdisciplinary 
institution in Norway acknowledged the limitations of engineering and 
technologically oriented solutions which cannot solve everything. 
Unfortunately, ‘techno-management’ and pipe thinking are very 
problematic and there is too much faith in technological solutions to ‘rescue 
us’. Instead, we need to have more learning and mutual, exchanges across 
diferent groups and levels of expertise. For example, scientists could learn 
from farmers at what temperature it is when crops die and then improve 
threshold scenarios. Policy makers could also make use of this information 
and give guidance to farmers to change their cropping patterns. But it is 
difcult for humans to grasp all of this complexity and learning processes 
embracing uncertainty are key. 
(Discussion with scientists August 2016, Oslo) 
Plural knowledge systems can act as the “bridge”. Historical work by Carey 
(2010) demonstrates how scientifc knowledge about glacial changes in the Andes 
is moulded by power dynamics, economic outcomes, local worldviews and social 
relations. Thus, even the so-called modern forms of knowledge based on western 
science are thoroughly dynamic and imbued with local culture and practice 
(Feyerabend, 1996; Wynne 1996). Thus, neither scientists nor local people are 
homogeneous. The dynamic view of the nature of uncertainty from “below” 
and “above” that we have pursued in this volume opens up the possibility of 
identifying convergences between certain actors and perspectives in local and 
scientifc worlds. Hybrid knowledges can, thus, be a suitable way to tackle 
uncertainty challenges, and a growing number of scientists are seeking to work 
in transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary ways (see also Movik et al., Chapter 7). 
As argued by a professor from Kolkata: 
I have moved out from the conventional academic domain. When we 
started only 2% of fshers used GPS, now 60% use it. Scientists are now 
working with farmers in Kutch and the Sundarbans to revive local crops 
that are resistant to droughts, salinity etc and can survive better in the 
face of cyclones, droughts etc In Mumbai, IIT researchers are developing 
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a food forecasting system. Diferent experts from tidal, atmospheric and 
hydrological sciences will work together and develop a model which will 
have a probabilistic forecast on foods. It will be opened up to community 
(urban people) to get their feedback on what way they can improve it 
further. 
(Interview, January 2014, Kolkata) 
The Met ofce in Norway works in close co-operation with diferent authorities – 
for example, roads, water, energy, agriculture, fsheries, transport and coast – 
who all depend on the weather for their work. They also consult the public 
about how best to provide weather forecasts and information (e.g. mobile apps). 
The 90-minute weather forecast is based on user feedback. We did not fnd 
this same level of user engagement in the IMD in Delhi even though there was 
acknowledgement of the strengths of local weather information and traditional 
knowledges: 
Yes, they [local weather forecasts based on perceptions] are useful in many 
respects, we can fnd out whether local people understand our ‘language’. 
We can also learn how to prepare better, how our information is used and 
what the local confdence in our warnings is. Traditional knowledge can 
be useful for some situations, e.g. a local person based on understanding 
of cloud formation can predict whether there will be thunderstorms etc. 
Farmers through this knowledge can utilise historical evidence, memory 
and observation. This knowledge can work but not always. Animal 
behaviour is similarly to have shown ability to react/predict weather but 
similarly cannot be used much or relied on. But traditional knowledge can 
be use especially for wider communication. 
(Scientists at IMD, Delhi, Interview May 2016) 
Clearly, despite appreciating local traditions and knowledge, this ofcial did not 
see an integration of this knowledge/and perceptions into models as feasible. By 
and large, the scientists we interviewed seemed to imply that scientifc knowledge 
was perhaps better or of a higher level. 
[…] ordinary people may be also decision-makers but it is our duty as 
scientists to explain about the possibilities for the future. The possibilities 
are based on historical records that you really have to take into account that 
the future will not be like the past. I think that is a sort of mission we have 
as scientifc people, to try to explain that. I do not think we will manage 
to convince everybody Religion is something you believe, that is good for 
many people, but science is not a religion, it is about good hypotheses for 
the future, which are based on scientifc work. 
(Interview with scientist in Oslo Met ofce, August 2016, Oslo) 
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A scientist working in Gujarat says he has learnt a lot from farmers regarding the 
agriculture–climate interface. His organisation has organised “listening sessions” 
with farmers and training programmes with farmers, however, with the aim 
to educate the farmers about climate change and also to improve forecasting 
“so we can help farmers”. Even though he acknowledges limits to modelling 
exercises, he thinks local knowledge is in itself difcult if not impossible to 
quantify and feed into models. In that way, rather than hybrid knowledges, most 
of the scientists we interviewed see an unbridgeable epistemic and ontological 
divide between expert and lay knowledge. Scientists in the MoESs plainly stated 
that local knowledge is “not useful in modelling. I don’t think local people can 
give feedback on weather/climate related information […] and don’t think it 
is possible to use local knowledge to further develop models” (Interview with 
MoES Scientists, Delhi May 2016). This was echoed by scientists from the 
National Centre for Medium Range Forecast (NCMRF) on the issue of local 
knowledge and its integration into modelling exercises: “No, they cannot be 
integrated. Model development is very diferent from local perceptions. There 
is so much subjectivity when it comes to observed weather. We are scientists 
want some objectivity and can’t rely on sentiments or emotions” (Interview with 
NCMRF Scientists May 2016). 
Similarly, scientists from a national research institute in Delhi said that it 
was difcult to integrate sociological dimensions in climate models since it was 
not possible to bring narratives together with quantifcation of data, with the 
exception perhaps of Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) which 
can incorporate development aspects and integrate diferent data sources, for 
example, scientifc data with socio-economic aspects (Scientists interviewed May 
2016, Delhi). Most of our interviewees expressed similar reservations although 
one US-based scientist said that bringing in local-level feld information is 
very challenging but might be viable. By contrast, scientists did appreciate that 
interdisciplinary research (especially in the natural sciences) is vital to “connect 
the dots’ and improve scientifc fndings and models across felds, though here 
too it depends on “what skills can tolerate other skills” and the ability of models 
to be re-examined with respect to incorporating feedback” (US-based scientists 
interviewed January 2018, Mumbai IIT). 
In the political realm, a top-down structuring of governance seems to be an 
impediment towards local perceptions making their way into decision-making 
processes, as a former Minister of Environment and Forests in India highlights: 
No, it is not possible at the moment to include local perceptions though 
NGOs as mediators are important. When I was minister, we listened to the 
people and civil society organisations but currently 95% of the information 
fow is top down especially at the centre. 
(Interview with former Minister of Environments and
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This highlights the importance of instituting structural processes at the political 
level if local climate information were to be of greater relevance in macro- as 
well as micro-level decision-making. 
In sum, while the experts we interviewed seemed to acknowledge limits 
to their models and approaches, most of them seem to imply that science or 
scientists have a “mission” regarding climate change. Barring a few exceptions, 
we did not see much evidence of scientists actively trying to incorporate local-
level knowledge and history into their models and methods. In fact, while 
doing the research, we did not fnd much evidence in the Indian context of 
climate scientists working closely with local communities and their indigenous 
knowledge systems to understand climate change-related uncertainties. This is 
unlike emerging alliances in the Arctic and beyond, where scientists are working 
closely with local communities and indigenous peoples to co-produce knowledge 
and understandings of climate change in a bottom-up and democratic manner.3 
There are growing attempts to create plural climate studies frameworks to 
embrace place-based experiences of local people and insights from the critical 
social sciences (see Chakraborty et al. 2021) and also attempts to decolonise 
climate sciences by using indigenous peoples’ experiences and knowledges as the 
starting point ( Johnson et al. 2021). We hope these will gradually make their way 
into mainstream climate science and climate policymaking. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has explored how uncertainty is understood by scientists, decision-
makers and boundary workers and how it is presented and represented in models
and scientifc understandings. We also discussed the science/policy interface and
the challenges in communicating uncertainty before discussing the possibility
of integrating local knowledges and understanding in order to generate a
socially grounded understanding of uncertainty. We found that despite an
acknowledgement of the problems of modelling in capturing and understanding
uncertainty, particularly at regional and local scales, there is a major drive to
improve modelling and predictions to embrace uncertainty and complexity.
Scientists also struggle due to the confation of uncertainty in weather and climate
in popular discourse and the media and the fact that the media do not portray
the nuances of forecasting well, which also impedes future work. Many scientists
were also constrained because their work on forecasts and models was often not
taken seriously or because the probabilistic nature of the models is not deemed
relevant to policymaking. 
The chapter also discussed the growing community of natural and social 
scientists, boundary actors and policy actors, working to develop approaches to 
better refect the “deep uncertainty” in relation to climate change and some 
eforts on the part of a growing community of natural scientists, social scientists 
and policy actors trying to bridge the gap between the “above” and “below”. 
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However, our interviews show that while there has been significant progress in 
developing concepts, large gaps exist in the understanding across the different 
groups, due, in part, to different starting points, languages and priorities (UK 
researcher, March 2017).
We also discussed how the scientific models and scientific data largely focus 
on biophysical factors. However, as the case studies in this book demonstrate, 
biophysical changes interact with socio-economic and other trajectories of 
change causing new vulnerabilities for people and their ecologies. Thus, 
models may lack the local perspectives, socio-historical components and 
human dimensions that confront communities at the forefront of climate 
change as they adapt and respond to climate change. It is, thus, important to 
validate models with micro-level detail, local perceptions and histories in a 
way that is non-instrumental in order to fill crucial gaps in knowledges and 
understandings of uncertainty. As we have discussed in this chapter, scientists 
are clearly aware of the political nature of climate change and the limits to 
their knowledge and also the problems with translating their knowledge into 
policy and practice. However, they still appear to be resistant to construct 
alternative models and approaches that are more plural and draw on other skill 
sets and repertories. Most of the scientists interviewed were men. In general, 
there are fewer women in senior roles in climate science and policymaking, 
but the few women we interviewed in all three countries, acknowledged 
some of the limitations of perspectives from “above” and the need to take 
on board local perspectives and realities in their work. This highlights the 
importance to have more plural and gendered perspectives in, otherwise, very 
male- dominated research and policy environments.
In conclusion, while the scientists we interviewed acknowledge uncertainty 
and there are signs of increasing appreciation of “deep uncertainty”, 
traditional approaches to uncertainty still dominate in the understandings 
and policy debates among the “above”. There remains a tension between 
the “above” still trying to master and reduce uncertainty through modelling 
and scenario building and the “below” that is seeking to cope with and live 
with uncertainty. While most of the scientists we interviewed acknowledge 
local understandings of uncertainty and the need for local expertise to inform 
climate models, and hybrid engagements emerging, there is as yet not much 
evidence of mainstream climate science or policymakers in India embracing 
alternative knowledges.
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Notes 
1 Radiative forcing is defned as “the net change in the energy balance of the Earth 
system due to some imposed perturbation (…) and quantifes the energy imbalance 
that occurs when the imposed change takes place” (Myhre et al., 2013). 
2 http://www.deepuncertainty.org/, accessed July 2021. 
3 See http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/world-heritage-37th-session/ 
whc37-detai ls/news/global_change_in_the_arctic_and_co_production_of_ 
knowledge/, accessed March 2020. 
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Kutch and the Sundarbans as environmental 
histories of climate change 
Vinita Damodaran, Rohan D’Souza and Subir Dey 
Introduction 
This chapter explores understandings of uncertainty in South Asian environmental 
history scholarship. Environmental histories of South Asia have mostly evolved 
their plot lines around the theme of environmental change (Kumar, Damodaran 
and D’Souza 2011: 1–13). The overall mood in such narratives has often been 
described as being “declensionist” – that is, emphasising environmental decline 
and irretrievable ecological loss. While providing compelling insights and 
careful documentation of the environmental impacts brought on by European 
modernisation and western colonialism, these declensionist frameworks have 
been inadequate in their scrutiny of the pre-colonial period in South Asia (Grove, 
Damodaran and Sangwan 1998). In part, this striking limitation has been driven 
by the belief that pre-colonial societies aimed for ecological harmony, and this 
led them to strive for achieving relatively stable environments as they pursued 
resource prudence rather than profigacy (cf. D’Souza 2019). 
Although a number of revisionist accounts have subsequently demolished 
the environmental stability thesis, recent anxieties about global warming have, 
understandably, pressed for another rethink over how South Asia’s environmental 
pasts may be understood (Damodaran and D’Souza 2020). In particular, this 
includes the need to debate how understanding weather events and long-term 
climate trends can help us grasp how states and societies have responded to radical 
environmental uncertainties. Thus, we suggest a rethinking of the plausible 
environmental history plot lines and narratives for South Asia in the context 
of climate change and global warming and the possibility for de-centring the 
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Uncertainty, as pointed out in the introduction to this volume, can be 
discussed in terms of its epistemic (knowledge-making) and ontological/aleatory
(how Nature exists) dimensions (Chapter 1). And integral to uncertainty is 
what Sheila Jasanof felicitously describes as the tensions between “global fact” 
and “local value” ( Jasanof 2010). While the global fact would refer to the high 
science of model building and the universal abstract protocols for collecting 
meteorological data (see Chapter 2), the local value, in Jasanof’s estimate, draws 
out how local communities experience and make sense of weather events and 
phenomena and the need to recover the local in our global regimes ( Jasnof and 
Martello, 2004). This is nicely illustrated through the empirical chapters in this 
volume (see Chapters 4–6). In efect, there is a friction between the qualitative 
that is borne by the everyday experience and the quantitative, which speaks for 
the abstract and distant assessment mainly by experts. 
To illustrate and deepen our understanding of the notion of uncertainty as 
a framing device for writing environmental histories of South Asia, we focus 
in this essay on two dynamic environments in British India – the princely state 
of Kutch (in present-day Gujarat) and the Sundarbans (Bengal). For the colonial 
authorities, Kutch and the Sundarbans were overwhelmingly marked as being 
“marginal environments” and treated as being distinctly diferent from places 
and regions that were, in contrast, considered as the “environmental normal”. 
While marginal environments, especially for colonial ofcialdom, meant 
environments that were subject to frequent extreme weather and natural events such 
as droughts, foods, earthquakes and violent river behaviour, the “environmental 
normal” referred to the relatively productive, stable, predictable and revenue-
yielding zones (Heredia and Ratnagar 2003; Prasad 2003; Bhattacharya 2018; 
Saikia 2019). These contrasts between the “marginal” and the “normal” not only 
shaped diferent types of colonial administrative interventions and institutional 
capacities but, critically, there emerged as well a set of sociological and economic 
distinctions that were elaborated by the colonial authorities that helped further 
defne these zones. Notably, the marginal was about subsistence communities 
that were characterised by mobility, vulnerability and regular environmental 
distress, while the normal comprised settled agrarian communities, revenue-
paying cultivators and referred to spaces which saw markets and commerce 
fourish. 
A second set of contrasts was over the notion of the environmental shock 
as opposed to that of gradualist environmental change. The regions of Kutch 
and the Sundarbans, we point out, were described and discussed within the 
administrative lexicon in terms of sudden and dramatic natural shocks such as 
earthquakes, cyclones or extreme foods, which not only resulted in the radical 
landscape change but could potentially cause the drastic erosion of livelihood 
possibilities and even the total abandonment of lands. In normal environments, 
on the other hand, environmental changes could be more gradualist and could 
be brought on by long-term activities such as steady forest clearances or even a 
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The “marginal environments” (Kutch and the Sundarbans) having
experienced limited interventions by the colonial state were substantially
documented and studied between the 18th and 19th centuries. The town of Bhuj
in the Kutch princely state had sufered from drought and scarcities of water
while the Sundarbans remained vulnerable to recurrent extreme fooding, drastic
landform erosion and ferocious cyclones. Both colonial and post-independent
state initiatives in these two sites were instituted to turn them into “normal” and
“secure” geographies (also see Chapters 4 and 5). Tracing the trajectory of such
stabilising initiatives can help deepen our understandings of how uncertainty was
experienced and discussed diferently by layers of society, communities, experts
and government ofcials across time periods, and how these translate into present-
day response. In particular, we are keen to explore how the responses from
communities, experts and the state or “below”, “middle” and “above” difered in
their approaches to viewing environmental change and the difering perspectives
they provided for understanding how environments were represented and
understood. The pastoralists in Kutch, for example, saw seasonal migration and
mobility as critical adaptation strategies for their livelihoods, while in the normal
zones, migration was mostly seen as a distress strategy or as desperate eforts to
cope with an irregular or a one-of event (Mehta 2005). Similarly, communities
in the Sundarbans remained agile to the moods of the rivers, as they hopped
across islands and diaras or chars as part of their portfolio of livelihood strategies. 
This essay, in efect, will seek to underline not only how the notion of the 
margin was, in several respects, framed as being a deviation to the normal and, 
therefore, caused British administrators to often misread local livelihoods, 
coping mechanisms and strategies aimed at harnessing uncertain environmental 
conditions. While the lack of environmental predictability meant a loss of control 
over territory and the populace for the colonial state, local knowledges, syncretic 
histories and pastoralist narratives can draw our attention to how certain kinds of 
social worlds could be more adept at handling environmental shocks. Below, we 
review the colonial archival record (from 1800 onwards) on what got described 
as calamitous events, natural catastrophes and environmental shocks in Kutch 
and the Sundarbans. The efort, in essence, is to read against the grain in order 
to explore and capture the varied conceptual tensions that ran through colonial 
eforts to frame marginal environments in terms of the normal through the lens 
of uncertainty. 
Discovering Kutch 
Kutch acquired political coherence from the late 12th century when the Jadeja
Rajputs came to rule the tract. In 1819, the ruling house, accepted the suzerainty
of the British East India Company (hereafter, EIC) with Captain James Macmurdo
becoming the frst political resident. Amongst the topographical peculiarities that
Macmurdo quickly noted was the striking physical feature of a salty marshland of
close to 10,000 square miles that comprised the Rann of Kutch, which alternated
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between being a seasonally dry sandy desert and a marshy inland lake with only 
small stretches of freshwater.1 He also recalled from memory in 1820, the impact 
of the earthquake of 1819 that had ravaged the entire province.2 In 1824, James 
Burnes, a doctor, posted in Bhuj and his brother, Alexander Burnes, also wrote 
about Kutch. Their initial writings were focused mainly on the regional history 
of Kutch and were essentially a subtle justification for British rule. In 1829, James 
Burnes began to pen his observations of the land and people of Kutch.
The general appearance of Cutch is barren and uninteresting. Most of the 
villages are ruinous and dilapidated, bearing marks alike of the shocks of 
nature and the destructive powers of man. A few fields in their neighbourhood 
are cultivated, while the remainder of the country presents nothing to the 
view but a rocky and sandy waste, which in many places is scarcely relieved 
by a show of vegetation. Water is scarce, and often brackish; and although 
the population does not exceed three hundred and fifty thousand souls, the 
produce of the land under cultivation is insufficient for their support; so that 
Cutch, even in the best seasons, is dependent on Sinde for supplies of grain.
( James Burnes 1830a)
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In addition to the fairly grim assessment of the resources and people, the brothers 
also advanced an understanding of the various castes, tribes, their customs, habits 
and social hierarchies3 and noted the unique Banni grasslands.4 In 1839, drawing 
upon the accounts of the Burnes, the writer Marianne Postans described Kutch 
as a “barbaric and primitive polity” that was marred by unfair and exploitative 
customs, which, she went on to conclude, could only be saved by the East India 
Company, who possessed “industrious sciences and the Christian faith”.5 
It is only in the memoir of S.N. Raikes of 1854, that we fnally note that 
Kutch is unhesitatingly described as a colonial administrative territory.6 Now
geographically demarcated from the neighbouring province of Sindh, Kutch was 
shown to comprise an area of 6,500 square miles. As for the Rann and the Banni 
grasslands, it was believed that seismic changes had created these salty marshes 
by converting a large water body into a seasonally dry seabed – a fact borne out 
by the periodic discovery of sea fossils.7 There was also the building of the great 
embankment by Gholam Shah in 1770 on the Eastern branch of the Indus in Sinde
(Sindh) and the building of canals for channelling the waters to the Kutch.8 The
Grand Runn (Great Rann of Kutch) on its northern boundary was 9,000 square 
miles. Mostly a rocky and hilly terrain comprising three irregular hill ranges: 
a Most northern range an irregular chain bordering the Runn, of rocks 
containing marine remains. 
b Charwar range passing through the centre of the province connected to the 
former at a northwest point. 
c Southern range connected to the centre of the Charwar range. 
Apart from these ranges, Denodar was the highest peak among a cluster of 
irregular hills that contained volcanic material. Geologists had begun to take 
a keen interest in Kutch since an early period for this reason. Raikes reported 
that, in some seasons, generally when rain falls in July, the surface, particularly 
of the eastern portion of the Runn, would be stunningly covered with salt (see 
Figure 3.1). On one or two occasions, “I have observed the whole distance 
between Kutch and Parkur covered with salt as white as snow, which it exactly 
resembled. It had a most striking appearance”.9 The southern coast was fertile 
and all channels of water that fowed through the province were periodic and 
would swell during the rains, after which these would remain as detached pools 
of water. They were most prominent on the northern side of the city of Bhuj.10 
The climate of Kutch was described as mild and agreeable compared to other 
parts of Bombay, the hot months being April and May. Along the coast these 
months were also found to be pleasant while the month of June could become 
cloudy before the preceding rains. Rains happened to be irregular and sometimes 
heavy and damaging to poorly designed housing. In 1850, it was reported that 
heavy rains fell claiming 50 inhabitants and led to the death of close to 20,000 
cattle. After the heavy monsoon, fever and rheumatism were found to be common 
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close to the Runn where the drying up of vegetation would release what was 
called “noxious vapours”. The temperature would remain high until November 
and then winter would commence from December and last until March. The 
occurrence of cholera after the rains was, in fact, noted to be fairly regular. The 
average annual rainfall between 1848 and 1853 was 12 inches (59 centimetres), 
though even this amount could be very variable.11 As the political agent Reeves, 
in an 1878 despatch, observed: 
Cutch is peculiarly situated as to rainfall being on the very edge of the 
South West Monsoon and getting a small and precarious rain, it is evident 
therefore that the sinking of numerous wells, whereby a permanent water 
supply is ensured, is of the frst importance.12 
The colonial narrative then was that, the Kutch was in dire need of improvements, 
especially through infrastructural interventions so as to be rendered into a 
productive and predictable landscape. 
Despite the uncertain rainfall pattern, a variety of crops were grown that 
included coarse cereals such as bajra, muth, gowar, jowary, moong and even some 
amounts of wheat. Cash crops were also cultivated, such as castor oil and cotton. 
Cotton was exported to Bombay from the region, and in 1852, Kutch produced 
75,000 maunds. Silk from Kutch found a substantial dedicated European 
clientele.13 Most Kutch dwellers were reported as being subsistence cultivators 
and did not own their lands. Proprietary titles to land and its jurisdiction known 
as Girasias were recognised by the British. This was, however, essentially 
confned to a much smaller constituency of members mostly from the Jharejah
clan, who formed the Bhayyad or the brotherhood. These landholders reserved 
the right to levy taxes and fnes on cultivation and goods in transit through their 
towns and villages. A small constituency of religious and charitable institutions 
held a certain portion of these villages and lands, for which they received grants 
from the Kutch durbar. These were known as Inamee and Khyratee. The British
East India Company recorded and recognised these landholdings as part of their 
policy of non-intervention in the domain of religion. 
In these colonial surveys, agrarian conditions were also described as being
adverse, owing not only to the uncertain rainfall pattern but also to the high
levies by local authorities. Additionally, duties across towns and villages that
were collected by the landholders led to a concentration of surplus at one end of
the social spectrum. During the mid-19th century, a trend became noticeable,
wherein the durbar of the court kept acquiring more lands from the nobility. Lands
in Kutch, consequently, increasingly began to be held directly by the court.14 
All ports of Kutch were under the durbar and foreign goods were only allowed 
to be imported through them. Sea customs were levied on all goods and the 
durbar and landholders of the nobility levied transit duties on merchandise in 
whichever direction they moved. By virtue of the treaty with the Kutch durbar, it 
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Known for their maritime success, the Kutchis were intrepid seafarers and many 
fortunes were made from oceanic trade. Port towns like Lakhpat, Jakhau, Mandvi
and Mundra retain even today, albeit to difering degrees, reminders of an earlier 
prosperity. While there have been studies focused on the seafaring traditions of 
Kutch that supported trade and migration, the overland migration that occurred 
across the Rann into Sindh and thence to Central Asia and beyond historically 
has been less studied (Simpson 2003). 
Pastoralism and weather uncertainties 
The Rann turned marshy during periods of rainfall and breaks into a collection 
of raised islands, where habitation becomes possible. These islands or gauchar
bets, which were also regarded as common lands, moreover, were overrun by a 
vast carpet of lush nutritious grasses. The Banni grasslands often fnd mention 
as being one of the largest bets in the Rann and colonial accounts describe it as 
attracting a number of pastoral groups with their cattle, who were even able to 
enjoy a better lifestyle than the agriculturalists (Williams 1981: 222). 
The colonial records, it should be noted do not refer to the pastoralists of 
Kutch in occupational terms, rather they were listed as nomadic tribes. While 
they did not have proprietary rights to the Banni, which was held by the Durbar, 
they had unlimited grazing rights. What they were taxed for was not grazing 
rights but their trade in butter. There were, moreover, strict grazing regulations 
for sheep and goats who were prevented from grazing in the earlier period which 
helped preserve the grassland resources for camels and cows (Ibrahim 2004). 
While recording land titles and ownership, Arthur Malet in 1842 remarked that 
in the district of Banni an estimated 100,000 cattle were tended to in this tract 
and fve kutchi kories (local currency)16 were levied on every maund of clarifed 
butter that was produced. In that very year, the revenue that the durbar received 
from Banni was 70,000 kutchi kories. It is unclear if this revenue was accrued 
through levies on butter or some other means as well.17 The Banni, moreover, 
was vulnerable to pillage from seafaring pirates and also sufered cattle theft. The 
British East India Company thus had to secure the property from such raids even 
as vulnerabilities from extreme weather events and famine regularly occurred.18 
In the 1880s, one colonial report on the Banni tellingly described it as follows: 
‘[…] is all apt to be covered with water in times of high food. The whole is 
scantily covered with coarse grass and babul trees, and supports large herds 
of bufaloes and other cattle, for whose use some wells and ponds have been 
dug. The herdsmen live in clusters of beehive shaped grass huts, and under 
the orders of their holy men use no sleeping cots and light no lamps after 
dark.’ On the pastoralists they noted that the ‘Rabaris 13,371 strong, also 
called Bhopas because many of them serve in Mata temples, a wandering 
tribe of shepherds are generally found in the Banni and other rich pasture 
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One also gets the idea of the recalcitrant frontier in the colonial archive. “The 
Muhammadan herdsmen in the Banni (a tract of grasslands extending along the 
edge of the northern Rann) are reckoned ferce and unsettled” noted Macmurdo 
in 1820. When caravans laden with goods – rice, dates, silks and cloths – would 
cross the Rann during the trading season between mid-September and mid-
June, their safety was not easily guaranteed.20 Tribes along the way had to be 
mollifed with payments to prevent the looting of goods. 
The colonial state, perhaps not unsurprisingly, as part of their eforts to pacify 
and settle what increasingly appeared to them as a marginal, uncertain and 
volatile zone sought to transform the pastoralists into a sedentary community 
that could be more legible to their taxation regimes. Amongst the frst initiatives 
was to enclose the commons and village forests. Local ecologies had various local 
terms identifying their importance to the common people: common lands which 
were termed as gauchars bets; islands in desert tracts termed as Pung, Aaliya and 
Nada; Grasslands like Banni, Kaddr, Lakhpat and Vadhiya; and Forests like Gir, 
Bardas, Aalech, Vidis and Rakhal. Pastoralism was adapted to the environment 
with mobility being key, with groups moving between Sindh and Kutch taking 
their herds where they would fnd fodder. The livestock included three native 
breeds of Oxon: Bagadia and Bharbads reared by Rabaris and the Banniai referring 
to Muslim herdsmen in the Banni. During the several famine episodes that were 
noted in the region, migration was the main response of local pastoralists. In 
1823, it was recorded that there was a migration of people and death of cattle due 
to famine. In 1860, severe scarcity of provisions led to heavy migration to Sindh, 
Kathiawar and Bombay, and the cattle were even driven to Gujarat. 
Colonial sources have recorded close to 102 episodes of what they would
consider calamitous events in Kutch through the course of the 19th century. Aside
from the earthquake of 1819, the remaining 101 instances counted relate to extreme
weather events. The list mentions 48 years as being marred by poor or untimely
rainfall leading to crop failure with some years tipping into becoming famines. In
the remaining 52 years, though there were a range of weather uncertainties such
as unintended showers, unexpected timings for rain and even shock foods that
brought about scarcities in fodder and grass and especially increased the prices
of food grains. Each event produced consequences for livelihood and economy,
which lingered on for years. A closer look in Table 3.1 details these events. 
In the frst decade, barring the two years of 1803 and 1804, the decade 
witnessed predictable weather events. However, the next decade was a trend in 
reverse, barring 1814 and 1818, one or more calamitous events occurred. This 
decade began with “pestilence resulting in crop failure” and famine followed 
by an epidemic of plague in 1812. In 1813, the epidemic continued and was 
accompanied by famine. While the situation began to marginally improve in 
1814, in May 1815, the cropped felds witnessed heavy rain and rats robbed the 
cultivators clean. The epidemic of plague reappeared in 1816 and continued in 
1817. While 1818 provided some succour, June 1819 witnessed an earthquake, 
followed by a heavy monsoon that destroyed crops. Untimely, rain and poor 
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TABLE 3.1 Table showing climate-related events in 19th century Kutch 
Decades of the Famines Crop Pestilence Epidemic Rainfall 
19th Century Failure Failure 
1800–1810 1 1 1 2 2 
1811–1820 3 4 2 5 5 
1821–1830 1 1 1 0 2 
1831–1840 0 1 1 0 1 
1841–1850 0 2 0 0 3 
1851–1860 0 1 0 0 1 
1861–1870 0 4 2 1 5 
1871–1880 0 3 1 3 5 
1881–1890 0 0 0 0 0 
1891–1900 2 0 0 5 4 
Source: Authors’ own using information from the Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency, 
Volume V 1880. 
harvests closed the decade in 1820 and the period 1821–1830 had seven years that 
did not witness any widespread calamitous event. 
The decade of 1831–1840 was comparatively free in terms of calamities, with 
only three years of adverse rainfall leading to poor harvest and crop failure. 
The following decade of 1841–1850 appears to be balanced with fve years of 
primarily poor rainfall leading to crop failure but with two earthquakes in 1844 
and 1845 noted as severe but without any additional details. The following decade 
had only two years known to have adverse rainfall and crop failure. This was 
followed by the decade of 1861–1870 in which frequencies of calamitous events 
were similar to the decade of 1811–1820. This state of afairs was only marginally 
reduced in the following decade of 1871–1880. In this decade, seven years saw 
active calamities which also included plague in cattle and animals in 1872 and 
1878 that had serious consequences on livelihoods. The count of these events in 
the last decade of the 19th century stands at nine active years of climate events 
and one clear year. The earthquake episodes from 1892 to 1895 did not seem to 
have any drastic impact enough to have entered the colonial records. The plague 
epidemic outbreak between 1896 and 1900, however, caused huge casualties and 
was accompanied by untimely rains and poor harvests (see Table 3.1).21 
State and people: the twain never meets 
A close study of the pattern of responses, from “above” and “below” that these 
frequently occurring extreme weather events evoked, shows that people and the 
state responded in diferent and often contrasting ways. The colonial state after 
some initial hesitation began to reconcile itself to the idea of having to settle for a 
mixed bag of good and bad years. In particular, the administration had to ensure 
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of the local populace to pay after an extreme event. In 1842, when Arthur Malet, 
the political agent at Kutch surveyed and documented the towns and villages and 
their ownership, the aggregate of revenue including all items and of all revenue 
receiving entities was estimated at 62,95,745 Kutchi Koris. Malet remarked that 
in a good year at least 64 lakhs Kutchi Koris of revenue was realised and then 
proceeded to estimate the most probable trend of revenue realisation under three 
additional categories, namely, the following: 
a Sookal which meant a very good year. 
b Dookal which meant a year of famine. 
c Kurwara which meant a year of when one fall of rainfall has failed. 
Against each kind of year, there was a proportionate adjustment in the scale 
of revenue realisation.22 Nonetheless, prices for necessities often escalated in 
difcult years. A report in 1872 on the previous year’s harvest, notes: 
[…] the monsoon has been unfavourable even for Kutch, where a 
precarious rainfall is the rule. The total number of inches was 3 inches 
and 47 centimetres, of which no less than 3 inches and 4 centimetres 
were registered during the frst week in May, a most untimely fall. The 
consequences has been diminished harvests throughout the country, and 
high prices for grain, grass and the necessaries of life, with much distress.’23 
Locusts sometimes could ruin a good harvest. In 1872, the year which recorded 
a good harvest owing to 
seasonable and copious rain during last monsoon throughout the province, 
after the previous year’s unfavourable and scanty fall, has relieved much of 
the distress that prevailed […] in consequence of the appearance of locusts 
when the crops were standing, and a good deal of damage was done in most 
of the districts thereby.24 
One of the main responses of the populace to rain defciency and such kinds of 
distress was to resort to strategic migration as noted in 1876: 
There was a defciency of rain all over the Province, the average being 
only 7 inch 21 centimetres, or about half the usual supply. The three 
pergannas bordering on Sind were the greatest suferers. The crops in them 
entirely failed, and a large portion of the population emigrated. The food 
supplies of the country were thus relieved. But severe scarcity has prevailed 
everywhere, and the water and forage supplies are dangerously low.25 
The transitory nature of such migration was noted, in 1891, for example, it was 
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well as the common pasture lands of the villages” failed to meet the demands of 
the domestic animals and immediately spurred the pastoralists to seek pastures 
elsewhere.26 Almost a year later, however, the pastoralists who had migrated 
“drew back to Cutch several herds of cattle which had left the province for want 
thereof in the previous year”.27 
While temporary distress migration seemed part of the rhythm for coping 
with the vagaries and uncertainties of the inhabitants of Kutch, the colonial 
administration increasingly saw well irrigation as the solution to preventing 
mobility: 
Scarcity and rain and danger of famine in Cutch are not unfrequent, and 
special precautions are necessary, against the distress arising there from. 
Well irrigation has been long considered to aford a sure, certain and 
suitable remedy, especially in this Province. The Council of Regency 
who conducted the afairs of the principality during the minority of His 
Highness the Rao recognised the necessity of increasing well irrigation as 
much as possible; since his accession to full powers of State, his Highness 
the Rao has also spared no pains in increasing wells and encouraging 
improved cultivation of land.’28 
Interestingly, since in most ofcial reports the cause of famine in Kutch was 
seen to be a result of multiple years of bad weather, the administration linked 
migration not to pastoral rhythms and coping strategies but exclusively to rainfall 
defcit and weather uncertainty. Well irrigation, consequently, became the 
widely accepted ofcial response which as a “[…] measure will not only keep 
compact and steady the subjects of the State in those parts, but will also bring 
to their doors a certain supply of water on which they can depend”.29 That is, 
the lack of cultivation in Kutch was seen as a natural calamity. The pursuit of a 
robust policy for sedentarisation, thus, also followed from the need to prevent 
migration and mobility. 
The improvement of agricultural resources of the country was highlighted as 
being necessary and involved the administration in trying to ensure that there 
was an “abundance of manure, good cultivation and plentiful supply of water”.30 
The State attempted to partially assist the cultivating classes by advancing money 
and granting remissions and also giving Takavi (loans) and grants-in-aid.31 In 
efect, by the end of the 19th century, a set of interventions for the sedentarisation 
of the populace improving well irrigation, revoking transit duties, relief work in 
the form of construction and taking over wastelands was considered to be the 
main response of the colonial state, which stood in striking contrast to that of the 
local populace that sought to develop and orient their coping strategies around 
temporary and seasonal migration as they historically had always done. As the 
exactions of the colonial state intensifed forcing sedentarisation on pastoralists, 
further changes in land use and boundary changes following the partition of India 
limited the range of responses to local climate events among these communities 
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leaving them more vulnerable to uncertainty and climate change (Mehta and 
Srivastava 2019; also see Chapter 4 for postcolonial interventions in Kutch). We 
now turn to a similar examination of uncertainty in historical perspective in the 
Sundarbans. 
Sundarbans’ migratory rivers and mobile people 
The Sundarbans comprises the most volatile deltaic portions that is borne out of 
the confuence of the massive Ganga, Brahmaputra and Meghna river systems. 
The region which overlaps both Bangladesh and India, has a unique ecology 
that is hedged in by mangroves, littered with mudfats and cut into innumerable 
islands by streams and channels. Given the fact that the Sundarbans is a highly 
unstable landscape that is recurrently moulded by tidal actions, foods and regular 
marine erosion, the early East India Company (EIC) ofcials, unsurprisingly, 
were overawed upon gaining possession of the territory in the fnal decades of 
the 18th century (see Figure 3.2). 
Upon seizing the right to assess and collect revenue in the Sundarbans in 1764, 
the EIC ofcials frst set their sights instead on containing the threats from the 
Magh, who were variously described as pirates and accused of plundering ships 
and carrying away populations for the slave trade in the Arakans. Apart from 
securing the routes of commerce that carried out through the many channels 
between the river Meghna and Hooghly, the Company also aimed to expand 
FIGURE 3.2 Early Survey and Mapping of Sundarbans 1794. 
Source: Map of Bengal, Bahar & C. prepared by Major James Rennell, Engineer and Surveyor 
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cultivation in the lower portion of the delta to prevent raiders from taking cover 
in the Sundarbans forests (Chatterjee and Sarkar 2010). 
Colonial administrators amidst difcult eforts to settle the volatile deltaic 
tracts, however, were led to systematically document the forest and vegetation 
cover for close to 150 years. The importance of fsheries was also recognised 
earlier on when the Sundarbans were acknowledged as possessing the “most 
valuable of the estuarine fsheries in Bengal”, with the numerous waterways 
being full of fsh. But the “deterioration” of several channels in later years, it was 
noted, had caused the water to turn brackish in several places such that “carp 
have already deserted them”.32 
Three aspects of the Sundarbans, however, came to defne the colonial 
documentary record in the region. First were the complications brought on 
by eforts to build and maintain embankments to secure the region from the 
regular devastations of the annual foods, an intractable issue that persists to date 
(see Chapter 5). Second were the tensions between ensuring forest conservation 
for timber, while, at the same time, encouraging the agrarian expansion and 
settlement in the deltaic tracts. The third involved the colonial anxieties bought 
on by cyclonic storms and their potential devastations. 
Embankment construction 
For the EIC, the project of building embankments and maintaining them proved 
to be a conficted intervention that preoccupied colonial ofcials, landlords and 
cultivators throughout. From 1783 onwards, ofcials began to farm out schemes 
for reclaiming lands from forests and marshy terrain. The frst attempt in this 
direction was by Mr. Tilman Henckell.33 Apart from reclaiming forest lands for 
cultivation, Henckell intended to extend the agrarian frontier so as to deal with 
a potential situation of famine. The famine of the 1770s was still fresh in public 
memory as it had allegedly killed ten million people. 
Initially, embankments in order to protect the reclaimed lots were undertaken 
by landlords and the cost of repairs was reimbursed by the Company. In 1785, 
the government resumed the pulbandi (embankment) charges and undertook 
maintenance on their own. However, in 1791, it decided to place the burden of 
the cost of repairs on landlords again and, not unexpectedly, faced considerable 
resistance from these groups. The landlords stated that if monetary assistance 
was not given by the Company, all losses in revenue incurred due to foods 
should be pardoned by the Company. As a result of this argument, this measure 
was withdrawn. The British government then farmed out the maintenance 
of embankments to Salt Agents who did so until 1803 when an Embankment 
Committee was formed. This Embankment Committee, however, failed 
to function properly, and in 1814, the government was obliged to rebuild 
embankments at their own expense. In 1816, a Sundarbans Commission was 
formed that operated till 1821. In 1819, the government asked the landlords to 
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superintendent. In 1834, the government withdrew monetary support for this 
purpose but owing to protests and losses, resumed maintaining the embankments 
through its Public Works Department. The maintenance of embankments and 
their impacts on the environment, however, continued to draw debate and 
dissension throughout the colonial period.34 
Forestry against Reclamation 
Reclaiming the forest was part of the push by the Revenue Department for bringing
tracts under cultivation. However, the period from 1870 to 1879, when new rules
for the reclamation of wastelands in the Sundarbans were issued, a number of
disputes erupted over the sale and lease of forest land. In part, this was because the
forest department considered forests more useful than rice cultivation.35 
The policy of Sir Richard Temple, the then Lieutenant Governor, was a 
case in point for he argued against any need for reclamation as the resources 
grown in the Sundarbans already were more valuable than creating more paddy 
felds. His policy resulted in the creation of the Reserved and Protected Forest 
in Jessore (Khulna) and the 24 Parganas. Temple chose to record his views about 
the importance of forest resources: 
Western Bengal is supplied partly from the Sunderbuns and partly from 
the high lands to its west. The southern districts of Central Bengal draw 
ample supplies of cheap wood from the Sunderbuns. In the city of Calcutta 
frewood is probably cheaper than in any large town of India; a short system 
of rivers and canals brings the products of the Sunderbuns to several parts 
of Calcutta and its environs. To the northern districts of Central Bengal, 
bamboos and timber are brought by river from the sub-Himalayan forests. 
Eastern Bengal is supplied by water from the Sunderbuns, from the frontier 
jungles, and from occasional private forests scattered over the country.36 
But the impetus for cultivation continued and 3,305 acres were transferred to 
the civil authorities to be leased for cultivation.37 The region soon became quite 
proftable and it was noted that 
It will be seen that there is a large and increasing surplus, so that the general 
result is satisfactory. The proft is very great in the Sunderbuns Division, 
from which Calcutta is supplied with fuel, and also the important sugar and 
other works scattered through Khoolna and Jessore. 
It was further reported that 
After sal (Shorea robusta) we have to notice sundri (Heritiera littoralis), the 
important produce of the Sundarbans forests, which serves to construct 
most of the native river craft met with on the Hooghly and adjacent 
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channels. In the water-divided country of the 24-Parganas, Khulna, 
Backergunge, Noakhali, and neighbouring districts, the rivers and creeks 
to a great extent take the place of roads, and boats the, place of carts, so that 
the value of the Government forests of the Sundarbans to the country at 
large is immense. Again, all the frewood used in Calcutta is brought from 
these same forests. The fnancial results were reported by the Sundarbans 
Division as especially satisfactory. Besides expending only 28 per cent, of 
its receipts it furnishes no less than 45 per cent, of the revenue of the whole 
circle. The regularising of the work and the introduction of the monopoly 
sale system have so improved matters that the period of its administrative 
uncertainty may be considered to be a thing of the past. The revenue 
during the year increased by Rs. 51,000.38 
It was further reported that the reclaimed tract to the north was entirely devoted 
to rice cultivation and winter rice of a fne quality was grown there; sugarcane and 
areca-palms were also cultivated in the tracts lying in Khulna and Backergunge 
districts. The methods of cultivation included the following: 
when land is cleared, a bandh or dike is erected round it to keep out the salt 
water and after two years the land becomes ft for cultivation; in normal 
years excellent crops are obtained, the out-turn being usually about 20 
maunds of rice per acre.39 
The debate on forests, however, remained very intense and often bitter. It was 
reported that by 1877 the limits of the forest reserve had been fxed, even as a 
considerable area of wasteland, the revenue administration believed had been 
excluded and was still available for reclamation,40 causing them to aggressively 
declaim in a note that as late as 1853 the 
Government had declared that the paramount object of its policy in the 
Sundarbans was the speedy reclamation of the forest in order to improve 
the health of the neighbourhood of Calcutta and to deprive wild animals, 
smugglers and pirates of the shelter aforded by the jungle: the improvement 
of the revenue was of secondary and altogether subordinate importance.41 
The history of forest demarcation, the debates on reclamation and cultivation 
and the responses of the Forest Department were to prove vital in partially 
protecting the region against cyclones. Although the Sundarbans forest was 
declared government property in 1817, it was not declared a protected forest 
area until 1878. At this time, 4,856 square kilometres in the south-eastern part 
of the Sundarbans was ofcially preserved by British authorities. This was an 
important victory not only for the Indian forest department but also for the 
deltaic stretch as well as these reserved and protected forests proved important in 
giving protection for cyclones and foods. 
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From the brief account “above”, one can gauge the slow pace at which the 
Sundarbans was brought within the domain of the colonial administration and 
the competing claims of the forest and revenue departments. During the middle 
of the 19th century, there were many proposals made that sought to undertake 
reclamation and settlement at a mega scale through mobilising big capital and 
labour. In January 1865, Ferdinand Schiller presented one such proposal of 
reclaiming all the remaining “wastelands” of the Sundarbans that, as per his 
estimation, was about close to one million acres, which included tracts that were 
yet to be surveyed. He proposed to introduce settlers from China, Madras and 
other parts of the coast of India and also encourage the immigration of free 
labour from Zanzibar on as large a scale as possible. He proposed to grow cotton 
on these tracts. Ferdinand summed up his rationale thus and is indicative of how 
gigantic the scale of his enterprise was being envisioned:
The object of my application is to provide for the speedy cultivation of the 
large tract of fertile country stretching to the Eastward between Canning 
and the River Megna. This would not only give a great additional impetus 
to the trade of Bengal, but materially improve the sanitary condition of 
both Canning and Calcutta. To accomplish this two things are required: 
money and population. The latter I could not hope to obtain by the mere 
withdrawal of excess population from other parts of India, as it is well 
known that India in many parts is suffering from great want of labor; and 
although it may seem strange that with such facts before us emigration to 
other distant Colonies is actually facilitated, yet I look upon this as a mere 
consequence of free trade and I do not complain of it as a grievance, claiming 
on the other hand the right and privilege to introduce the necessary labor 
for the accomplishment of my scheme from such parts of the world as 
may appear desirable. The first country I should direct my attention to is 
China, where the peaceful agricultural classes have long been suffering 
from the consequences of Civil wars, and where, I know a good class of 
laborers with their families could be obtained under the altered conditions 
of that country. In settling Chinese we should introduce a superior race, 
a race which would soon rise into a trading population and keep up by its 
own spontaneous action a constant and regular stream of immigration. 
With these men, we should have to deal to suit their peculiarities, and 
each family would probably have to be started as small farmers at once, 
being under bond to the Company for the refund of their passage money 
and paying such rents for the land they occupy as may be considered fair 
and equitable. San Francisco, the Straits, and many Islands in the Indian 
Archipelago have thus been successfully populated. Another class of labor I 
should propose to draw from various parts of the African Coast. With these 
men a different system would probably have to be adopted. In addition, we 
will, of course, obtain cultivators from other parts of India. Special Acts 
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termed foreign labour. In entering on this cultivation we should have to 
leave certain belts of jungle, say 10 miles inland facing the sea, untouched, 
partly with the view of protecting the inner cultivation against the storms 
in the Bay of Bengal, partly in order to preserve the supply of fuel for 
the surrounding population; but many of the outer grants would have to 
be protected by good bunds, similar to those which prevent the sea from 
washing over some of the richest portions of Holland.42 
What Schiller was proposing was not within the rules of settlements and perhaps 
owing to a miscommunication the proposal remained shelved and led many 
investors to withdraw from the venture. However, something much more 
dramatic happened that put an end to any real prospects of such a proposal; this 
was the total destruction of Port Canning in a cyclone in 1867 to which we will 
now turn in the context of the cyclone history of the region. 
Cyclones, uncertainty and devastation 
The Sundarbans, for the early ofcials of the EIC, appeared almost deserted and 
it took them a while to connect the relative lack of habitation and settlement to 
the devastating impacts of the 1737 cyclone, which were still lingering: 
There remain yet to be considered the efects of a cyclone and its storm
waves. This occurred in Calcutta in 1737, cyclone, “when a wave 40
feet higher than usual, came up. Such would have been sufcient to
produce an almost total loss of life in the Sundarbans and its consequent
abandonment.”
It was debated in colonial sources whether it is the constant invasions by 
Portuguese and Mug (sea pirates) that have created this condition of abandonment 
or whether it was the harsh environment of the Sundarbans and the argument 
was settled in favour of the latter. The extent of revenue collection in the past 
was also debated. It is believed that at one time the Sundarbans was far more 
extensively inhabited and cultivated than at the present; and possibly this may 
have been due to the fact that the shifting of the main stream of the Ganges from 
the Bhagirathi to the Padma, by diminishing the supply of fresh water from the 
north, rendered the tract less ft for human habitation.43 
There is a strong indication that in the times of the Mughals (1526–1857), 
the Sundarbans was, indeed, inhabited. A cyclone of 1585, nonetheless, fnds 
mention in the writings of Abul Fazl, where he notes that 
The Sarkar, or district, of Bagla, extends along the seacoast. The fort of 
the Sarkar is surrounded by a forest. From new moon to full moon, the 
waves of the sea rise higher and higher; from the ffteenth to the last day 
of the moon, they gradually decrease. In the 29th year of the present era 
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(A. D. 1585), one afternoon, an immense wave set the whole district under 
water. The chief of the place was at a feast; he managed to get hold of a 
boat, whilst his son Paramanand, with a few others climbed up a Hindu 
temple. Some merchants got on a Tâlâr* For nearly five hours the waves 
remained agitated; the lightning and the wind were terrible; houses and 
ships were destroyed; only the Hindu temple and the Tâlâr escaped. About 
two hundred thousand souls perished in this hurricane.44
The cyclone of 1585 did not result in the depopulation of the Sundarbans 
because Abul Fazl, 11 years later, in 1596, mentions four towns as belonging to 
the Sarkar of Bagla, viz., Isma’ilpur, commonly called Baglachinj, Srirampur, 
Shahzadahpur and Adilpur. These four places must have been of some importance 
because the district then paid a revenue of nearly 70 lakhs of dams, that is, 
nearly 180,000 lis., and was besides liable to furnish 320 elephants and 15,000 
zamindari troops.45 Earlier debilitating cyclones, therefore, had not deterred 
people from settling in the area as one report noted the frequency of storms and 
the consequent suffering:
The colonies of settlers in Sundarbans are specially exposed to the fury 
of such storms. Their houses and their fields are only a foot or two above 
high-water mark and when the cyclone wave pours up the great streams of 
the Poseur and Haringhata, and from them spreads over the country, the 
inundation works cruel havoc among the low-lying isolated villages. The 
grain in their fields is spoiled their houses are torn away and all their stores 
are lost their cattle are carried away and drowned; and they themselves are 
reduced to extreme shifts to save their own lives.46
The frequency of cyclones was also apparent from the literature. In October 
1895, which swept over both the Bagherhat and Satkhira subdivisions
On 16 May 1869, a cyclone destroyed 250 lives in Morrellganj alone and 
caused an immense loss of property.47 It was reported in 1870 that the average 
annual rainfall varied from about 82 inches in the west to over 200 inches in the 
east. Cyclones and storm waves occurred from time to time. The worst of the 
calamities of this nature was in 1870 when a great part of the Backergunge and 
the adjoining districts was submerged, the depth of water in some places being 
over ten feet.
In the night of 31 October and 1 November 1876, another report noted that 
the most terrible cyclone and storm wave had been experienced since 1822. 
The greatest havoc was confined to Chittagong and the estuary of the Meghna 
and accordingly the Bakarganj portion of the Sundarbans suffered severely; in 
Galachipa thana, no less than 10th of the population was estimated to have 
been drowned. The calamity was described in detail by Sir Richard Temple, 
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, who visited the affected area immediately after 
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District published in 1918. Crops and cattle were destroyed far and wide, and the 
immediate efect of the storm, so far as it efects this history, was the relapse of a 
vast area of the Sundarbans in Bakarganj to jungle.48 The secondary efect of the 
cyclone was an enquiry into the possibility of erecting refuges to protect from 
loss of life in case of similar calamities. This cyclone heavily impacted land leases 
as several lands were submerged by the storm. Importantly, it was also reported 
that 
Khulna was afected only to a small extent by the terrible cyclone and 
storm wave of 1876 but its immunity was largely due to the protection 
aforded by the large area of forest and to the fact that no reclamation 
had been undertaken in the danger zone with the exception of lots 1 to 6 
(Khaulia-Barisal) on the Haringhata estuary.49 
In contrast to Bakarganj being severely impacted by the 1876 cyclone, it appears 
that the creation of more reserved forests in Khulna protected the district from 
the impact of the cyclone. Clearly, here the transformative potential of forests to 
protect against natural disasters was widely commented on.50 The rich state of 
the forests was commented on frequently: 
It appeared to be clear, both from the look of the forests and from the 
statements of the wood-cutters, that the Sunderbuns forests reproduced 
themselves in ten to twenty years. One-twentieth of the forest area would 
yield about 700,000 tons of frewood and petty timber per annum, or more 
than would supply all the requirements of Calcutta and the Delta districts, 
and therefore the Sunderbuns forest might be trusted ‘to supply the wants 
of the country without any interference’.51 
Forests not only provided protection from cyclone but the colonial reports also 
give details about people livelihoods and how they were linked to the forest. 
Woodcutting and fshing were recorded as being part of people’s livelihoods 
though the dangers of tiger attacks continued to be high. In 1908 it reported the 
practice of the woodcutters: 
These brutes, who will swim broad streams in search of prey, are justly 
dreaded by those whose business takes them into the forests. No woodcutter 
will go there to cut wood unless accompanied by a fakir who is supposed to 
have power over tigers and other wild animals. Before commencing work, 
the fakir assembles all the woodcutters of his party, clears a space at the 
edge of the forest and erects a number of tent-like huts, in which he places 
images of various deities, to which oferings are made. When this has 
been done, the allotment is considered free of tigers; and each woodcutter, 
before commencing work makes an ofering to the jungle deities, by which 
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of any of the party being carried of by a tiger, the fakir decamps and the 
woodcutters place fags at the most prominent comers of the allotment to 
warn of others.52 
Yet the number of tiger deaths continued and they themselves came under
attack. In 1906, the number of persons reported to have been killed by tigers in
the Sundarbans was 60 against 79 in the previous year with the number of tigers
killed during the year being 35. In 1914, the number of persons reported to
have been killed by tigers in the Sundarbans was 79 against 81 in the previous
year and the number of tigers killed during the year was 39. In 1916, the
number of persons reported to have been killed by tigers in the Sundarbans
was 19 against 60 in the previous year and 86, the average of past fve years. it
was noted that “There was an appreciable increase in the number of deaths by
tigers, the total fgure being 81 in 1917 against 55 in 1916”.53 The number of
tigers killed increased from 110 in 1916 to 123 in 1917. In 1919, the number of
deaths caused by tigers showed a decrease, the number being 28 against 60 in
the preceding year and the number of tigers killed decreased from 104 in 1918
to 86 in 1919. Tigers were clearly a force to be reckoned with in this period and
were actively killed by the settlers.54 
Two devastating cyclones hit the centre of the Sundarbans and Calcutta in 
the latter half of the 19th century. This was a period when colonial weather 
data and collecting cyclones had made a big step forward. It was realised by 
colonial scientists that climate and weather are complex phenomenon and vary 
through time and geographically. The colonial scientifc network allowed for the 
possibility to collect useful data through lots of data points and an information 
fow network that spanned Australia, India and oceanic islands such as Mauritius 
and St. Helena. The “Monsoon” coined from Arabic mawsin (a season) was key 
to understanding world climate and, therefore, the Indian peninsula became 
key to understanding world climate. Between 1700 and 1924, main features of 
world climate discovered by Indian civil servants and ofcials, who were mostly 
Scots, Germans& Bengali.55 They included the remarkable Henry Piddington 
who wrote the Law of storms and coined the word cyclone in 1848. By 1852, 
there were 123 weather stations in India with the Centre of Calculation being 
in Calcutta. The journal, Asiatic Researches published the data which included a 
detailed study of cyclones.56 
The 1864 storm had a width of 100 miles and was proceeding at a speed of 
10–17 miles per hour. The greatest damage on land was from a 15-foot storm 
surge. It was reported that at the end of the cyclone, 48,000 people were declared 
dead in Calcutta and environs about 1/3 of the population including those who 
died in the aftermath due to death by cholera. The ofcial report of the 1864 
cyclone by Henry Blanford is a biography of the cyclone.57 The storm chart of 
the Bay of Bengal drawn up by Henry Piddington showed that the majority of 
the cyclones, the tracks of which are there laid down, proceeded from a line 
running from south to north by the Nicobars, Andamans and the islands of the 
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Arracan coast, following the westward side of the mountain axis, which, in part, 
submerged and a prolongation of the Sunda Islands. 
Of these storms, several appear to have originated in the neighbourhood of 
the Andamans. The force of the cyclone was intensifed by the formation of a 
tidal bore in the Hoogly breaching dykes in many places and leaving the interior 
fooded.58 
Local ships like the Alexander, Clarance and the Comet gave details of the 
storm. On the impact of the 1864 cyclone itself, contemporary reports noted 
several details. Babu Chatterjee noted that in Tamluk Bazaar in Midnapur, the 
storm waves rose and the water stood 12 feet “above” the roadway and of the 
1,400 houses and huts only 27 were left standing.59 In Calcutta, heavy winds 
and the fall of barometric pressure to 29.7 accompanied the storm on the 6th of 
October felling several trees in Chowrangee. 
Wherever there were trees, they were either uprooted and fell, carrying 
with them in many cases walls, railings and buildings, or their branches 
were snapped of like reeds and hurried away with the wind. Carriages 
and pulkees were upset and strewed the roads, mingled with the debris of 
roofs, verandahs, gates and fallen trees; corrugated iron roofngs were torn, 
doubled upand blown away like sheets of paper.60 
The cyclone showed the diferential impact on the rich and poor. In Calcutta 
alone, 102 pucca houses were destroyed, with 563 severely damaged. On top of 
that, 40,698 native huts were completely levelled. Reports from the ship Clarence 
also provided some of the details.61 A scheme was being mooted to develop 
another port as an auxiliary to Calcutta, a place about 45 kilometres to the 
south-east of Calcutta, deeper in the Ganga–Brahmaputra delta, on the estuarine 
river, the Matlah. Piddington wrote to the Governor-General of India in 1853, 
warning the site would be extremely vulnerable to storm surges. Port Canning 
was commissioned in 1864, and in 1867, a storm of quite moderate intensity 
brought in six feet (1.8 metres) of water over the settlement. The damaged port 
was abandoned four years later. Port Canning was an ambitious venture that 
the government had taken up in Bengal, and this proposal had the approval 
from the apex ofce of the colonial administration. Since 1853, the government 
had undertaken the survey of the lands around river Matlah with the intention 
of building a subsidiary port to Kolkata and settling a municipality town as 
well. Work of survey, settlement and formation of a company occurred in rapid 
succession. That very year, Henry Piddington who had moved his residence 
in Kolkata to pursue his varied intellectual interests wrote to the Governor-
General of India stating that the river Matlah as per his calculations was directly 
in the way of cyclones a term that he had coined for the sea storms and gales 
that he had been studying for a while now. His letter was received, and his 
proposition was reviewed in The Calcutta Review in which his reputation was 
commended, but his proposal was refuted on the premise that there were no 
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facts to support his projection. His critics chose to ignore his warning and stated 
that given an upsurge in the river one could always resort to the good old system 
of embankments. The example of prosperous coastal ports and port towns in 
Europe was thrown in comparison for good measure. 
In 1867, Piddington’s claim turned out to be true. Port Canning after its grand 
inauguration in 1864 came in the way of a cyclone and was completely destroyed, 
never to be rebuilt again. This was one of factors that eventually shelved the 
proposal drawn up by Ferdinand Schiller. The state had ignored the warnings of 
experts like Piddington at its own expense. The Sundarbans, however, continued 
being reclaimed and populated and by the beginning of the 20th century had 
begun to be reclaimed in its lower reaches within the lease undertaken by Daniel 
Hamilton who introduced a cooperative system to communally maintain the 
embankments while he provided its fnancial cost. 
During the long 19th century in the Sundarbans, the colonial state had to 
contend with foods and cyclones while trying to turn the Sundarbans into a 
productive geography. At the ofcial level, in the responses from “above” 
embankments appear to be the answer to all calamities from water. The cyclones 
of 1864 and 1867 did not seem to have acted as any deterrent or any reference 
point for refection as we can see the haste with which Port Canning was 
constructed despite advice from Henry Piddington. The pertinent question that 
appears to have engaged them was who would bear the incidence of maintaining 
and repairing the embankments? 
Making the margin from the normal: concluding remarks 
Environmental histories on Kutch and the Sundarbans, especially in terms of the 
colonial record, suggest that these environments were considered to be dynamic, 
unpredictable and subject to debilitating impacts from extreme natural events. For 
the colonial ofcials and the state consequently, both Kutch and the Sundarbans 
were considered and treated as marginal environments and, therefore, subjected 
to diferent regimes for monitoring and exploitation. Local communities, 
however, despite many of their vulnerabilities as subsistence cultivators and 
pastoralists turned mobility and a portfolio of livelihood generating capacities 
into adaptation strategies rather than simply as coping responses. For the 
Sundarbans, this disjuncture of responses from “above” and “below” give us 
insights into the ways in which these continue to be part and parcel of the nature 
of governance and local-level responses in the postcolonial period. Following 
the most recent cyclones in the region in the 21st century, Aaila, Titli and 
Amphan while communities have responded by migration, their options now 
are much more limited (see Chapter 5). In Kutch, similarly, the responses of 
the state to frequent droughts and the 2001 earthquake has not brought solace 
to communities whose water resources are being ever more reduced by dams 
upriver, water grabbing by the industries and increasing rainfall variability (see 
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partly due to the introduction of an alien species by the state, Prosopis julifora. 
Nearly, 55% of the area is today invaded by Prosopis, a leguminous shrub, locally 
called gandobaval, imported from South America in the 1960s, in an attempt to 
keep desertifcation and salinisation at bay. The fragile eco-system of the Kutch 
is teetering on the edge of an environmental crisis. 
Notions about uncertainty, as pointed out earlier, are critically informed by
ideas about environmental change (Bennett 2010; Marris 2011;. Environmental
histories, on the other hand, can help explore the layered social, economic
and political responses to environmental shocks. Consequently, as out study
shows, the colonial record on Kutch and the Sundarbans becomes particularly
compelling in terms of how subsistence cultures by local communities can
ofer insights for assembling adaptation strategies in conditions of extreme
environmental stress. 
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FIGURE 4.1 Coastal infrastructure projects undermine pastoralism in Kutch (Photo 
credit: Shilpi Srivastava). 
Introduction 
“Kudrat ek karishma hai, uske apne tareekein hain, Malik dekh lega!” (Nature
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now Suf mystic, when we met him in a small fsher hamlet in Kutch in August
2016. He was referring to the changes in seasonal cycles and attributed these
to the miracles and also at times to the wrath of nature. But beneath his sense
of poise and calm was an anxiety about the future, about his family, village
and their livelihoods. “We have to get by”, he said and smiled. This anxiety
about the “unknown” is often laced with a staunch belief in divination, be it
God or karma, as life and livelihoods become increasingly precarious for these
marginal communities in Kutch. This district in Gujarat, western India, has
witnessed massive ecological, economic, demographic and social changes
in the 21st century. These include aggressive industrialisation and a boom in
business activities which have not only led to economic growth for some but also
dispossessed many local people from their traditional lands and livelihoods (see
below; also see Figure 4.1). 
For most rural communities in Kutch, living with uncertainty has been an 
intrinsic part of their daily lives. For example, droughts have been a part of the 
ecological rhythm in Kutch and something people living there have been used 
to dealing with (see Mehta 2005). However, many now say they are struggling 
to cope due to a combination of, on the one hand, changing rainfall patterns and 
intensities of droughts and, on the other hand, the compromised ability to tackle 
these extremes due to wider social and economic changes which have increased 
precarity and vulnerability. 
Once considered to be the backyard of the developed and prosperous state 
of Gujarat and a “punishment post for bureaucrats” (Mehta 2005: 314), Kutch, 
especially after the 2001 earthquake, has been slowly and strategically turned 
into a corporate enclave (Srivastava and Mehta 2017). This new landscape has 
also made way for a new set of actors. These include big corporate houses that are 
increasingly laying claims to coastal and marine resources and a vibrant network 
of civil society organisations (CSOs) working in diverse areas of reconstruction, 
rights and development (Kohli and Menon 2016). 
Thus, this landscape, hitherto considered “remote” and “backward” with 
respect to mainstream development in India, is now servicing the engines of the 
capitalist economy through various interventions such as the Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs)1 and renewable energy parks that are making these marginal 
areas legible to the state and corporate actors (see Damodaran et al., Chapter 3; 
Scott 1998). In parallel, climate change is also posing a threat to the traditional 
livelihoods in the district (Mehta et al. 2019). Due to rapid groundwater depletion 
and poor rainfall, saltwater intrusion has emerged as a major challenge (GUIDE 
2014). Furthermore, industrial development in some eco-sensitive zones has 
afected local livelihoods such as dryland agriculture, fshing and pastoralism 
(Kohli and Menon 2016). 
In this chapter, we investigate how uncertainty is characterised by these 
diverse actors in Kutch. As discussed in Chapter 1, we use the Kutch case to 
argue that the increase of extreme events, together with the many ecological, 
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rise to a more radical form of uncertainty. By radical uncertainty, we mean a 
situation where the past is no longer a good guide to what the future might 
hold (Kay and King 2020). This, we argue, creates situations that are not only 
pushing people to the limits of coping but also reducing their adaptive capacity 
to live with current as well as future climatic uncertainties. Thus, new ways of 
anticipating and reimagining these landscapes may be required for socially just 
transformation in the context of climate change. 
After laying out the conceptual framework and methodology, we discuss 
the varying perceptions of uncertainty from the “above” and “below”. This 
is followed by a short discussion on the role of intermediaries (the “middle”) 
who are instrumental in entrenching or reframing the development narratives, 
thus becoming the potential facilitators of transformative change in Kutch. We 
discuss one such example at the end of the chapter. 
Radical uncertainty and transformation 
Changing rainfall patterns caused by climate change can increase the severity 
and frequency of both droughts and foods (Lehmann et al. 2018). This is a cause 
for concern when these historically new patterns occur in drought-prone areas. 
While local people may be attuned to coping with climate variability in Kutch, the 
rapid rise of extreme weather events and high climatic variability has constrained 
their traditional responses, especially when wider forces in the political economy 
also limit their adaptive capacity and pathways to address climate-induced 
uncertainties (Tschakert 2007; Solecki et al. 2017). This intersection of epistemic 
uncertainty with wider drivers of change leads to what we have called radical 
uncertainty in this chapter. 
In this chapter, we draw on Walker et al.’s (2003) distinction between ontological
(uncertainty due to inherent variability of the system) and epistemological
uncertainty (uncertainty due to imperfect knowledge) and argue that perceptions
of and responses to uncertainty are shaped by diverse factors. These range from
dynamic and variable ecological systems (rainfall, temperature, salinity intrusion)
to the incumbent knowledge systems and systemic drivers of change (such as
industrialisation, water and land grabs) which lead to situated perspectives on
uncertainty and also shape particular responses (Haraway 1988; Mehta et al. 2019). 
This intersection between these diferent drivers has material efects and is at 
the heart of radical uncertainty, which either pushes local people to the limits of 
coping or compels them to adopt maladaptive pathways that compromise their 
or others’ well-being in diferent ways (Gajjar et al. 2018; Mehta et al. 2019).
It creates what Ribot (2014: 673) has referred to as the “pre-existing precarity 
that climate change fnds in place”, which then (re)produces vulnerabilities and 
may limit future adaptation pathways and choices. For example, we show how 
the denigration of pastoralism has led several herders to take up precarious and 
insecure employment and also compromised on their identity and sense of well-
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Uncertainty and transformation 
As argued in the introduction, uncertainties can often create feelings of anxiety 
and precarity, these should not always be viewed negatively. They may present 
opportunities, policy windows and spaces that trigger change, disrupt incumbent 
systems that lock in social inequalities and provide an opportunity to address root 
causes and in efect “to reconfgure the meaning and trajectory of development” 
(Pelling 2011: 231). These are broadly characterised as transformations in this 
chapter. 
For example, in the context of climate adaptation, Pelling (2011: 88) notes 
that “the most profound act of transformation facing humanity as it comes to live 
with climate change requires a cultural shift from seeing adaptation as managing 
the environment “out there” to learning how to reorganise social and socio-
ecological relationships, procedures and underlying values “in here””. In this 
chapter, we look at transformation as a contested process that may be triggered by 
various uncertainties but is directed towards social justice, ensuring recognition 
of livelihood rights of the marginal communities and is attuned to production 
processes and ecological realities that attempt to re-orient value systems towards
social and economic justice. Transformations require moving away from top-
down and techno-centric approaches to more plural, place-based and diversifed 
ways of embracing and living with uncertainty which are sensitive to human–
environment relationships and target the root causes of vulnerability (Eriksen
et al. 2015). We argue that such deliberately created spaces can ofer possibilities 
to reimagine radical socio-economic change, which also incorporates ecological 
considerations (health and quality of the ecosystem) as discussed through the 
pastoral initiative in this chapter. 
Methodology 
This chapter draws on a multi-sited qualitative study, which brings in a long 
durée perspective going back many decades by two of the authors. Following 
a literature review on climate change, environmental politics and development 
in Kutch, feldwork has been taking place since 2015. To capture the diverse 
ecosystem and livelihoods profle of Kutch, the ethnographic feldwork focused 
on two geographical sites: Merka in Rapar taluka (sub-district) and the coastal 
village of Jalva and adjoining hamlets in Abdasa taluka. This was complemented 
by extended feld observations in these sites and by an additional short research 
study undertaken in Tasu and Phuleri vands (hamlets) in Mundra. These sites 
represent the diverse ecosystems of Kutch (coastal-marine, wetland and dryland) 
and the predominant livelihoods of the region which are fshing, agriculture and 
pastoralism. Our feld visits aimed to capture uncertainty in diferent seasons 
(winters, summers and post-monsoon). Over 70 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with herders, farmers and fshers. This local-level feldwork 
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(Abdasa), Bhuj, Gandhinagar and Ahmedabad. Geographically, the “above” 
and “middle” are spread across the taluka headquarters (Rapar and Naliya), the 
district headquarter (Bhuj) and the twin cities of Gandhinagar and Ahmedabad. 
In total, 100 interviews were conducted across the various feld sites in Gujarat.2 
Site description 
Kutch, derived from the Gujarati word Kachua (tortoise), was formed out of the 
former native State of Kutch and ten enclave villages of the former native State of 
Morvi (Mehta 2005). Kutch is the largest district in the country covering an area 
of 45,674 sq km, of which 51% is covered by the Rann (salt desert) and 15.67% by 
forests (Government of Gujarat 2020). It has nine ecological zones that range from 
the Ranns to the lush green irrigated felds and the Banni. The main occupations 
are pastoralism, agriculture and fshing, but these are in transition due to changes 
in the local economy after the 2001 earthquake (discussed “below”). 
Of the Bhuj–Ahmedabad Highway and bordering the Little Rann of Kutch 
is the compact village of Merka in Rapar taluka. Merka is a medium-sized village 
with over 1,000 households that are multi-religious and multi-caste. Caste, 
wealth, gender, ownership of land and water resources form the important axes 
of social diferentiation (Mehta 2005). Prominent social groups include the 
erstwhile feudal lords (the Darbars or the Jadeja Rajputs), the Rjputs (also from 
the so-called warrior castes, but traditionally considered “lower Jadejas” because 
they gave up certain restrictive feudal and gender practices (cf. Mehta 2005)), the 
herders (Rabaris and Bharwads) and Dalits (referred to as Harijans in the village), 
Kolis and Muslims. The Darbars and the Rjputs occupy the village centre and 
the Harijan, Koli and Muslim vas (settlements) are on the margins. Kolis live 
in the vand on the periphery of the village. They are one of the least developed 
communities in Merka with little access to health, water, sanitation and other 
basic amenities. 
The village has a semi-arid climate, and the average annual rainfall is about 365 
mm (Samerth Trust 2013). The prominent livelihood activities are agriculture 
(which is largely rain-fed), livestock rearing and charcoal making. Like other 
villages in the district, water is the backbone of the rural economy in Merka. 
Previously, the villagers depended on open wells and community ponds (gaon
talabs) for drinking and livelihood activities, but most of these water sources are 
either depleted or have fallen into disuse in the last 15 years. With the expansion 
of settled agriculture, and depletion of other water sources such as ponds, wells 
and dug wells, groundwater resources are severely strained. Although the village 
falls within the catchment of the Sardar Sarovar project, which is considered a 
“lifeline” for Gujarat (see Mehta 2005), water has not yet reached this village 
and “people are still waiting” (Interviews, January 2016, Merka). For drinking 
water, people usually rely on the piped water supply but fall back on the wells, 
especially during the summer months, when the supply is irregular since water is 
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Towards the north-west frontier of the district is Jalva, a large coastal village
located in Abdasa taluka, with a population of 5,369 people (Government of
India 2011). Since medieval times, the Jalva port has assumed central importance
owing to trade links with west Asian and African countries (Ibrahim 2009).
Being the last port on the western frontier of India, Jalva has signifcant strategic
importance and the activities are continuously monitored by the Border Security
Force (BSF). The village is predominantly Muslim, with the majority of the
population belonging to the Vagher community. Other social groups include the
Jains or the Vania, Bhanushalis, Lohana, Darbars and Kolis. Given its proximity
to the coast, fshing is one of the major livelihoods in Jalva largely practised by
the Vaghers and the Kolis. Livestock rearing is also an important livelihood in the
village. The maldharis (one who owns and rears livestock) usually live in the simara
(the boundary of the village) or small hamlets adjacent to the main Jalva village.
One such hamlet is Jimlivand, which is the site for our focused study on Jalva. 
Jimlivand, a hamlet of approximately 35 families, is a compact community of 
Fakirani Jats (diferent from the Jats of Northern India), a sect infuenced by the 
Suf tradition, who have settled in various hamlets across the Gujarat coast (Soneji 
2017). They claim their ancestral links to the Halaf region in Iran (Bharwada and 
Mahajan 2007). Although fshing is one of the predominant livelihoods in the 
community, Jimlivand’s identity is closely linked to camel and cattle-rearing, 
that is, being maldharis. However, the residents have given up on camel breeding 
and rearing and now keep bufaloes instead. The village now has about 600–700 
bufaloes (Srivastava and Mehta 2017). 
The average rainfall of the taluka is 371.67 mm and there has been a slight increase
in the rainfall (by 17%) from 1932 to 2010 (Gujarat Ecology Commission 2011).
Declining water quality is a serious issue in Jalva. Most wells in Jalva have now
turned saline and are unft for drinking or irrigation purposes. Piped water supply
is irregular and unreliable. With very few freshwater wells, women and young girls
have to make several trips to the wells and wait for hours to collect water. 
About 150 km away from Jimlivand is Mundra, a coastal town, which survived 
the destruction from the 1998 cyclone due to its “thick” mangrove shield 
(Srivastava and Mehta 2017). A sprawling SEZ has now replaced the mangrove 
shield. Due to the construction of the SEZ (including the private port), it is 
estimated that about 3,000 hectares of mangroves were cleared by the Adani 
Group, and in some cases, as in Mundra and Hazira, they virtually disappeared 
overnight (Singh quoted in Asher 2008). On the margins of the SEZ are the 
small-scale fshers (pagadias and boat fshers) and the Rabari camel herders whose 
livelihoods are at risk due to this large-scale industrialisation (Kachchh Camel 
Breeders Association 2013). 
Kutch: a landscape in transition 
Kutch is socially diverse and is home to several hundred ethnic groups with 
distinct customs, languages and identities (Mehta 2005). For much of its recorded 
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history, emigration has been a way of life in Kutch and its geographical location 
on the western seaboard provided the required fllip to trade and mercantile 
activities, which, in part, led to the development of a multicultural and 
syncretic culture in this region (see also Chapter 3). Ibrahim (2007) locates the 
development in Kutch along two key axes: one, primarily emerging through the 
outward-looking trade and migration routes with other seafaring communities 
in East Africa, Bombay or the Persian Gulf, which she calls the Vaniya-vegetarian-
patidar belt, and the other, hitherto neglected but equally important for the rise 
and sustenance of syncretism in Kutch, are the pastoral communities who were 
crucial to the overland trade routes through Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central 
Asia. Before the partition (1947), the Kutchis usually connected with Sindh more 
than Gujarat, which was often referred to as pardes (foreign land) in oral narratives 
(Ibrahim 2009; Interview, September 2016, Ahmedabad). Maldharis would often 
migrate to Sindh in times of drought. The land border after the partition severed 
these ties and successive India–Pakistan wars sealed the divide. 
While irrigated agriculture and maritime development received signifcant 
attention after Independence in 1947, the contribution of the pastoral economy to 
Kutch and her people was both neglected and marginalised (Mehta and Srivastava 
2019). State policies and programmes have systematically ignored the particular 
dynamics around variability, uncertainty and water scarcity in Kutch and the 
experiences and abilities of local communities, especially pastoralists, to deal 
with these, thus displaying “dryland blindness” (Mehta 2005). This “dryland 
blindness” and also the systematic denigration of pastoralism in policy discourses 
have accelerated with the rapid industrialisation processes that intensifed after 
the 2001 earthquake. 
Following the earthquake, Kutch became the symbol of reconstruction and 
development, a “new resource frontier” whereby the economy, nature and society 
were re-confgured to create “spaces of capitalist transition” (Barney 2009: 
146). Tax holidays, port development and the establishment of the SEZ have 
systematically altered the countryside and the coast leading to substantial changes 
in the demography, resource ownership and allocation in the region. In the name 
of development, the economy and social sector were opened to diverse actors, 
such as NGOs, business and corporate houses and other foundations (Kohli and 
Menon 2016). We now move on to show how uncertainty and transformation 
have played out in this altered landscape of Kutch. 
Politics and perspective from “above”, “middle” and “below” 
Described in some government reports as a “museum of environmental 
hardship” (cited in Mehta 2005: 11), Kutch’s geology, climate and topography 
make its resource endowments, especially water, crucial to the sustenance of life 
and livelihoods. The water endowments of the region vary considerably from 
place to place. They range from areas abundant in groundwater supplies (such as 
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in Kutch also have highly diferentiated access to and control over water and land 
resources (Mehta 2005). 
As a state falling in arid and semi-arid zones, Gujarat has traditionally had
a drought cycle of fve years, including two years of moderate rainfall, two
years of low rainfall and one year of good rainfall (GUIDE 2014). Two or three
consecutive years of low rainfall make it difcult for the local communities
to sustain their livelihoods. In the period between 1958 and 2007, Kutch
recorded the highest annual rainfall variability (57%) among the districts of
Gujarat. Kutch, along with parts of Banaskantha, Patan, Surendranagar, Rajkot
and Jamnagar districts, was also found prone to experience moderate to severe
droughts in more than 30% of the years (Pandey et al. 1999, 2009). A 2014 study
by the Gujarat Institute of Desert Ecology (GUIDE) also recorded an increase in
the number of villages experiencing drought in Kutch over the past two decades
(GUIDE 2014). 
A long coastline also exposes the state to stressors such as cyclones, sea-level 
rise and salinity ingress. According to a coastal vulnerability assessment (2015), 
the Gulf of Khambat and north-western part of the Gulf of Kutch are classifed 
under very high-risk category (Mahapatra et al. 2015). With the warming of the 
Arabian Sea, cyclonic activities are also likely to be amplifed in this region given 
the recent trends in the incidence of extreme weather events in the Indian Ocean 
(Sarkar 2020). 
Until a few decades ago, droughts and, to a lesser extent, cyclones were the major 
environmental challenges in the state as well as the district of Kutch. However, in 
recent times, increasing extreme events such as intense rainfall and heatwaves are 
adding to environmental vulnerabilities of the district. For instance, in August 
2020, various parts of the district were fooded and the region recorded 32% 
higher rainfall than the season’s average (The Hindu Business Line 2020). Like 
several other regions, Kutch also has a varied agro-climatic profle with diferent 
micro-climates in diferent regions, which require targeted adaptation strategies. 
So, how do policymakers and scientists understand climate-related uncertainties 
in Gujarat and more specifcally in Kutch? 
The bird’s eye view: uncertainty from “above” 
For the “above” in Gujarat, very few actors spoke of climate adaptation and 
mitigation strategies tailored for one specifc region or district in the state. Instead, 
they largely referred to the aggregate state-level scenario where Kutch featured as 
one among the many districts of Gujarat which is vulnerable to climate change. 
This bird’s eye view also meant that local perceptions and experiences of climate 
change rarely featured in policymaking on climate change. 
For scientists in Gujarat, climate change is real and certain and is measured 
through key variables such as temperature, rainfall, sea-level rise and 
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere. They concur that what is uncertain is 
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downscaling in the Global Circulation Models (GCMs) (Interviews, September 
2016 and January 2018, Gandhinagar and Ahmedabad; Sarkar et al. (2015); see 
also Chapter 2). However, their position and emphasis on each of these variables 
varied where some tend to focus more on rainfall and adaptation, while others 
on temperature and atmospheric changes. 
Almost all climate scientists that we interviewed agreed that climate change 
will have unprecedented efects on the social and economic life in Gujarat. 
Referring to these issues, the Director of IMD (Ahmedabad) stated: “there may 
be uncertainty about rainfall, but there is no uncertainty about maximum and 
minimum temperature in Gujarat as heatwaves will become more frequent and 
oppressive” (Interview January 2018, Ahmedabad). 
Specifcally for Kutch, a 2015 study on downscaling temperature and rainfall 
scenarios projects that Kutch is likely to get hotter and wetter by the end of 
this century. For instance, the study indicates that the daily maximum and 
minimum temperature would increase by at least 0.4 °C, 1.5 °C and 3.0 °C 
during 2011–2030, 2046–2065 and 2080–2099, respectively, compared to the 
baseline temperature (Sarkar et al. 2015). The study also concluded that rainfall 
projections were ridden with uncertainties and required further investigation. 
For IMD rainfall had a higher margin of uncertainty because of reduced spells, 
delayed onset of monsoons (from June to October) and heavy rainfall in short 
spans which was bound to have a signifcant impact, especially on agriculture. 
Referring specifcally to Kutch, the Director mentioned: 
In this area, the uncertainty will never decrease. It is an arid area, the 
south-west monsoon is not uniform, it comes in spells and pulse, sometimes 
we can have good rains and some time for twenty days, there will be no 
rains. In arid areas like Kutch, you will get very few spells, so you need to 
develop water storage capacity. 
(Interview January 2018, Ahmedabad) 
For the scientist, in a government research institute who referred to being in a
“privileged” position because of her existing networks with other scientists and
policymakers, on the one hand, and vulnerable communities (through projects), on
the other hand, uncertainty is not merely present in the models but embodied in
the ways people perceive, respond and deal with climatic events. She argued that: 
Uncertainty does not exist merely at research levels but also in people’s 
perception of the phenomenon i.e. how does it impact them. They [people] 
understand that things are changing and they would be able to relate with 
things like rainfall (rainy days have reduced) and temperature (the winters 
are not that cold). Uncertainty lies in the fact that we do not know how 
much is changing, whether this is real climate change or can be attributed 
to a local weather phenomenon. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, global projections on climate change are not
particularly helpful when it comes to state or district-level planning.
Policymakers usually rely on scientifc expertise to understand climate change
as a phenomenon, which is often limited to questions of changes in patterns
such as the arrival of the monsoons, the severity of foods and the intensity
of heatwaves, but this scientifc input does not extend to policy planning or
strategy development. Most of the scientists interviewed agreed that they
faced challenges in communicating with policymakers, where they are often
perceived more as “information providers” than substantive “policy shapers”
because scientists fnd it hard to accurately predict local-level impacts given the
uncertainties in the scenarios. Policymakers often downplay their advice since
they only see the value in “hard” predictions. 
In the past two decades, climate change has attracted signifcant policy 
attention in the state of Gujarat. In 2009, Gujarat became the frst state in the 
country to establish the Climate Change Department (CCD). Announcing the 
initiative in the state assembly, Narendra Modi (then Chief Minister of Gujarat) 
said – “Gujarat government’s separate department for climate change will act 
as a bridge between government and society to address the issues related to 
global warming” (cited in Business Standard 2013). Though introduced with 
a lot of fanfare, CCD has predominantly focused on mitigation rather than 
adaptation while devising the climate strategies of the state. Tasked with the role 
of mainstreaming climate change action into the state-wide policy of Gujarat, 
CCD’s attempts to this day have been partial and this has been recognised by 
various policymakers (Roundtable dated January 2018, Gandhinagar). We 
conducted interviews with bureaucrats in this department who were not very 
aware of climate change issues but instead focused on the achievements of Gujarat 
in building the controversial Sardar Sarovar Dam, which was often packaged as a 
form of climate adaptation (Interview, May 2019, Gandhinagar). Although other 
departments have a diverse portfolio of projects on energy, agriculture, livestock 
and rural development that address the impacts of climate change, this often takes 
place through the route of poverty alleviation rather than deliberately targeting 
or framing these programmes around the language of climate adaptation. 
While climate change is a defnitive entry point of discussion with the 
policymakers, the use of uncertainty was at times met with scepticism. Largely, 
policymakers were uncomfortable with the use of the term and preferred to talk 
about climate change than about the “realms that cannot be known”. This is 
explained by a former civil servant in Gujarat in the following way: 
The term uncertainty can create policy paralysis. Policymakers usually like 
to be certain about the course of action and they can work with likely 
scenarios but not with something that is highly uncertain. We need to 
justify our decisions […] uncertainty creates policy chaos, and decisions 
cannot be taken if the range of uncertainty is too high. 
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Largely, the actors from “above” acknowledged that climate change impacts are 
most vigorously felt at the local level, especially in terms of the changes in water 
supply and resources, health, livelihoods, loss of forest and biodiversity. However, 
many considered the local level to be like a “blackbox” (Roundtable January 2018, 
Gandhinagar) where uncertainty is not articulated very clearly. They concurred 
that the everyday practices of people in terms of living and coping with climate 
change have not been documented or understood sufciently, especially by the 
“above”. Largely, there was a tendency to discredit these experiences as anecdotal 
evidence. This was evident at the roundtable organised in Gandhinagar which 
was very well attended by policymakers and ofcials from diferent departments 
of the state. 
Very often, climate scientists and policymakers dismiss the everyday
experiences of local people and situate them as “weather” as opposed to “climate”,
which has a longer-time horizon (see Chapter 2). However, as argued by Hulme
(2017), there are overlaps between the two and it is the instantaneous experience
of atmospheric conditions such as wind, temperature, cloudiness, pressure and
so on, which averaged over a period of time becomes climate. There are also
tensions about the visibility and invisibility of climate change where scientists
contend that local people cannot “observe” climate change. However, local 
people “feel” the manifestations of climate change through changes in resource
quantity and quality as well as in terms of impacts on their livelihoods (Rudiak-
Gould 2013). Thus, a focus on the everyday practices shows how humans relate
to nature encompassing socio-economic and demographic changes, conditions
of political economy that impact patterns of resource use, social norms and
cultural codes as well as the global fows of capital and labour (Leichenko and
O’Brien 2008). We now turn to these experiences and their intersections in the
next section. 
Uncertainty from “below” 
There is a great deal of regional variation across the sites and the experience of 
climate-related uncertainties is also diferentiated by caste, class and gender. As 
with most drylands, rainfall is highly erratic and variable across Kutch. Farmers 
told us that over and above climatic variability, limited access to credit, lack of 
extension ofcers, the paucity of information and crop insurance, depletion of 
groundwater and salinity intrusion are the causes of their current vulnerability 
(GUIDE 2014). 
For resource-dependent communities, who live close to nature, climate change
is not a term they use. Rather, they speak of changes in the atmosphere, locally
called the havamaan. Similar to the perceptions among the “above”, temperature,
erratic patterns of rainfall and drought, cyclones and sea-level rise also featured
as key climate plots for the local people in Kutch although these were captured
through the lens of changes in everyday routines and livelihoods (discussed
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experiences of climate change among the maldhari women. It captured the more
embodied, socially and culturally embedded experiences of uncertainty revealed
through the powerful images of the “invisible” care economy that sustains
the pastoral system on a day-to-day basis (Mehta and Srivastava 2020). Some
examples include frequent trips to drying wells in the summer, picking fodder
leaves, milking bufaloes and washing the calves, and the role of faith and religion
in coping with climatic uncertainties (Mehta and Srivastava 2020). Across the
sites, women and young girls reported spending more time in fetching water. For
example, in Jalva, where wells are turning saline rapidly, young girls are dropping
out of school to help with household chores. 
Generally, when asked about the changes in the havamaan, oppressive heat 
and changes in seasonal calendars were a standard response to “feeling” the 
changes in the climate. These emerged as central themes during our discussions 
in both Merka and Jalva. Several interviews highlighted experiences of increased 
variability over long-term climate change. An ayurvedic doctor, who has lived 
in Jalva for most of his life, ruminated over the changes in this way: 
We have seen some changes after the earthquake [in 2001] but they have 
become more intense in the last 5–6 years, it is more variable. It is colder 
but for fewer days while the summers are getting hotter, and the heat lasts 
for more days. Seasons have also changed. Earlier rains would come at 
the end of June but now they come in September. Due to the changes in 
rainfall, crops are also changing. 
(Interview February 2016, Jalva) 
Several studies have documented how communities that are highly exposed to 
climate variability adapt to uncertainty by drawing on local cosmologies and 
indigenous knowledge (IK) systems to predict, forecast and prepare for both 
immediate and distant futures (Scoones 2004; Mehta 2005; Naess 2013; Hastrup 
2013). In the next section, we explore how local people in Merka and Jalva 
anticipate some of these changes and analyse the social and solidarity networks 
that they rely on. We also reveal how practices of anticipation are often not 
enough in conditions of radical uncertainty when ecological uncertainties 
intersect with wider changes. 
Local cosmologies and uncertainty 
Rama Bappa, a Rjput landowner in Merka, and his family own large tracts of land 
in Merka. He enjoys a lot of respect across diferent social groups, much to the 
envy of the Darbars. Farmers often approach him seeking advice for sowing and 
crop diseases. As we bite into rotla (local bread) smeared with butter, he narrates 
how farming has changed in the past few decades, with a higher incidence of 
pest infestation and that seasons have become much harder to predict. Similarly, 
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were increasingly failing them and that nature was becoming hard to predict and 
prepare for.3 
In Kutch, local people have historically drawn on IK to plan their livelihoods. 
They have used traditional methods to predict the arrival of the monsoons and 
the success and failure of crops. These range from observing seawater currents, 
animal and bird behaviour, the fowering of particular plants as well as planetary 
positions in the sky, with many preferring these “signs of nature” to scientifc 
forecasts about rainfall (Mehta et al. 2019). The Rabaris look at the stars and 
perform certain rituals to make predictions about rainfall. Similarly, fshers in 
Jalva also rely on the movement of stars, the direction of the wind and the colour 
of the sea to make weather predictions. 
In both Merka and Jalva, village elders are revered as repositories of 
knowledge. They read changes in the good and bad omens of nature. Binetkar 
kaka is a 70-year-old Jat, who many Vaghers in Jalva refer to as the “grandfather of 
fshing”. In our conversations along the Jakhau coast, he talked about predictions, 
the colour of the sea and certain leaves which are only spotted before the onset 
of monsoons. He was confdent that 2016 would be a year of good rainfall, but it 
did not turn out to be so.4 
A 2014 GUIDE study reports that scientists found predictions based on IK to 
be 90–95% accurate in the 1995–2004 period, but after 2004, they acknowledge 
that local-level predictions of monsoon patterns have become more uncertain and 
difcult to predict for local people. A similar observation is made by a scientist, 
at a research institute in Kutch, who argued that “local people’s forecasts are 
also based on observations but because long term climate and weather patterns 
are changing, these local forecasts are not working very well” (Interview June 
2016; Kutch). In this way, traditions and practices of anticipation are faltering in 
the face of increased climate variability. Also, as we indicate below, the radical 
nature of these uncertainties becomes more apparent as they intersect with local 
livelihoods and resource insecurities. 
Everyday practices and experiences around uncertainty are rarely conceptualised 
around climate change. Instead, they are usually felt and experienced in terms of 
access to livelihood opportunities which many local people referred to as anishchit
(uncertain). In the following sections, we explore what anishchit means for the 
three predominant livelihoods in Kutch. 
Livelihoods on the margins 
Kutch receives the majority of its rainfall through the south-west monsoons 
between June and September. Although previously (between 1958 and 2001) 
July was the month of peak rainfall, in recent years that has shifted to September, 
with maximum rainfall now falling in this month (GUIDE 2014). The problem 
of salinity ingress is compounded by the indiscriminate invasion of Prosopis
julifora, locally referred to as ganda bawal (mad shrub), an invasive weed originally 
planted in Kutch to check desertifcation, but that eventually resulted in the loss 
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of arable land. Extreme weather conditions in the form of droughts and foods 
have often wiped out crops, leaving farmers impoverished and helpless (GUIDE 
2014). Since rainfall patterns have become more erratic, farmers fnd it difcult 
to plan their seasonal calendars. Rao bhai, a male Rjput farmer, explains how 
changing seasonal cycles have created challenges in agriculture: 
We are used to hot summers, but the temperature seems to be more 
extreme. Summers are oppressively hot, and winters are longer. Extreme 
heat and prolonged winters are not good for the crops. Winter rain is not 
unusual, but it seems to be increasing and is also not good for the crops. 
(Interview June 2016, Merka) 
In Jalva, the compounded problem of prosopis julifora along with increased 
salinity is pushing the farmers outside of agriculture. Several farming families 
that we spoke to had either abandoned farming or would only take crops after 
the monsoons. These families are also increasingly migrating to other livelihoods 
such as ofering labour on the lands of other farmers or moving to other small-
scale business. For example, Suli-ben,5 a female farmer in Jalva who practices 
dryland farming lamented: 
I have spent a lot of money in digging wells and searching for sweet water 
but no luck so far. I do not think I can continue like this. 
(Interview June 2016, Jalva) 
Poor agricultural yield has had cascading efects on other livelihoods, especially 
for the maldharis who graze their livestock in the farms and buy groundnut and 
wheat chaf as fodder from the farmers. With poor rains and lack of water and 
fodder/grass in the simara, the maldharis migrate to other parts of Kutch or Gujarat 
in search of food and water. 
Although seasonal migration with animals in lean periods is a way of life 
for pastoralists, it is becoming increasingly difcult due to shrinking commons, 
lack of fallow felds to graze on due to perennial irrigation facilities, changing 
state policies and growing resentment towards pastoralists (Mehta 2005; Mehta 
and Srivastava 2019). Climate change leading to increased temperature, higher 
incidence of livestock diseases and shortage of water in summer has also infuenced 
the milk yield of animals (GUIDE 2014). This has resulted in a dramatic increase 
of bufaloes in the livestock composition because they are better suited to the hot 
climate. An increase in the number of milk dairies and transportation facilities 
has also favoured this change (GEC 2011). 
For example, the Jats of Jimlivand who once bred and reared camels have also 
moved onto a more sedentary lifestyle. Until a few decades ago, camels were used 
for farming, patrolling and transport. However, with changes in agricultural 
patterns and reduced access to grazing felds, the value of camels has declined 
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livestock (cows, sheep or goats), their resistance to heat and higher tolerance to 
prosopis julifora are cited as some of the reasons for this preference. They also have 
the advantages of better feed conversion efciency, can sustain on poor feed and 
forage quality and provide higher returns from milk (bufalo milk across breeds 
has more than 8% fat) with a better nutritive value of milk (Balhara et al. 2017). 
The Jats of Jimlivand comprise the big pastoralists who shift between fshing 
and livestock rearing. Small maldharis can only aford to keep a limited number 
of bufaloes and are largely reliant on small ruminants (i.e. sheep and goats) and 
hence face the brunt of ecological uncertainties. Since goats and sheep are more 
susceptible to livestock diseases, these maldharis are increasingly fnding it difcult 
to continue with their traditional livelihood. Herders with small ruminants often 
fall outside of the drought mitigation schemes which largely target large livestock 
owners and farmers. For instance, Musa bhai, a small maldhari recounts: 
If we have good rainfall, then there is no problem but if the rainfall is not 
good, we are in loss, not proft. We are spending our money on purchasing 
drinking water, fodder grass, cotton and groundnut leaves and wheat. 
Livestock diseases have also increased. Now maldharis are migrating with 
animals in search of fodder and water. This year, there was no water in the 
sim, we gave the pipeline water to animals. In summer, we need to purchase 
more tankers. One tanker is 700 rupees. I do not think I can continue like 
this […] I do not want my grandson to struggle in the same way. 
(Interview February 2016, Jalva) 
Similar to other livelihoods, it is estimated that climate changes will have 
profound efects on the marine ecosystem as warmer sea temperatures will lead 
to shifts in availability and adaptability of particular species (Harley et al. 2006). 
Fishing is both a major livelihood and a burgeoning business opportunity on the 
Kutchi coastline. It was the introduction of mechanised boats from 1981 onwards 
that led to the gradual development of Jalva as one of the major fshing harbours 
in the state (Gujarat Ecology Commission 2011). 
Most fshers whom we interviewed said that they are now witnessing warmer 
sea temperatures and a decline in fsh catch. Faiz bhai, the head of Jalva’s fsher’s 
association, narrates the changes in the following way: 
Due to warmer temperatures, there is a decrease in fsh production. In the
1990s, the day temperature used to range from 7 to 10 degrees and the night
temperature was around 2 degrees. But from 1995 onwards, heat has increased.
The fsh needs salt as well as freshwater. Industries and salt pan activities have
also afected fsh production. If the rains are late, the fsh breeding period also
changes accordingly. Jellyfsh is food for the fsh, but trawlers are catching this
fsh because of the high demand in China. The food shortage for fsh may also
be one of the reasons for the decline in fsh production. 
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Though several fshers spoke of oppressive heat and hot water, they rarely attributed 
these to climate change and blamed industrial activities for the problems instead. 
They were united in their anger towards large fshing trawlers who “break the 
rules” and go for the catch which is “rightfully theirs” (Interviews, February 
and June 2016, Jalva). They were also critical of the salt pans and industries, 
which discharged untreated toxic water into the sea, often killing the fsh and 
destroying the mangroves, which are natural nurseries for fsh breeding. Similar 
complaints were heard from the adjacent Mundra taluka regarding the harmful 
efects of industrial pollution on the marine and coastal ecosystem. 
Across fshing communities in Mundra and Abdasa, fshers have noticed 
several changes in their habitats and attribute this loss to port activities, mangrove 
denudation and waste that is dumped into the sea (Srivastava and Mehta 2017). 
While the destruction of mangroves has resulted in the decline in fsh catch, 
fshers’ access to water channels is also blocked as the coastline is now populated 
by industries. Feroz bhai,6 a veteran fsher, explained: 
Fishing is our livelihood. My father, my grandfather, all were fshers. We 
have been involved with fshing [for a long time]. For the past six to seven 
years it has been particularly bad […] they [industries] draw water from the 
sea to cool their plants, small fsh get stuck in the process and die. Then 
they release hot water. Fish go away[…] A lot of big projects come up on 
the coast […] All these factors lead to less catch. 
(Interview August 2016, Mundra). 
While the Vaghers and non-native fshers still manage to get some catch, it is the 
Kolis who have faced the brunt of these changes. The loss of mangrove cover and 
industrial pollution has also afected creek fshing. Referring to the fsh trawlers, 
one Koli fsher lamented that “the big fsh are eating the small fsh [i.e. Kolis], 
and we have nowhere to go” (Group discussion February 2016, Jalva). 
Thus, the experiences of uncertainty from “below” are mediated by relations of
power within the “community” and asserted by more powerful actors such as the
industries and the state. The livelihoods perspective underlines how climate change
intersects with other political, social and economic factors for these marginalised
communities as they continue to live with highly unfair and unequal conditions that
have been imposed on them through social, historical and political arrangements. 
The “above” takes an aggregate view of uncertainty, albeit realising the value 
of local experiences and the need for a more targeted approach, mostly in the 
form of technical interventions. The perceptions of the “below”, by contrast, 
broaden the understanding of climate from an experience of an atmospheric 
phenomenon to lived realities as climate change intersects with various transitions 
in Kutch. These interactions are also facilitated by an alliance of actors within 
and outside of the state, bringing in the new constellations that emerged after the 
2001 earthquake. We now turn to the role of some of these networks in the next 
section that this volume characterises as the “middle”. 
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The “middle”: intermediaries for transformation 
After the 2001 earthquake, NGOs working on reconstruction and rehabilitation 
(R and R) rapidly developed expertise in disaster reconstruction while 
simultaneously addressing wider issues concerning Kutch’s development 
trajectory. This became all the more crucial as corporates entered into Kutch in a 
big way after 2001. One NGO worker describes the changed context as follows: 
“We were so busy working on R and R that we hadn’t realised that a corporate 
takeover had taken place” (Interview, October 2016, Bhuj). 
We have already described the impacts of aggressive industrialisation on 
Kutch’s coast and landscapes. Many NGOs have resisted these processes together 
with local communities. However, in some cases, new alliances between India’s 
big corporate houses (Adanis, Ambanis, Tatas and others) and the NGOs have also 
emerged over the past two decades via the route of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). Shrinking development funds from the state often leave CSR money as 
the only or predominant source of funding for many development NGOs and 
research organisations in Kutch (Srivastava and Mehta 2017). While some of the 
NGOs argue that this provides an opportunity “to bring about change from 
within by having a seat at the table”, they also acknowledge that these relations 
are ridden with tensions (Interview October 2016, Bhuj). 
Industries have also roped in scientists to support their compensatory 
aforestation and environmental assessment activities (Srivastava and Mehta 
2017). Having worked in these areas for decades, these scientists not only 
bring along technical expertise but are also able to act as interlocutors between 
the industry and the local communities. Against the backdrop of shrinking 
development funding, these corporate-scientist and corporate-NGO alliances 
may have provided some legitimacy to the “development” discourse in Kutch as 
they are co-opted in the neoliberal project of development in Kutch (Srivastava 
and Mehta 2017). By contrast, more activist-oriented groups have challenged 
these top-down systems of intervention. 
Thus, the “middle” is geographically varied, holds diverse positions and engages 
both with the community and the “above”. As the “middle” often works within 
alliances, they often seamlessly merge into the “above” and “below” depending 
on the context and issue at hand. This also accounts for their heterogeneity and 
diferent strategies which include contestation, subversion and collaboration. For 
example, in the case of CSR, some scientists and NGOs tend to assume the 
role of the “above” dictating policies and programmes, while in other instances, 
they also identify themselves as the “middle” that brokers information from one 
group to the other. 
Thus, torn between the “above” and “below”, and recognising the deep 
divide, some NGOs compare their position to that of a trishanku (a state of limbo 
with conficting aims and ambitions) (Interview June 2016, Rapar). For instance, 
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Yes, there is uncertainty, but the uncertainty of the community is very 
diferent from the uncertainty of the “above”. Their vocabularies are very 
diferent, and they speak in a diferent language. The “above” wants plans 
and strategies and the “below” is concerned about day-to-day food and 
work. Local communities often worry whether they will have food on the 
table for the next meal and if their kids would get education or jobs. And 
the “middle” is diverse and not united. 
(Interview June 2016, Rapar) 
However, several NGOs are also working with communities to provide greater 
support to address these uncertainties. For example, an organisation working 
on groundwater issues in Kutch admits that the landscape of Kutch may have 
changed, but bridging this divide is crucial to navigating through this complex 
environment (Interview October 2016, Bhuj). They now train local people as 
bhujal jankars (those who have knowledge about groundwater) to understand 
groundwater ecology and to work on groundwater conservation in their 
communities. Several such bottom-up and transformative initiatives are currently 
underway in Kutch. One such case concerns the revival of camel rearing in 
Kutch, to which we now turn. 
Restoring pastoral livelihoods 
As discussed above, pastoral communities have been severely afected by industrial
development on the Kutchi coastline. While local people bemoan the loss of their
coastline to ports and industrial enclaves, it is the pastoralists who have lost access
to grazing lands that are either destroyed, encroached upon or made of-bounds for
them. A Kachchh Camel Pastoralists’ Organisation study notes that camel grazing
lands are shrinking due to widespread encroachment and degradation due to large-
scale industrialisation in the coastal areas (KUUMS 2010). The report alleges that
steel and thermal power plants have appropriated huge areas of mangroves, making
them hard to access or useless for grazing. Being a border district, the threat of
terrorism and international security is also often overplayed to deny common
people access to the coast as well as coastal resources (Srivastava and Mehta 2017). 
In Phuleri vand, the camel headcount has dipped from 10,000 to 80 camels 
over the past few decades. “We just can’t get enough fodder, after a port and 
two thermal power plants took away much of the mangroves, and forest guards 
prevent entry to some other areas”, laments Jarod-bhai. He states: 
With the company’s arrival, people started selling their camels and some
have migrated to other places in search of fodder. We are assuming that if this
grazing land problem is not solved, in future no single camel will be available
in this vand. We have to fght the company and the forest department. 
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The massive degradation of mangroves is also threatening the survival of an 
indigenous breed of camels, the celebrated kharai (salty) camels that can browse 
on land and also swim across to the bets (mangrove islands). Mangroves constitute 
about 70% of the kharai’s diet (Shrivastava 2013). In the monsoon, they swim to 
the bets and stay there for a few months getting the crucial nutrition required to 
make milk. However, their access to these mangroves is now very compromised, 
as explained by an ecologist at the NGO Sahjeevan: 
Mangroves [islands] are still there as per their [camel’s] knowledge but they 
cannot access those mangrove islands due to all the industrial activities. So 
now they keep on migrating from one place to another. The herders are 
selling their animals. Earlier they had 500 to 600 camels in this particular 
area. Now they hardly have about 100 camels. 
(Interview September 2016, Bhuj) 
Breeding of the kharai camel is the main source of livelihoods for many Jat and 
Rabari communities in several villages of Abdasa, Mundra, Lakhpat and Bhachau 
talukas. However, mainstream conservation debates within the state often blame 
herding and grazing practices for the denudation of mangroves (Srivastava and 
Mehta 2017). Scientists argue that overgrazing, “unscientifc grazing patterns”, 
that is, camels browsing on leaves and damaging the tree and cutting of leaves are 
responsible for the destruction of mangroves. By contrast, herders vehemently 
oppose this discourse and talk of the synergistic relationship between the camel 
and the mangroves. The Jats denounce the claim that camels could “ever be 
bad for mangroves because they share a natural relationship with the cheria
(mangroves)” (BCP 2012; Srivastava and Mehta 2017). The kharai camels play an 
integral role in the pastoral landscape, and both men and women describe a deep 
connection with these camels. However, with aggressive industrialisation, their 
pastoral identity and landscape are now at risk. As a consequence, several Jat and 
Rabari herders have migrated to low-scale contractual jobs in the companies or 
left for towns and urban centres to work as security guards or taxi drivers (Mehta 
and Srivastava 2019). 
Over the past few years, however, alliances have been made between civil
society and local herders to preserve the pastoral identity and restore the
landscape. The kharai camels have now been recognised in India as a distinct
breed or “threatened” species that need protection. Sahjeevan is working
closely with these marginal communities to revive their indigenous systems
and restore the native habitats, food stocks and grazing routes of the kharai. 
The intervention is transformative in that it hopes to counter received wisdom
regarding pastoralism on many fronts (particularly so on grounds of being
unsustainable), while also using innovative methods and alliances to counter-
arguments and pressures that threaten to disrupt pastoralist practices (Interview
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Compounded uncertainties under COVID-19 
The frst case of COVID-19 in Kutch was recorded in Lakhpat taluka, not far 
from where we are doing research.7 Around 30 families with about 500 kharai
camels use the tropical thorn forests and mangroves in these areas to graze their 
animals (Mehta et al. 2020). Several herders whom we spoke to over the phone 
narrated the problem of fodder and access to pastures in the early period of the 
lockdown. The lockdown coincided with the crucial summer months where 
sources of fodder and water have always been challenging. The immediate efect 
of the lockdown was felt acutely in terms of mobility restrictions, lack of food 
supplies and suspension of dairy activities. Since the villages are located in the 
remote border areas, access to hospitals, banks and shops was highly restricted. 
A Jat herder remarked: “food is a big problem, everything is closed and the 
shops and markets are also quite far” (Telephone interview August 2020). The 
easing of lockdown in May did not resolve the problem of mobility restrictions 
and suspension of livelihood activities. This meant that there was no liquid cash 
for purchasing essential commodities especially food items. In the months that 
followed, Kutch also experienced higher than average rainfall leading to fooded 
farms and waterlogging in various parts of the Abdasa taluka. This excess rainfall 
may have helped pastoralists but those who farm have been disproportionately 
hit by the devastation having lost their crops and agricultural income. These 
intersections of extreme climate variability and the health crises reveal the 
structural inequalities that have compounded the challenges faced by these 
marginal communities and cascaded into diferent livelihoods. 
Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter has argued that radical uncertainty, originating from the combination 
of changes in biophysical stressors, on the one hand, and socio-political changes 
such as marketisation and neoliberal trends, on the other hand, have exacerbated 
the vulnerabilities of the “below”. Traditional methods of adapting to scarcity 
and droughts (e.g. temporary migration, change in cropping patterns, subsistence 
fshing) are struggling to deal with these radical uncertainties. Although 
traditional livelihoods around pastoralism, fshing and dryland agriculture are 
confgured around ecological uncertainties, these have witnessed an almost 
tectonic shift in the wake of rapid industrialisation that has taken place in Kutch 
in the past two decades. These livelihoods are also interdependent, as uncertainty 
experienced in one sector cascade into the other (e.g. maldharis having to buy 
fodder when agriculture fails). 
The “above” takes an aggregate view of uncertainty, albeit realising the value 
of local experiences and the need for a more targeted approach mostly in the 
form of technical interventions that seldom refect the ecological and social 
diversity of this district. Furthermore, institutional silos and the mitigation/ 
energy focused bias in the climate strategy of Gujarat have meant that climate 
policy remains blind to the dryland dynamics of this ecologically diverse district
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(see Mehta 2005). This has hindered the mainstreaming of substantive pro-poor 
adaptation policies, which could include strengthening dryland agriculture and 
pastoralism rather than neglecting or denigrating them. This has often resulted 
in, for example, pastoralists giving up their livelihood in favour of casual labour.
Climate scientists, working within the remits of their discipline, certainly 
recognise the challenges of uncertainty and its associated limitations in modelling. 
Although integrating people’s perceptions into climate science and modelling 
may be difficult, they are keen to “learn” how people cope with uncertainty and 
want to work towards providing information in real time to support livelihoods 
planning and diversification.
The perceptions of the “below”, by contrast, broaden the understanding of 
climate from an experience of the atmospheric phenomenon to lived realities 
as climate variability intersects with various transitions in Kutch. Thus, the 
experiences of uncertainty from “below” are mediated by relations of power 
within the “community” and asserted by more powerful actors such as the 
industries and the state.
The “middle” comprises an assemblage of actors who have differing views and 
positions with regard to climate change and uncertainties. Most of the NGOs agree 
that industrialisation has aggravated the uncertainties faced by these marginalised 
communities, but they often find themselves tied to the political economy of aid and 
grants that limit the possibilities of working for transformative change. Through 
state- and corporate-funded projects, the “middle” acts as an intermediary when 
the communities are tied into relationships of patronage and dependency with 
either the state (through scientists) or the industries (through CSR projects) 
although these relationships are ridden with contradictions and internal tensions
In conclusion, this chapter has highlighted the various manifestations and 
perceptions of uncertainty amongst the “above”, “middle” and “below” in Kutch. 
We have shown that changes in the wider political economy are depleting the 
adaptive capacity of people and, in most cases, accentuating their vulnerability. 
The experience of this radical uncertainty is often mediated by power relations 
between the “above”, “middle” and “below” which shapes their interactions 
and responses to uncertainty. Alliances forged between different actors – state 
and corporate, CSOs and corporations and scientists and communities – have 
intensified the capitalist growth trajectories producing winners and losers. In 
parallel, new alliances are emerging which seek to challenge these incumbent 
neoliberal regimes. These initiatives demonstrate the beginnings of the unruly 
political re-alignments that are seeking to challenge incumbent power structures 
as well as top-down systems of knowledge and could potentially foster pathways 
to social transformation.
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Notes 
1 These are areas demarcated in India to promote investment and trade. Business and 
tax laws are far more relaxed in the SEZs than in the rest of the country. 
2 To respect anonymity, names of respondents have been changed and we have provided 
pseudonyms for the hamlets in Kutch. 
3 Field Journal of Srivastava, 2016. 
4 Field Journal of Srivastava, 2016. 
5 Means sister; in Gujarati, women are often addressed as ben as a mark of respect. 
6 Means brother; in Gujarati, men are often addressed as bhai as a mark of respect. 
7 This section draws on our work in two ongoing projects: TAPESTRY https:// 
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THE CERTAINTY OF UNCERTAINTY 
Climate change realities of the  
Indian Sundarbans 
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FIGURE 5.1 Precarious fshing in the Indian Sundarbans (Photo credit: Shibaji Bose). 
Introduction 
While scientists and policymakers grapple with ways of understanding and 
framing climate-related uncertainty at macro-scales, people’s everyday life is 
mired with uncertainties that are immediate. An understanding and appreciation 
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of these immediacies calls for studies from the grassroots that can build bridges 
with the macro-level framings thus informing substantive policymaking. 
Conway et al. (2019: 7) have argued for “the critical need to situate climate 
adaptation within the context of broader socio-economic, environmental and 
political processes; something that top-down approaches often fail to consider”. 
“[T]he complexity of lived experiences” (ibid.: 7) provides the substratum for 
this chapter which seeks to understand the experiences of uncertainties as they 
unfold in the everyday lives of the people of the Indian Sundarbans, a marginal 
landscape and India’s largest wetlands seemingly drifting out of mainland 
West Bengal in Eastern India. We focus on livelihood uncertainties and other 
uncertainties arising from climate, political economy and embankment politics, 
and the way the “above”, “middle” and “below” (see Chapter 1) understand, 
perceive and respond to these (Figure 5.1). 
We use elements of the livelihood framework (Scoones 1998; Ellis 1999, 
2000) to understand the livelihood portfolio and the ongoing diversifcation 
process pursued by households in the study area. In the process, we coin the term 
“distress diversifcation”, which we feel is more apt to describe what is going on 
in the Sundarbans. The term distress diversifcation captures the diversifcation 
of livelihood activities by households towards less proftable, more tedious, more 
risky, more dangerous, more fragile, more uncertain and marginal activities. It 
also includes diversifcation towards activities that are more labour and capital 
intensive, especially in eroded and marginal lands, which would require higher 
initial investments and incur higher cost of production than previous livelihood 
activities. While this distress diversifcation afects both women and men, the 
intensity is felt more by female-headed households. The term also captures the 
phenomenon of proletarianisation of agricultural and fshing households, when 
they are forced to work as part- or full-time wage labourers to contribute to 
the livelihood portfolio of the household. Households tend to engage in these 
activities under conditions of distress, as we elaborate later in this chapter. 
The Sundarbans is a major climate hotspot and faces signifcant climatic and 
other ecological challenges such as degradation and disappearance of mangrove 
forests, erosion of islands due to rising sea levels, erratic rainfall and extreme 
whether events such as cyclones. While the delta has always been subject to 
climatic variations, recent changes have aggravated efects on the lives and 
livelihoods of the inhabitants. Although climate change impacts and related 
uncertainties have been well documented in the Sundarbans, this chapter tries 
to understand how actors at various levels understand, experience and respond 
to and/or cope with uncertainty and vulnerability. Our primary focus is on the 
two islands of Ghoramara and Mousuni in the Sundarbans, while also capturing 
the views and perceptions of “middle”-level actors involved in mediating policies 
of the “above”. 
The chapter is structured as follows: we frst provide a brief overview of the 
Indian Sundarbans, contextualising the study, followed by a description of the 
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economic and ecological production of the Sundarbans and its uncertainties 
with an exposition of the general ecological and livelihood uncertainties 
and vulnerabilities. This is followed by an analysis of people’s experiences of 
uncertainties with the two major livelihood options – agriculture and fsheries. 
The socio-political disturbances created by the embankment politics and conficts 
and how these exacerbate livelihood uncertainties are then discussed. We discuss 
out-migration as the major coping strategy of the islanders and the attendant 
uncertainties. This is followed by an analysis of the pursuit of alternatives by 
the islanders and the crucial role of the “middle” in mediation. We then discuss 
the political economy of policymaking in the Sundarbans and provide some 
concluding remarks. 
The Indian Sundarbans: a socio-ecological system in transition 
The Sundarbans comprises an area of some 40,000 sq km that includes water, 
forested islands, inhabited islands, cultivable land and part of the mainland. 
This is the world’s largest mangrove delta and is politically and administratively 
divided between India and Bangladesh. The whole land mass of the Indian 
part of the Sundarbans can be divided into two types of inhabited islands: areas 
closer to the mainland and areas on the fringes of the mangrove forest, reclaimed 
between 1900 and 1980. These two geographically distinct areas comprise the 
northern and western part, and the southern part of the Sundarbans, respectively. 
The north-west part is relatively elevated from the sea level and less vulnerable to 
storms and tidal inundations. This stable delta part has fertile soil and freshwater 
canal irrigation system. This part is also closer to West Bengal’s capital city of 
Kolkata than its southern counterpart. 
Islanders in the Sundarbans region have had to contend with shocks such as 
cyclones and foods, and variations in its deltaic ecology as well as socioeconomic 
marginalisation since the frst settlements were established (for more historical 
context, see Chapter 3). In recent years, many scientifc studies have shown that 
erratic climatic events (e.g. more intense rainfall, heatwaves and sea-level rise) are 
becoming more frequent and pronounced. These manifestations of climate change 
have added to the existing problems, including frequent embankment breaching; 
loss of land, homesteads and other assets and salinity ingress in agricultural land 
and freshwater ponds. All of these have placed huge stress on the traditional 
agro-fshing economy and strained the islanders’ coping capacities. Households 
are forced to constantly change their livelihood patterns, for instance, undertake 
agro-fshing, wage labour, seasonal migration to other parts of West Bengal or 
other states of India and so on (WWF 2010; Hazra et al. 2012). 
The literature on the Sundarbans (India and Bangladesh) and the Bay of Bengal
delta depicts that prominent manifestations of climate change like sea level rise
(SLR) is happening at an alarming scale making the life of the islanders increasingly
vulnerable (see, e.g., Hazra et al. 2002, 2010; Ghosh et al. 2015). Incidences of
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near future which would cause the disappearance of the landmass and subsequent
displacement of the population. The Indian part of the Sundarbans is highly
vulnerable to climate change manifestations like land erosion as it is losing its
mangrove cover rapidly (Giri et al. 2007). Some of these changes, however, are
attributed to the active geology of the delta and the several major rivers draining
into the Bay of Bengal. For instance, Mukhopadhyay et al. (2015) suggest that
the changes, especially in the islands of Sagar, Nayachar, Ghoramara and New
Moore, are resulting from changing dynamics in the Bay of Bengal as well as its
numerous rivers that play a major role in accretion and erosion dynamics of the
delta. In a recent study on Ganga–Brahmaputra–Meghna (GBM) delta, Brown
et al. (2018) found that GBM deltas are at high risk of long-term fooding, even if
the global temperatures stabilise. Moreover, large-scale reclamation, deforestation
and unsustainable exploitation of natural resources have contributed to changes
in the physical and biological dynamics of the Sundarbans delta (Hazra et al. 2002;
Ghosh et al. 2015; Hajra and Ghosh 2018). 
Along with the changing climate, recent demographic trends (Census 2011) 
exhibit Sundarbans’ marginality from a development point of view due to its 
mono-cropping-based agriculture and dwindling fshing economy despite 
being ahead of the state average in sex ratio (Sundarbans = 955, West Bengal 
= 950) and overall literacy (Sundarbans = 84.06%, West Bengal = 77.08%). 
At the same time, the impacts of globalisation have also led to changes for the 
islanders through the widespread uptake of mobile phones, television and satellite 
television and the consumption of packaged food and beverages. The problems 
that take centre stage in an ecologically challenged place like Sundarbans are 
heightened vulnerability to climatic events like foods and cyclones, which, in 
turn, exacerbates livelihood uncertainties. 
Ethnographic exploration in Ghoramara and Mousuni 
An ethnographic exploration was conducted in two islands, namely, Ghoramara 
and Mousuni, of the Indian Sundarbans between March 2015 and September 
2018. These are among the ten sea-facing islands in the southern part of the 
Sundarbans and, therefore, most vulnerable to climate events (Hazra et al. 2010). 
Both these islands fall under the administration of Sagar and Namkhana Block of 
South 24 Parganas District and are the two most climate-afected islands within 
the Sundarbans (Hazra et al. 2002). 
Ghoramara has already lost substantial land area due to climate change-
induced land erosion and embankment breaching (Hazra et al. 2010). In 1975,
the total area of this island was 8.51 sq km, which decreased to 4.43 sq km in
2012 (Ghosh et al. 2014), a reduction in size by half. This is an indication of the
alarming rate of land erosion and the consequent loss of habitat and livelihoods.
The situation has forced the islanders to out-migrate, causing a drop of 0.55%
in the population growth per year compared to overall growth of the nearby
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shifted laterally towards the east due to the extensive erosion of the western
part and the acretion in the eastern part (Ghosh and Sengupta 1997). According
to Ghosh et al. (2003) the eastern shore of the island is likely to merge with
mainland India in two-three decades, while the western shore is likely to be
totally washed away. Mousuni Island is situated near the river Hatania-Doania
(a channel that connects India and Bangladesh). This island was severely afected
when cyclone Aila hit the Sundarbans in 2009. Subsequently, a major food in
2014 further breached the embankment and inundated huge tracts of land in
the island. The island has lost 25% of its land area since 1969 and is projected
to lose 15% more by 2020 (Hazra et al. 2010). Up to three-fourths of the island
gets fooded each year. 
The agricultural land area of Ghoramara is 1.2% and that of Mousuni is 17% of 
the total land area, respectively. The percentage of agricultural land is quite low 
in Ghoramara as this island has experienced the maximum land loss, including 
large extents of agricultural land over time (Hajra et al. 2016). The estimated 
erosion rates of agricultural land per year during the period from 1990 to 2015 
were 0.02 sq.km in Ghoramara and 0.08 sq km in Mousuni (ibid.). Considerable 
changes have occurred in the shape and size of both islands due to processes of 
erosion or accretion (ibid.). 
Interactions were conducted mainly with community members who faced 
climatic shocks directly or indirectly in the last fve years (2015–2020). We had 
interactions with 86 persons, both women and men (including elders), who could 
describe climatic and related changes over the last 40 years, community leaders 
like Self-Help Group leaders, school teachers, political and religious leaders, local 
doctors and grass roots village health workers, local clubs and activists working 
with environmental issues, Panchayat (local administrative unit) members and 
local media personnel. 
A participatory rural appraisal technique, namely, the Participatory Hazard 
Ranking exercise, was also undertaken as a visual means of enabling the 
respondents to construct and analyse their own uncertainty contexts in Mousuni 
and Ghoramara. These techniques were used after six months of the initial 
ethnographic observation and discussion with the community. The Participatory 
Hazard Ranking exercise was used to analyse the experiences of extreme climatic 
events after cyclone Aila. This is because many extreme events after Aila have 
not received the same attention because of their relatively low scale of impacts. 
Still they have contributed to the livelihood distress in the islands. The exception 
being cyclone Amphan of 2020, which we focus on briefy later in this chapter. 
A total of 48 key-informant interviews were conducted with the “middle” of 
the Sundarbans, comprising actors starting from grass roots non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs) and journalists 
having an understanding of ground-level realities, to activists working in the 
Sundarbans for the past three decades and community leaders. We also focussed on 
the “above” of the Sundarbans, identifed through snowballing and interviewed 
30 representatives from several government departments, scientists working in 
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universities and donor agencies funding diferent developmental projects. In-
depth discussions were held with the “middle” and “above” regarding their 
perception on climate change in the Sundarbans and accompanying uncertainties 
in local people’s livelihoods. We also relied on secondary literature ranging 
from journal articles, media reports, grey literature and vernacular writings and 
magazines. 
Historical, political economic and ecological production  
of uncertainty in the Sundarbans 
As discussed in Chapter 3, understanding the unique socio-ecological development 
of the Sundarbans has been a challenge to historians. According to Eaton (1990), 
the Sundarbans forest was a frontier zone for many centuries: from 1200 to 1750 
AD, it was an economic frontier for wet rice farmers who came from further 
west of the region, a political frontier for the Delhi Sultanate (1204–1575) and 
the Mughal Empire (1575–1765). The wet rice farmers brought with them new 
technologies and forms of social organisation, and the state formation by the 
Islamic rulers played a major role in the intensifcation of rice cultivation and 
introduced new property rights systems. All these contributed to fundamental 
changes in the ecological system of the Sundarbans – the natural forested 
ecosystem began to undergo radical changes. The “process of clearing the forests 
preparatory for agricultural operations produced extremely complex tenure 
chains extending from the zamindar [landlord] at their upper end, down to the 
actual cultivator at the lower end” (Eaton 1990: 11) with numerous intermediaries 
in between. Land was leased to the zamindars, who sub-leased it to men who 
were, in turn, prepared to bring colonies of cultivators from the mainland to the 
Sundarbans islands. This system brought in countless intermediaries who were, 
in fact, capitalist speculators (Eaton 1990). Large tracts of natural forests were 
converted to paddy rice lands by the late 18th century when the British took over 
the governance of the region and the new colonisation of the area began. Some of 
the most remote forest tracts of the Sundarbans were transformed into fertile rice 
felds in the period between 1905 and 1920, by creating a class of small peasants 
who were forced to settle down permanently in the islands (Ascoli 2020). The 
extractive tenure systems and the tough ecological conditions of production 
resulted in the immiseration of the peasantry (Chatterjee 1990). 
After independence, the Sundarbans was divided between India and (East) 
Pakistan (now Bangladesh). New borders were created across the rivers and 
water bodies, rendering the eforts to control the efects of foods, cyclones and 
other natural calamities a difcult task. The property rights regime and forest 
conservation policies continued along the colonial lines. Our discussions with 
the islanders revealed the complexity of the confused land tenure regimes they 
inherited through history (see also Chapter 3). A large number of households in 
our study area do not have land records, and this creates bureaucratic impediments 
to accessing services from the state including compensations for loss of land 
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“middle”-level actors mainly the community leaders, NGO/CBO personnel and 
social science scholars working in the Sundarbans, highlighted that the islanders 
have to contend with the uncertainties imposed on them by history, geography 
and politics. Historically, their forefathers were forced to come to the islands 
by the probashi zamindars (absentee landlords) who got the right to the land as 
lease from the British, while some of the islanders are descendants of the raiyats
(independent proprietors of land) who settled down in the Sundarbans when the 
raiyatwari system (a land tenure system where the registered land holder (raiyat) 
was recognized as the proprietor from whom revenue was collected directly by 
the government) was introduced. However, we also found that some households 
benefted during the massive land reforms implemented by the left-wing 
governments in the 1970s and 1980s in West Bengal, which included distribution 
of land to landless households and registration and regulation of tenancy contracts. 
The process of land reform was complex and protracted and eventually came to a 
standstill in the late 1980s (see Bardhan et al. 2014 for a discussion of land reforms 
in West Bengal). Hence, the process was not completed and a sizeable amount 
of households remained landless. In addition, due to unofcial in-migration in 
Sundarbans in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there has been a further increase 
in the number of landless people. However, a large part of the benefts from 
land reforms in Ghoramara and Mousuni have been lost to the sea, or rendered 
uncultivable due to salinity ingression, as explained by the informants. 
According to experts and “middle”-level actors, climate-related uncertainties
are caused by various factors including rising sea level, increase in sea current
and increasing variability in the patterns around cyclones and foods. These
are exacerbated by government apathy towards the maintenance of bunds, the
construction of the Haldia port with total disregard for the islands which are nearest
to the Bay of Bengal and insecurities around access to water, health and food.
Due to the gendered division of labour, changing access to water, health and food
particularly afect younger women and mothers who have caring responsibilities
in the household. Ironically, globalisation and market forces have also increased
vulnerabilities of local people, already dealing with the impacts of climate change.
Take, for example, the advent of the fshing and the tourism lobby. One of the
major tourist attractions – the sea beach of Bakkhali – was the temporary site for
fsh drying for local fshing families. The smell of the drying fsh, however, was
disliked by tourists and tourist operators. The strong political lobbying by the
tourism industry resulted in mass evacuation of small-scale fshing families without
providing them with alternatives. As pointed out by Ohdedar (2020), “This
impoverishment [of the people of Sundarbans] is not a natural state or determined
purely by the fragile ecology. Rather, it is the result of human agency, policies,
laws and institutions”.1 Uncertainties and vulnerabilities of the local populations
are, thus, produced through political economic and ecological processes, where the
global and the local intersect through networks of power relations. Therefore, we
need to go beyond the “schematic of external climatic threats and internal social
exposures” (Taylor 2014: 4) in thinking about social transformation, as the internal
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Cascades of ecological vulnerabilities to livelihood uncertainties 
Climate change in the Sundarbans is imposing uncertainty for diferent actors 
in diverse ways although this varies in pattern and magnitude. Among those, 
the most immediate and prioritised by the “below”, “middle” and “above” is 
livelihood uncertainty. Our study shows that communities living in these islands 
face constant threats to their lives and livelihoods. Climate-induced changes 
have led to increased heat, unpredictable rainfall and delayed monsoon, whereas 
climate-induced geo-morphological changes like sea-level rise and increasing 
sea surface temperature have led to increases in fooding, cyclones, rapid erosion 
and salinity of land and freshwater sources. These changes have an increasing 
impact on the household income of the traditional agro-fshing communities. 
For example, a middle-aged male respondent from Mousuni Island narrates: 
In my childhood, the sea wasn’t that rough, rain came on time for the seed 
sowing; we got good fsh in ponds and grew vegetables plenty. God knows 
what happened in the last two decades, everything changes-the rain, the 
sea, the river, everything. 
(Interview November 2016, Mousuni Island) 
Saline lands and ponds are rendered unsuitable for cultivation and pisciculture. 
Moreover, frequent fooding breaches the embankments and destroys household 
assets and crops, leaving the community in deep economic uncertainty. 
Consequently, households are compelled to change/modify/diversify their 
livelihood pattern constantly through multiple ways, viz., cropping pattern 
changes, wage labour, fshing, prawn seed collection, crab catching, seasonal 
migration and so on in order to secure income and resources. We discuss these in 
detail in the following sections. 
To explore the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and the extent
of destruction, a Participatory Hazard Ranking exercise was conducted with a
mixed group of community members in Ghoramara. The results are provided
in Table 5.1. According to the group, except in 2013, every year after the 2009
cyclone Aila, there were natural hazards such as rapid land erosion, high water
levels and relative inundation, embankment breaching and moderate cyclones
that hampered the daily living and livelihood activities. The impacts were multi-
pronged and multi-layered which created deep uncertainties for livelihoods and
shelter. Salinity ingression in agricultural felds and fshing ponds; loss of standing
crops; loss of other livelihoods; demolition of homestead; erosion of agricultural
and non-agricultural lands were the major impacts of such consecutive climatic
events. The respondents reported skin rashes, diarrhoea and other waterborne
diseases during these periods. According to them, these small shocks cumulatively
resulted in loss in fsh catch, yearly loss of crops and large-scale out-migration of
male family members from the island. Though communities received emergency
support from the Panchayats and CBOs, they did not receive any long-term
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TABLE 5.1 The climate shock history of Ghoramara Island. Compiled from the 
Participatory Hazard Ranking exercise in Ghoramara, 2016, by the authors 
Year Type of Extreme Event Type of Destruction 
2015 Flood and tidal • Water level increase 
inundations • Breaching of embankment and Inundation 
initiated 





Inundation due to embankment breaching 
Demolition of homesteads 
Severe skin infection 
•
•
Huge loss of agricultural crops 
Loss of fsh catch 
• Loss of cattle 
2013 No signifcant climatic 
•
N
Drinking water crisis due to salinity intrusion 
one 
events 






Livestock washed away 
Children sufered from fever and diarrhoea 
for almost a month 





Loss of agricultural crops and fsh catch 




Livestock washed away 
Children sufered from fever and diarrhoea 
for almost a month 






Loss of agricultural crops and fsh catch 
Water logging in households for months 
Loss of pond fshing due to salinity intrusion 
Loss of agricultural crops due to salinity 
intrusion 
Mousuni Island too experienced similar consecutive impacts but being larger 
than Ghoramara Island, the manifestations were more localised and almost went 
unnoticed by even the local administration. As noted by a woman from Mousuni: 
This time only our hamlet got fooded during the annual high tide. The 
villagers kept an eye on the embankment the whole night and quickly 
fxed the embankment as and when it was breached, all on our own. The 
Panchayat did not help with anything as it was only a matter of few houses. 
(Interview December 2016, Mousuni Island) 
The communities’ experience shows that such localised events are gradually 
eroding the resources in a subtle manner which is often unrecognisable to 
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Coping with livelihood uncertainties: towards distress
diversifcation 
The livelihood framework developed by Scoones (1998) is a common analytical 
tool especially in rural contexts to understand the resources and strategies available 
for households to earn a living. Households employ natural, economic, physical 
and human capital to pursue strategies such as agricultural intensifcation and/ 
or extensifcation, diversifcation of activities, migration and so on. Ellis (1999, 
2000) further developed the idea of livelihood diversifcation and discusses the 
idea of rural households’ construction of livelihood portfolios. The livelihood 
framework focuses on what households already have and builds on that, where 
diversifcation is a strategy for expanding the livelihood portfolio to achieve 
sustainable livelihoods. Contrary to this, what we see in the Sundarbans is a 
constant erosion of the various livelihood capitals (natural, physical, fnancial 
and human capitals, cf. Scoones 1998), which places serious constraints on the 
possible strategies that could be pursued by households. Livelihood diversifcation 
is, indeed, ongoing in Mousuni and Ghoramara. This, as we elaborate in later 
sections, is a diversifcation towards less proftable, more dangerous, more fragile 
and more marginal livelihood activities such as switching from rice to betel leaf 
cultivation in unfertile eroded lands on the waters’ edge, prawn seed collection, 
crab catching, fshing in dangerous waters and in the vicinity of the tiger 
reserve and so on. Therefore, we call this “distress diversifcation”. In distress 
diversifcation, households have already lost the assets/capitals/resources they had 
and diversifcation is not a choice but a necessity for survival. 
Households in Ghoramara and Mousuni are not only displaced to other locations
within the islands for new shelter but are also forced to engage in diversifed
sources of income including wage labour and out-migration. A female farmer from
Mousuni said, “We have to dig the earth; we have to work for others; we have to
live life” (Interview September 2016, Mousuni Island). 
Declining agricultural productivity 
Most of the respondents reported loss of productivity of agricultural land due 
to salinity ingress after Aila and expressed concern that “at least fve to six years 
would be needed to regain the productivity”, as stated by a middle-aged male 
farmer from Mousuni Island (Interview November 2015 Mousuni Island). The 
experiential knowledge of respondents regarding increasing tidal inundations 
appears to be in concurrence with the scientifc knowledge of sea-level rise in the 
region. As stated by a female villager from Mousuni: 
In my childhood we could not see the river bed from our village. We could see
it only from a distance once we got to the top of the embankment. Now the
river and the plain are at the same surface level, the river has come so near to us. 
(Interview May 2016, Mousuni Island) 
 
 
Climate realities in the Sundarbans 117 
It would also mean that the islanders continue to lose both natural and physical 
capital. 
Other respondents added that these localised incidents lead to recurrent loss 
in agriculture, particularly rice crop and farmers succumb to the cycle of debt 
leading to gradual economic impoverishment by the loss of fnancial capital. Loss 
of agricultural land to the sea, that is, land erosion is also a common phenomenon, 
thereby losing both natural and physical capital. A farmer from Ghoramara stated: 
I had a plot of land until last year which was very near to the embankment. 
At the peak of harvesting time, the plot started sliding into the sea. It 
happened so rapidly that I could manage to harvest only a few kilos of 
paddy which was sufcient for household consumption only for a few 
months. The compensation given by the government was not applicable 
in my case as it was not related to foods or cyclone; hence I couldn’t 
claim compensation for losing my land to the sea. Now I have to work as 
a labourer in my neighbour’s feld which is a bit centrally located within 
Ghoramara. 
(Interview March 2017, Ghoramara Island) 
Moreover, as mentioned above, the loss of soil fertility leads to decrease in crop 
productivity. Rice is the primary crop and staple food of the study islands and the 
productivity of rice is an indicator of the regional economy (Hazra et al. 2002; 
Hajra and Ghosh 2016). About two-thirds of the population in these islands are 
dependent on rice monocropping (Aman crop) for their livelihoods (Census of 
India 2011; Hajra and Ghosh 2018). Islanders are trying to cope with livelihood 
uncertainties by changing cropping pattern – from food crops like rice and 
vegetables to cash crops like betel leaves, which, in turn, has implications for the 
food security of the islanders. A middle-aged betel leaf farmer from Ghoramara 
Island stated: 
In my childhood, I have seen Ghoramara producing sufcient amount 
of rice grains and vegetables like chilli and watermelon. The piece of 
land which was once fertile enough to produce 550–560 kg of paddy has 
reduced its production to 220–240 kg. We have now shifted from paddy 
cultivation to betel leaf cultivation. The continuous intrusion of saline sea 
water during tidal inundation has reduced the fertility of the land. It can 
hardly produce paddy and betel once in a year. Still we are struggling. 
(Interview August 2016, Ghoramara Island) 
Switching to betel leaf cultivation is a form of distress diversifcation consequent 
to the loss of land fertility, that is, natural capital, as the land is unsuitable for 
rice cultivation, which is the preferred crop. These lands are perched on the 
water’s edge and could be rendered unviable or vanish into the sea any time by 
tidal surges and inundations. Construction of betel leaf garden incurs high costs 
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and only a few can aford to do that. Most of the islanders build the structures 
necessary for betel leaf garden by taking loans from the local money lenders at 
high interest rates. As mentioned by respondents, this is a risky strategy. If and 
when there is a crop loss, due to fooding or erosion of the plot, the farmers are 
unable to repay the loan and they get caught in a debt trap. Some of the islanders 
who have already lost their lands work as wage labourers in the betel gardens. 
Women farmers are more vulnerable in this regard. We were informed 
that women who previously had lands used to work their own felds. But after 
losing their land to the sea, they ended up working as agricultural labourers in 
the betel leaf gardens of others. From the discussions, it became apparent that 
this is still a “comfortable” option for them to work within the island as the 
owners of the gardens are either their close neighbours or fellow villagers. The 
women we spoke to mentioned that there are limited options left for them to 
sustain livelihoods like kitchen garden and livestock rearing, due to the loss of 
land. “As paddy cultivation is depleting, our livestock is getting less amount 
of fodder. In many cases we have to sell them, though we know that we are 
losing another source of income”, stated a female villager during an all-female 
discussion in Mousuni (Interview November 2016, Mousuni Island). Increasing 
proletarianisation of both women and men is, thus, ongoing in Ghoramara and 
Mousuni, in the wake of loss of land and other income earning on-farm activities 
such as animal husbandry. The islanders are increasingly adding wage labour to 
their livelihood portfolio as a distress diversifcation strategy. 
Agricultural livelihoods are, thus, characterised by continuous loss of natural, 
physical and fnancial capitals and distress diversifcation to other crops as well 
as wage labour. Although there is no specifc intervention targeted at small, 
marginal or landless farmers to address the aforementioned challenges, there 
are a few initiatives taken by the “middle” – the CBOs/NGOs with scientifc 
support from agricultural scientists (“above”) of various Universities of West 
Bengal are supporting the depleting agriculture to adapt in the face of climate 
change. Discussions with the CBOs revealed that there are attempts to bring 
back salinity-resistant rice varieties to the marginal farmers especially those who 
lost productivity of their agricultural land due to salinity ingression. These are 
contributing to processes of reintroducing local knowledge and practices that 
existed in the region. These practices had almost been lost due to the Green 
Revolution agricultural practices promoted by the government of India, where 
the focus was on the adoption of high-yielding varieties (HYV) of crops and 
use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides. Of late, the collaboration between 
agricultural scientists, local CBOs and farmers has led to the development of 
farmers’ associations in large parts of the afected areas which are attempting 
to revive traditional and local agricultural practices alongside general awareness 
programmes of organic farming. Model farms have been selected by a few leading 
NGOs, mostly concentrated within the project implementation areas. However, 
there is not much uptake either by the government or by the community outside 
the implementation areas. These interventions, if scaled up, could contribute 
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to the revival of livelihoods and perhaps slow down the process of distress 
diversifcation to the high-risk betel leaf cultivation as well as diversifcation 
out of agriculture to wage labour and other marginal and risky activities such as 
fshing and crab catching, as discussed below. 
Between the tiger and the deep sea: fshing in uncertain waters 
Fishing is a traditional livelihood activity in the Sundarbans. One of the traditional 
inland fshing activity – meendhar (prawn seed collection) – was associated with 
the women fshers of the Sundarbans. This small-scale fshing was considered 
to be mainly a “women’s job” as it was less risky than deep-sea fshing. Women 
fshers could contribute to the livelihood portfolio of the household through 
their meen catch. Prawn seed collection, though deemed less risky, is, indeed, a 
tedious process, which demands standing long in waist deep salt water, leading 
to health consequences like vaginal infection and body ache. 
Deep-sea fshing in coastal waters was another signifcant source of livelihood 
for majority of the people in the Sundarbans. Many of their local belief systems 
and social structure are also built around this livelihood activity. Climate change 
along with globalisation is now driving this traditional livelihood towards 
extinction. According to the local fsherfolk, the amount of fsh caught in the 
past two decades is much less than their previous experience. According to the 
respondents, both climatic and non-climatic factors have caused the declining 
fsh catch. For instance, the extinction of a few fsh species due to extreme climate 
events and the increasing number of fshing trawlers from other states active in 
the waters of the Sundarbans have caused a decline in the quantity and quality 
of the fsh catch of the islanders. They are also concerned that the waters have 
become more unfriendly to the traditional ways of fshing. According to them, 
fshing has now become a professional activity undertaken commercially by 
outsiders rather than a traditional livelihood activity of the islanders. A middle-
aged fsher of Mousuni Island said: 
It is not at all a proftable option anymore. The nature of the water has 
changed; it became rough and wavy along the coast. We-the fsher folk 
of the village took a collective decision to leave fshing and take up wage 
labour to sustain livelihood.
 (Interview April 2016, Mousuni Island) 
The respondents mentioned that the amount of fsh catch around the coast is 
declining. Now they have to go far out into the sea for longer number of days 
to catch a desirable quantity. “We are not getting good fsh catch along the 
coast. My sons have to go for 7–10 days in the deep sea to catch fsh now. I have 
discontinued going with them as my health is not permitting the stress of journey 
into the sea”, stated an elderly fsherman from Ghoramara (Interview January 
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increased intrusion of mechanised trawlers, leaving chemical pollutants in the 
water, which has led to degradation of river water and disappearance of some fsh 
species. The diminution of natural capital – the fsh population, fsh species and 
the quality of coastal waters, signals increased uncertainties within the fshery-
based livelihoods. 
Fishers’ experiences and observations correspond to the scientifc explanation
(Hazra et al. 2010; WWF 2011) that rising sea surface temperature is impacting
the costal marine life and forcing the species to move into the deep sea. “The
coastal marine life has changed especially after Aila. Some of the species
have changed their habitat due to the increasing sea surface temperature and
migrated to the deep sea”, stated the Principal Scientist of Central Institute
of Brackishwater Aquaculture, Kakdwip Research Centre (Interview, January
2017 Kakdwip). 
The declining fsh catch and increasing operational cost make the condition 
difcult for the fshers in the Sundarbans to continue with this once most viable 
livelihood option. Available credit facilities are now declining and fshers fnd it 
difcult to meet the operational expenses. Inland small fshing, which used to be 
a prominent livelihood option in Sundarbans, is also decreasing, especially after 
Aila. Salinity intrusion into the fsheries has made them unsuitable for freshwater 
fshing and unusable especially for meendhara (prawn seed collection). Moreover, 
Meen has always been in controversy because of biodiversity conservation in the 
Sundarbans as this traditional practice is considered a threat to the conservation 
of marine species (see also Jalais 2010; Sen and Pattanaik 2017). According to 
the Biodiversity Conservation Act, prawn seed collection from the fringes of the 
river is now illegal. From a livelihood perspective, the ban on meen collection 
has resulted in the loss of this natural capital for the households in general and 
women in particular. This has forced them to engage in distress diversifcation to 
crab catching, as discussed “below”. 
The islanders mentioned that, given the increasing constraints in coastal fshing,
inland fshing and prawn seed collection, most of the fshers have switched to crab
catching. However, this activity entails more physical stress and is riskier as crabs
are mostly found around the tiger reserves, inhabited by the ferce Bengal Tiger.
The waters are also home to a large number of crocodile populations. While “tiger
widow” is a common phenomenon in the Sundarbans due to a large number of
men losing their lives to the tiger in pursuit of livelihoods (collection of minor
forest produce, crab catching, fshing, etc.), now women themselves and children
are increasingly at risk. This is, indeed, the epitome of distress diversifcation,
especially by the most vulnerable groups – women and children. As told by the
respondents, it is mostly women and children who are engaged in crab catching as
men are compelled to out-migrate seasonally to work elsewhere for cash incomes.
However, as the demand for crab in the market is relatively low compared to prawn
and in the absence of commercial market regulations for crab selling, crabs fetch
lower prices than the actual market price. This is a refection of the patriarchal
social norms, which undervalue the labour of women and children. 
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Although crab catching is pursued by many islanders as it is a relatively 
proftable option, respondents from the “middle” (NGOs/CBOs) refect on 
two main challenges that make commercial crab catching not so viable for the 
community. One, crab is not considered to be a nutritious food in Bengali food 
culture; hence, it is not very popular in the daily diet. Second, quite related to the 
frst, there is a lack of marketing strategies to sell the collected crabs in an organised 
way. The respondents maintained that there is a steady demand for Sundarbans’ 
crab in the Chinese market. However, due to the lack of formalised regulations 
and infuence of the middlemen, the catchers who are risking their lives do not 
receive adequate payments. According to the “middle”, crab catching can be an 
alternative for the people if marketised well in combination with risk reduction 
measures. While crab catching is a potentially viable livelihood activity, it risks 
the loss of human capital, including human lives. 
The above discussion highlights the diferent forms and dimensions of the 
distress diversifcation of livelihoods the people of the study islands are engaged 
in. They constantly incur loss of natural capital, physical capital, economic/ 
fnancial capital and human capital due to the extreme weather events, which 
compel them to engage in distress diversifcation to marginal, more dangerous 
and precarious livelihood activities, which, in turn, might result in further loss 
of human capital and human life itself. In the Sundarbans context, therefore, it 
may not be fruitful to focus on what households already have, as envisaged in the 
livelihood framework, but focus should be on the erosion of the various capitals 
and support alternative less precarious livelihood strategies. 
Socio-political uncertainties: embankment politics and conficts 
Embankment failures during extreme events are a common phenomenon in the 
study islands. These often contribute to the vulnerabilities faced by the islanders 
due to the loss of homesteads, land and livelihoods and sometimes life itself. 
The repeatedly breached and continuously eroding embankments in the study 
islands starkly highlight the ongoing uncertainties faced by the islanders and 
serve as a foreboding of the disasters-in-waiting. The scale of displacement 
this has generated and continues to generate is huge. In Ghoramara, after the 
disappearance of a signifcant part of the island Khasimara, 30,000 households 
had been resettled to Jibantala in Kakdwip Block 40 years ago. Since then, there 
has been no ofcial rehabilitation programmes by the government, although 
breaching of embankments is a recurrent phenomenon along the coastline of 
the island. We were told that households from the eroded hamlets keep moving 
towards the interior of the islands in a centrifugal fashion and live in make-shift 
houses almost every year. This has, in turn, increased the population density in 
the interior parts of the island and has led to further pressures on vital resources 
like drinking water, homestead and cultivable lands. The embankment breaches 
have led to a gradual stratifcation of the island societies with the livelihoods 
of the households living in the periphery taking a direct hit compared to their 
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fellow islanders living on higher grounds or towards the central part of the 
afected islands. The loss of homesteads and habitats, agricultural lands, salination 
of ponds, loss of drinking water sources, etc. are far greater for the people living 
close to the embankments. This has resulted in livelihood inequities leading to 
variable uncertainties vis-á-vis the geography within the islands. 
Embankments are a highly contested technology in the context of the 
Sundarbans. Historically, mud embankments began to be erected in the 1770s 
during the British colonial period in order to facilitate the reclamation and 
settlement of people and to protect the agricultural lands from tidal waves (Sarkhel 
2013; also see Chapter 3). Though continuously maintained by the Public Works 
Department, the repeated extreme weather events, sea level rise and tidal surges 
have led to the collapse of large sections of the embankments. In the period 
between 1961 and 2000, the Sundarbans region experienced 31 severe cyclones. 
The cyclone Aila in 2009 was an extreme weather event that had catastrophic 
efects and resulted in the destruction of about 500 kilometres of embankments 
(Sarkhel 2013). Following this, with the fnancial assistance of the World Bank, 
the Sundarbans Embankment Reconstruction Project has been initiated to build 
“modern” concrete embankments (Mehtta and Bhattacharyya 2020). 
While some hail this as a technological breakthrough in the protection 
of the Sundarbans against climate change, others are critical and ask if this 
is a sustainable approach to the problem. For example, the title of a National 
Geographic article reads “Building tomorrow in the Sundarbans: How an 
inspiring project is rebuilding the lives of an endangered community facing the 
threat of rising sea levels” (National Geographic 2019).2 This project employing 
“modern” technology is expected to “turn the tide” according to the article. 
Mehtta and Bhattacharyya (2020), on the other hand, ask, “Is concrete the way 
forward in rebuilding the Sunderbans?” “During Cyclone Amphan, these modern 
embankments, with their whopping budgets and their supposed state-of-the-art 
material, developed cracks, broke and collapsed”.3 Rudra (2010) has discussed 
extensively the socio-ecological consequences of concrete embankment building 
in the Sundarbans in the aftermath of Aila. 
A scientifc expert and senior bureaucrat, in an interview, pointed out: “The 
World Bank sanctioned INR 5,000 Crores for building concrete embankments 
in the Sundarbans, out of which only INR 149 crores has been utilised in the last 
seven years”. Embankment – the life line of the Sundarbans – has not been planned 
according to the scientifc inputs provided to the relevant departments, as stated 
by several “above” and “middle”-level respondents. According to the website 
of State Irrigation Department (updated in January 2018), after the devastating 
cyclone Aila in 2009, which broke at least 400 km of embankments,4 a task force 
on “Restoration of Sundarbans Embankments damaged by the cyclone Aila” 
was formed by the Union Ministry of Water Resources. Concrete embankments 
were proposed by the Department of Irrigation, which was recommended by 
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According to Irrigation Department ofcials in the Blocks to which the study 
islands belong and the website of the same department, this new embankment 
is going to be higher than it was previously, which would need more lands from 
the islands thus making the land mass smaller. It is planned to slant towards the 
coast covered by mangroves as frst line of defence against storms or cyclones. 
In line with scientifc expertise from the Irrigation Department, incorporation 
of geo-tubes has been proposed in more erosion-prone zones. However, the 
rest of the embankments is going to be earthen. Ground-level staf of Irrigation 
Department, a crucial actor for implementation who are mainly working at 
Block level, pointed out the gap between knowledge and implementation in the 
construction of embankments in eroded parts of the region. According to the 
irrigation ofcer of one of the studied Blocks: 
We are not giving enough time to the land to be mature geo-
morphologically to hold the dense population. More so, building
embankment on one side create pressure on the river to erode the land
on the side where the homesteads are situated. This faulty design of
embankment along with cutting down of mangroves catalysed the rapid
erosion of the Sundarbans. 
(Interview May 2016, Kakdwip) 
The embankment is a bone of contention among various actors. Amidst the 
pressures and compulsions of competitive electoral politics, the politicians 
are compelled to act, in forms that are “visible” to their constituencies. The 
technocrats are always already prepared for technological solutions, while the 
bureaucrats seem ever ready to push any solution that comes to the table. The 
voices that arise from the amphibian landscape of the Sundarbans get drowned 
even before they leave the islands. 
According to “below” respondents, breaching of embankments is almost a 
regular phenomenon now, especially during the monsoons. Local people expect 
that every year the necessary maintenance and repair works be done before the 
monsoon in a pro-active manner. However, according to local communities, 
the Irrigation Department ofcials and contractors responsible for building or 
repairing embankments fail to deliver work on time; hence, submergence and 
temporary displacement occur repeatedly every year. Previously, there was 
ground-level staf from Irrigation Department (called beldaar in Bengali) posted 
in each island to monitor the status of the embankments. Eventually, these posts 
were abolished or remained vacant due to the negligence on the part of the 
Panchayat. At the time of our feldwork, Ghoramara had only one beldar who 
was close to retirement age (60 years) and without the required equipment to 
repair the embankments, and Mousuni did not have such a post. The beldar of 
Ghoramara stated that the private contractors appointed by the Panchayat have
become more powerful as they are generating wage labour opportunities for the 
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The highly politicised nature of the embankments became obvious during the 
discussions with the islanders. They mentioned the complexities created by the
partisan politics that prevails in the islands, a refection of wider patron/client 
nature of West Bengal and Indian village politics which has resulted in prioritising 
repair work for selective households that support the elected representative. A 
community leader from Mousuni stated: 
The embankment building in the present political context is just to earn 
some more money. Nothing else. The situation has changed completely. 
Now we are not making a proper embankment; we are using low quality 
materials; we often pluck the bricks from the embankment and allow the 
water to come in; we even break the portion at night which has been 
built during the day. The political parties are earning benefts out of this 
embankment breaching.
 (Interview February 2017, Mousuni Island) 
Embankments are thus not merely physical structures of uncertainty to be 
breached by the waters but contested political structures to be repeatedly 
breached and repaired in an efort to sustain livelihoods and negotiate political 
power at the margins. 
The role of out-migration 
Migration has emerged as the most popular and accepted way of coping with 
the ever-present difculties and vulnerabilities on the islands. The Sundarbans 
is currently experiencing permanent out-migration as well as seasonal out-
migration. Permanent out-migration means that islanders leave Sundarbans 
and settle down permanently elsewhere, mainly in a nearby city or town. 
This has been historically attributed to the pull factors (Todaro 1969). Of late, 
climate change uncertainties and vulnerabilities, that is, push factors are also 
contributing to permanent out-migration. The northern and the southern parts 
of the Sundarbans are only about 4–5 and 5–6 hours, respectively, by road 
from the mega city Kolkata and are experiencing the impact of globalisation 
and increasing urbanisation. These act as pull factors especially for the educated 
rural elite of Sundarbans to settle down near Kolkata where they have access to 
better education opportunities for their children (e.g. English-medium schools) 
and healthcare facilities (e.g. multi-speciality hospitals). However, they usually 
leave their parental home under the care of their relatives or elderly parents, 
sometimes, a piece of agricultural land in these islands as a symbol of their roots. 
The educated youth are often able to fnd of-farm employment in the towns 
and cities. The discussions we had with the educated elite youth revealed that 
they wanted to leave the Sundarbans because they are worried about the extreme 
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which struck in 2020). “It has now become a land of fury, cyclones, foods, no 
facilities. I do not want my daughter to be here anymore. I have bought a house 
in Sonarpur. My daughter got admission in a good school in Kolkata. At least 
she will have a good life”, stated a young man from Mousuni (Interview August, 
2016, Jaynagar, South 24 Parganas). 
Seasonal out-migration especially by men has also emerged as a widely
accepted coping strategy. Male members migrate to the cities and towns of West
Bengal or to other states in India for certain periods of the year and engage in
unskilled work like wage labour, as restaurant waiters, working in cold storages,
construction sector and so on. The uneducated rural poor mostly opt for
seasonal migration. Respondents stated that it is quite difcult for them to cope
with this livelihood transition as they often lack even the basic level of skills
required for the jobs and they do not have opportunities for acquiring the new
skills in the Sundarbans. Hence, physical wage labour is the only option. Most
of the households in Mousuni and Ghoramara have at least one family member
who has migrated either to other states like Haryana, Kerala, etc., or cities like
Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, or to cities within West Bengal such as Kolkata,
Hooghly and Burdwan. During feldwork, we met with some migrants who
had returned home from other states for a certain period of the year and were
waiting to travel back to their host regions. In the absence of men, women
assume the responsibility as head of the household. When they do not receive
remittance in time, they are compelled to borrow from money lenders at high
interest rates to meet household expenses. Women in a group interaction in
Mousuni stated: 
Mahajans increase the rate of interest as per his wish any time. But still 
we have to take loans from them, if husbands fail to send money on time. 
Earning options are becoming less and less here. How can we run the 
show? 
(Interview May 2017, Mousuni Island) 
It would seem that for a number of island households incomes from seasonal 
migration of family members are uncertain as well. Therefore, the coping 
strategy of seasonal migration adds another dimension to the uncertainties. 
Searching for alternatives and the crucial role of the “middle” 
As the traditional livelihood opportunities are depleting, there is a growing need
to build new skills for livelihood and address the problems they face regarding the
existing livelihood options. With growing demand from the community, a section
of the “middle” is trying to fll the gap by implementing various alternatives by
creating alliances. Personnel from NGOs and CBOs widely acknowledged the
funding apathy for long-term climate change programmes and went on saying
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that the big donor agencies are more interested in short-term disaster reliefs whose
impacts are rapid and visible. The Chief Secretary of a local NGO stated: 
The international agencies rushed with aid and disaster relief to partially 
ameliorate the suferings of the people in the immediate aftermath of 
cyclone Aila. But little has been done with an eye to provide sustainable 
solutions that address the basic necessities of the islanders for preparing 
them to handle climate change impacts.
 (Interview January 2017, Kolkata) 
For them, skill or capacity development of the community to take up new 
livelihood options is the priority amidst uncertainties. NGOs working in the 
Sundarbans have taken a few initiatives in developing capacities of the local 
youth. Some NGOs run vocational training courses like nursing, beautician 
or electrical works for youth who successfully completed 12th grade in school. 
Alongside they are also organising computer training for women through Self-
Help Groups (SHGs)-based women’s cooperatives, specifcally to understand 
banking processes. This is a timely intervention as most women in the islands 
receive money from their husbands who are seasonal migrants. 
However, according to the members of the civil society organisations we 
spoke with, their initiatives have been adversely afected by erratic funding cycles 
from the “above”, be it government or the big donor agencies and, in most cases, 
failed to address the core issues of sustainability. The “above” seems to be more 
keen to invest in building and construction work or activities that are easily 
visible rather than on human resource development. This points to the eagerness 
of the “above” to show of to the islanders, the outsiders and the media, the 
development activities that happened/are happening through their benevolence 
and funding. The sinking islands of the Sundarbans including Ghoramara and 
Mousuni are hotspots of media activities – both domestic and international 
media. Harms (2018) provides an insightful account of the social consequences 
of media encounters with the islands and islanders. Film crews that regularly visit 
these sinking islands produce captivating footage on climate change for global 
audiences, while at the same time rework the memories of the displaced islanders 
and often producing new memories by staging acts of remembering in front of 
the camera. “In both instances, particular pasts are prioritised and imbued with 
a sense of urgency and relevance to foreign flm teams and global audiences” 
(Harms 2018: 1). 
The media, thus, is an important “middle”-level actor in the Sundarbans. 
The print, electronic and of late several online pages and forums in social media 
play an active role both as a watch dog and reporting about this deltaic region. 
In the period before cyclone Aila in 2009, the occasional stories that dotted the 
pages of the mainstream media were mainly on the Bengal Tigers and projecting 
the region as a World Heritage site. A senior journalist mentioned in discussions 
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realising the vulnerability of the delta region, the climate shocks and the 
precarious nature of the islanders of the Sundarbans. The media played a major 
role in highlighting the devastation in the islands, pressured the government 
into providing immediate relief to the islanders as well as plan for the building 
and repairing of embankments. However, with time, both media’s attention and 
the state government’s attention towards fast tracking of the projects waned. 
The more recent cyclones Amphan in 2020 and Yash in 2021 have once again 
brought the media’s attention back to the Sundarbans. It could be surmised that 
media’s role and attention as a “middle”-level actor is largely seasonal and waxes 
and wanes in tandem with the extreme events. 
A senior member of the media fraternity who has reported extensively on the 
region for a long period sums up media’s attention on the region in the following 
words: 
Like the government and most other institutions working in the region, 
the media too is fckle in terms of how to report about the region. The 
media has somewhat failed in communicating the voices from the region 
and instead has limited itself to reporting calamities and climate change 
warnings.
 (Interview March 2017, Kolkata) 
One could say that the opinion pieces, expert columns and the editorials of the 
print media have mostly lacked the coherency and consistency of a narrative 
that would make the decision-makers and decision infuencers to give a policy 
direction to deal with the short- and long-term developments in the Indian 
Sundarbans. Based on a study of the role of media in the health system of the 
Sundarbans, Ghosh et al. (2016) argue for the need of sensitisation and awareness 
raising of the local media so that they can support integration and translation 
for wider awareness and dissemination related to locally led cooperatives and 
women’s Self-Help Group initiatives. 
The Political economy of climate policymaking in the 
Sundarbans: the disconnected “above” 
“Sundarbans as a region is not homogenous in terms of characteristics,
dimensions and climate change impacts. Hence a one-size-fts-all approach
cannot resolve challenges of the Sundarbans”. This was raised by a leading
health economist working on the health system of Sundarbans for more than
a decade. According to him, one needs to understand that there are “many
Sundarbans within the one” (Interview January 2018, Kolkata). A leading
NGO person reminded us of the interlinked socio-ecological system of the
islands: “Climate change in Sundarbans cannot be separated from its geology,
geo-morphology and society”. She continued, “Social evolution is unique in
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institutions have a crucial role to play now in the present day social transition
in Sundarbans accelerated by climate change impacts” (Interview January 2018,
Kolkata). A noted ex-bureaucrat of West Bengal said, “Within this perplexing
transition, implementers often miss to hit core factors and end up with messy,
unsustainable strategies. Policymaking too, is a subject of this diferentials”
(Interview January 2018, Kolkata). 
The above narratives refect a signifcant gap in knowledge while making 
policies for the Sundarbans keeping the dimensions of “many Sundarbans” in 
mind. “Many Sundarbans” refers to various geographical locations – (a) the 
coastal pockets; (b) the deltaic Sundarbans and (c) the mainland, each of which 
is subject to varied impacts of climate change. “In each location climate change 
impacts are manifested diferently and people are responding in the way they are 
facing it. This knowledge has to be incorporated in the policy making”, stated a 
senior climate scientist working for decades in the Indian Sundarbans (Interview 
January 2018, Kolkata). 
Evidence suggests that there seems to be a disconnect between scientifc 
knowledge from environmental experts and policymakers. Though both belong 
to the “above” in our heuristics, they have failed to draw up a coordinated plan 
for tackling climate change in the Sundarbans. From our discussions with the 
“above”, it became clear that this has been exacerbated by the lack of motivation 
and interest in getting connected with each other and build bridges between 
concerned departments and academia so that they could act in tandem rather 
than in an isolated manner. “We are more interested to get connected with 
the community. We have relations with a few bureaucrats but that’s more on a 
personal note”, stated one leading climate scientist working on the Sundarbans 
(Interview September, 2017, Kolkata). 
The responses from the donor agencies – a part of the “above” – indicate that 
they too are not keen to get connected with the policymakers. This concerns the 
overpowering political infuence on the development programmes in the state. 
Almost all the respondents from donor agencies stated that the state government 
shows little interest in receiving fnancial and technical support from them 
despite their repeated facilitation and advocacy. 
I am heading the Sundarbans programmes in my organisation; I never 
took a single penny either from the past Left Front government or from 
the present government. If I take money from the government then I have 
to listen to them who do not have any people-centric approach. And if 
they listen to us, they cannot build bridges, roads and other infrastructural 
development which is adding to the people’s suferings, stated a senior 
programme ofcer from an international donor agency.
 (Interview December, 2017, Kolkata) 
The donor agencies are well connected with the “middle”-level NGOs/CBOs 
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implementation by donor agencies and NGOs appears to be a patch work which 
is beneftting only a miniscule portion of the people. For example, a local-level 
NGO working in a particular region in the Sundarbans is the partner for diferent 
donor agencies. They use the funds received from diferent donor agencies for 
implementing programmes in that particular region where they operate. Other 
regions in the Sundarbans with similar development challenges remain ignored. 
A lacuna has been observed in the short- and long-term planning and 
preparedness by the government and civil society who are mainly focusing on 
disaster response. Following the lessons learnt after cyclone Aila in 2009, the state 
and local administrations seem to be confdent that large shocks can be managed 
through emergency responses. Yet, despite the consensus between the scientists 
that concrete embankments are not a permanent solution to coastal erosion/ 
storm water surges, there has been a dominant focus on concrete embankments 
in the policies for the Sundarbans, as discussed in an earlier section. Ground-level 
implementation of schemes, such as land acquisition for embankments, mangrove 
conservation and compensation for crop loss due to natural calamities as well as 
employment of rural youth under livelihood schemes severely lack community 
knowledge and participation. For example, the people in Ghoramara told us that 
after severe food damage, people from some parts of the island afected with land 
erosion could not claim compensation for crop loss as the afected agricultural 
land simply disappeared into the sea. Mostly being tenants and due to lack of 
knowledge regarding legal/formal formalities, the farmers could not produce the 
required land documents to the government ofcials. Consequently, the claims 
for compensation were rejected. One is reminded of the rendering of the “Anti-
Politics Machine” by Ferguson, where development actors construct the object 
of development in order to deliver development (Ferguson 1990). When the 
“object” of development, in this case, the land with crops on it, vanishes into the 
deep waters without leaving a trace, the bureaucracy is at a loss to grapple with 
it and, consequently, compensation is denied to the farmers as they are unable 
to document the object of development. It would seem that the certainty of 
citizenship itself is linked to terra firma – frm grounds on which people can stand 
on and make claims on the state. Discussing the case of the island Lohachara 
in the Sundarbans, which was subject to large-scale erosion and disappearance 
of villages, Harms (2017) has pointed to the uncertain citizenship rights and 
entitlements due to coastal erosions. “Environmental degradations involve” 
(ibid.: 70), what he calls “corrosion of citizenship at the margins” (ibid.: 70). 
Concluding remarks 
The fndings bring to the fore the experiences and understandings of climate-
related uncertainties and other vulnerabilities from the standpoint of diferent 
actors. The people at the grassroots (“below”) have a clear perception about 
changes in weather patterns that have occurred over the last fve to ten years. 
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colder winters, reduced and erratic rainfall and frequent foods and cyclones. 
The “below” is also experiencing negative efects of climatic change on the 
various livelihood capitals, so much so their livelihood portfolio is characterised 
by distress diversifcation – engaging in more risky, more fragile, more capital 
intensive and less proftable livelihood activities. The local perceptions of climate 
change were consistent with scientifc evidence regarding climate change impacts 
in the Sundarbans. 
The islanders perceive that their current problems are certainly human induced 
at least in large part. Nature makes their life uncertain but, paradoxically, also 
had added an element of certainty through their livelihood activities centred 
on agriculture, fshing and collecting minor forest produce. As discussed in 
this chapter, islanders are now increasingly forced into distress livelihood 
diversifcation due to the diminution of their livelihood capitals. The increasing 
imposition of restrictions by the government on fshing, prawn-catching and 
other livelihood activities in the name of “conservation” is also intensifying and 
reinforcing climate-induced uncertainties. 
As we understand from this study, marginalised environments like the 
Sundarbans call for radical–critical adaptation as well as the strengthening and 
protection of local ecosystems and biodiversity in a people-friendly and locally 
appropriate way. We use the term radical–critical adaptation to fag the structural 
dimensions and the necessity for radical restructuring of the capitalist relations 
of production towards a more equitable and socio-ecologically just production 
and distribution system. Vulnerabilities and uncertainties emanate not merely 
from an externally imposed climate threat but primarily from the historical– 
political economic–institutional power relations, which engender diferentiated 
experiences and responses to climate change. We have discussed how the socio-
ecological marginalities and uncertainties have been historically produced in the 
Sundarbans at the confuence of the incorporation of the island’s resources into 
the circuit of global capital and the twin imperatives of conservation and late 
globalisation. As argued by Taylor (2014), we need to produce ourselves and our 
environments diferently. This calls for a transformation of the current capitalist 
relations of production. We would argue that, for this to happen, an ideological 
shift is warranted. 
Postscript 
Our last feld visit to the Sundarbans was in September 2018. Since then,
the islanders have faced four catastrophic events – cyclone Bulbul in 2019,
COVID-19 and associated lockdowns since early 2020, supercyclone Amphan
in May 2020 and cyclone Yash in 2021. In addition to the loss of lives and
infrastructure, these have further exacerbated the livelihood uncertainties of the
islanders. Livelihood losses include hundreds of livestock and the agricultural
produce of nearly half a million farmers. Amphan hit at a time when the
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and livelihoods (see Ghosh et al. 2020). The lockdown has hindered even the
“distress diversifcation” activities including crab catching and fshing around
tiger reserves (see Basu 2020). Seasonal migration, the major coping strategy of
the islanders, has all but stopped due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover
“there has been a steady stream of migrant islanders who are now being forced
to return to the delta from diferent parts of India” (Ghosh et al. 2020).5 The 
intersecting nature of these disastrous events are, indeed, devastating for the
lives and livelihoods of the Sundarbans islanders, which need further research to
unravel the short- and long-term efects. 
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
UNCERTAINTY IN INDIA’S
MAXIMUM CITY, MUMBAI 
Hans Nicolai Adam, Synne Movik, D. Parthasarathy,
Alankar, N.C. Narayanan and Lyla Mehta 
It is said that Bombay never sleeps 
Never stops 
Never tires 
But brother, on Tuesday 26 July 
Bombay stopped 
Bombay tired 
Every mobile phone went silent 
When the cloudburst struck Bombay 
Darkness prevailed when the power went out 
—A Bhojpuri music video called ‘Museebat mein Bambai’1 describing
Mumbai’s mood following the 26th July 2005 fooding 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we explore how climate change and uncertainty shape the 
urban landscape of Mumbai – a megalopolis whose land was largely reclaimed 
from the sea and that faces ever-increasing threats from climate change, 
environmental deterioration and development pressures (Figure 6.1). Globally, 
the city consistently ranks as one of the most threatened megacities from the 
efects of climate change (Hanson et al. 2011; Abadie et al. 2020), with fooding 
arguably one of the most formidable natural hazards it faces. In 2005, Mumbai 
experienced a traumatic and devastating food event, the so-called Mithi deluge, 
which claimed more than 1,000 lives, in addition to causing enormous economic 
and property damage (Bhagat et al. 2006). Despite promises and eforts by urban 
authorities to transform Mumbai and prioritise food mitigation in the aftermath 
of the 2005 event, fooding remains chronic with regular disruption, economic 
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FIGURE 6.1 Koli fshers and urban expansion in Mumbai (Photo credit: Hans Nicolai 
Adam). 
entire city. Multiple food events continue to wreak havoc and have brought the 
central and suburban districts to a standstill for intermittent periods over the past 
years (see Kumar 2019; Singh 2020). 
Flooding is, however, not a “natural” phenomenon attributable to climate 
change and rainfall alone. It also relates to the physical characteristics of the 
city’s landmass, its built environment, urban governance as well as socio-
economic characteristics – and the growing uncertainties that accompany these 
interlinked issues. We explore these aspects by examining the nexus between 
urban development, political economy and the science–policy interface through 
the perspectives of the “above”, “middle” and “below”. 
Flooding is not new to Mumbai. It is expected and “normal” to experience
waterlogging, localised inundation and disruption to transport services on
a seasonal basis – especially with the onset of monsoon rains. Flooding and
climate-related uncertainties in the monsoon season are usually experienced
within normal bounds, and as we document in this chapter, residents of the city
have devised coping and adaptation strategies accordingly. Yet, rare “outlier”
events have increased since 2005 – ranging from cyclone threats to droughts
or extreme rainfall variations. For example, in July 2020, the city recorded its
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in decades”, Cyclone Nisarga in the same year, prompting the evacuation of
tens of thousands of people (BBC 2020). Every year appears to bring about new
climatic challenges, and in 2020, the pandemic was added to the mix. Thus,
a new type of radical uncertainty is emerging that lies outside the bounds of
what is regularly experienced – straining tried and tested coping and adaptation
mechanisms, with implications for future urban policy and development. 
What makes Mumbai so vulnerable? The coastal megalopolis is a complex
urban landscape that represents a microcosm of the conficts, threats,
opportunities and uncertainties that global integration, economic growth,
demographic transition and climate change bring forth. It is the fnancial capital
of India and one of its largest urban agglomerations with a population of over
12 million people in its municipality (Census of India 2011) and an estimated
20 million plus in the metropolitan region. The increasingly dense built-up
space in central and suburban Mumbai has diminished scarce open spaces that
act as food plains, limiting water percolation and leaving central areas of the
city highly food prone. Disappearing coastal wetlands, food plains and poor
disaster governance (Revi 2005, 2008) further heighten Mumbai’s vulnerability
to already chronic fooding. The destruction of mangroves in the city and its
periphery has aggravated livelihood threats to the thousands of Koli fshers,
the original inhabitants of the city, along the east and west coast (Chouhan
et al. 2016). Nearly half of Mumbai’s residents live in informal and temporary
dwellings with limited provision of basic services such as clean water, education,
sanitation and healthcare (de Wit 2016). Across the city, the most severely
afected residents from fooding, and displaced by infrastructure projects tend
to be poorer, socially excluded and are forced to live on marginal, low-lying
land. Inadequate sanitation, solid waste management, poor governance and
illegal construction activities compound threats from regular rainfall events and
climate change to leave the city and its residents highly vulnerable (Revi 2005;
Hallegatte et al. 2010; Ranger et al. 2011; Parthasarathy 2018). 
In this chapter, we explore this vulnerability context and tease out the
politics and perspectives around the (changing) nature and impacts from
climate change and uncertainty in Mumbai. Our focus is particularly on the
city’s most vulnerable residents, who make up a heterogeneous mix of migrants,
castes and religious minorities living largely in informality and threatened
by the intersection of climate change, fooding and iniquitous development
interventions. We argue that the dominant pathways of dealing with climate-
and food-related uncertainties are exclusionary in nature and vie for control
through structural measures, while not integrating alternative planning ideas or
evolving climate change threats into urban governance and policy. The chapter
proceeds as follows: we frst briefy sketch out our conceptual framework,
proceed to describe Mumbai’s socio-economic profle, before engaging with
the narratives, understandings and approaches from the “below”, “middle” and
“above” – informed by our ethnographic feldwork – and end with a concluding
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Conceptual framework: uncertainty in urban Mumbai 
Climate mitigation and adaptation concern much of contemporary urban 
development planning and policy. Urban centres in the global South play a 
vital role in achieving climate targets because of their importance as population 
centres, drivers of economic growth, vulnerability to climate impacts and also 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions (While and Whitehead 2013; Heynen 2014; 
Kumar et al. 2020). The “mainstreaming” of climate priorities into development 
planning, urban governance and policy has concomitantly accelerated, albeit 
with mixed results that heighten the possibility of maladaptive action (Eriksen 
et al. 2021) and long-term climate risk integration into planning falling short in 
India’s urban centres (Singh et al. 2021). How do we conceptualise our research 
in Mumbai with respect to these issues? Vulnerability studies underpin much of 
existing work on climate adaptation (Adger 2006), with diferent interpretations 
of vulnerability having implications for the way adaptation action is framed 
and practised (O’Brien et al. 2007). We go beyond understanding adaptation 
merely as a response to climate stimuli in a separated human–environment 
system. Instead, we understand adaptation as part of an existing vulnerability 
context that is premediated by socio-historic and scaled economic, cultural and 
ecological factors. We also respond to Ribot’s critique of “locating causality 
within the hazard” (2014: 667), and the undue focus in the risk-hazard literature 
on proximate causes for vulnerability, which pays little attention to causality by 
sidestepping interacting socio-ecological processes that leave people vulnerable 
in the frst place. In contrast, a more technically, natural science-informed 
framing of adaptation concentrates disproportionately on homogeneous, 
quantifable limits and costs and benefts. Responses here concentrate on 
techno-managerial solutions that leave little space for diferentiation and political 
contestation (O’Brien and Barnett 2013; Eriksen et al. 2021). As discussed in 
the Introduction and Chapter 2, despite the apparent limitations of dominant, 
quantitative methodologies and their eforts to vie for “control” through static, 
deterministic approaches (van de Sluijs 2005), they remain at the forefront. This 
is demonstrated by the disproportionate attention that technical measures receive 
in adaptation and resilience projects as well as “universalist” urban planning 
approaches (UNEP 2014; Zeiderman et al. 2015) that rely on centrally designed 
“master plans” as instruments to achieve a set of economic, social and political 
goals (Watson 2009). 
Uncertainty, as we conceptualise in this book, is becoming an ever more
important feature in climate and development debates in urban areas. Urban
agglomerations form “cluster points” for various uncertainties to meet in a
turbulent age of globalisation, migration, environmental change and technological
upheaval (Zeiderman et al. 2015). These uncertainties fall into ontological and/ 
or epistemological categories (Walker et al. 2003) and as we distinguish in the
Introduction, fall into ecological, knowledge/epistemic and political economy
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in climate change projections compound the problem for urban policymakers to
formulate strategic responses in adaptation or mitigation realms. For example, to
what height should storm surge barriers be built, based on what projections and at
what location? Ecological uncertainties extend to those found in the knowledge
realm. In the case of Mumbai, as we show, a pertinent example of aforementioned
“knowledge politics” is the approach to “control” or “tame” fooding through the
construction of boundary walls along the Mithi river and other drainage channels
– prejudicing one knowledge regime over alternatives that might be anchored on
local peoples experience but are deemed “unscientifc”. Uncertainties also extend
to the political economy realm where they may be a product of social diferentiation
(gender, caste, class or ethnicity), historical or political arrangements. These
warrant an exploration of the diverse range of institutions, processes and structures
(climate-related and otherwise) that “modernist” urban planning approaches have
so far largely bypassed (Watson 2009). Urban governance itself emerges here as
a source of uncertainty, in conjunction with a confuence of social, political and
economic uncertainties that intersect with ecological ones in intricate ways (see
also Parthasarathy 2018). The location, origin and nature of uncertainty also
difer depending on the kind of climate-induced impact one is studying and on
the social actors that are the subject of interest. 
We understand a transformation of this vulnerability context in broad
terms according to Few et al. (2017), in the sense as adaptation that generates
transformation as outlined in Chapter 1. In the urban context of Mumbai, this
implies that social and environmental justice goals (equality, inclusiveness and
participation), a co-production of knowledge that acknowledges plurality and
incorporation of environmental values in planning and a departure from “business
as usual development”, would emerge as priorities. At the core of transformation
lies a re-confguration of relative power dynamics that address the factors
which enable vulnerability in the frst place (lack of housing, gender and caste
discrimination) and goes beyond strengthening of resilience, technical measures
or disproportionate attention towards incentivising coping action (Ribot 2014). 
Methodology 
We used methodological tools and approaches that were ethnographic and 
qualitative in nature. These included transect walks, key informant interviews, 
group discussions, structured, semi-structured interviews and key event analysis. 
Snowballing was used extensively to locate key informants. Interview guides 
developed over the heuristics of the “above”, “middle” and “below” were used 
to identify respondents, pose research questions and follow up on analysis. A 
cross section of respondents that are refective of gender, class, polity, academia 
and bureaucracy was subsequently interviewed. These included several key 
government ofcials with the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development 
Authority (MMRDA), Mithi River Development and Protection Authority 
(MRDPA), Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) – including its 
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disaster management cell, Maharashtra Forest Department and Maharashtra 
Pollution Control Board (MSPCB) working on disaster and urban governance 
issues. In addition, professors and scientists from the IIT-B, Tata Institute of Social 
Sciences (TISS) and National Environmental Engineering Research Institute 
(NEERI) who have been involved in water, food, development and disaster 
management planning were interviewed, as well as civil society fgures from 
leading think tanks, environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and civil society organisations (including Vanashakti, Observer Research 
Foundation [ORF], Mithi Sansad, fsher and residential associations). To protect 
the identity of respondents, their names and designation have been anonymised. 
In addition, a literature review covering policy documents, scientifc articles, 
newspaper coverage, reports and other sources was conducted. Data collection 
by the research group took place during multiple feld visits in the period from 
2015 to 2020 covering diferent seasons. In total, more than 130 interviews were 
conducted, providing a rich data set. Where possible, interviews were recorded 
and transcribed; otherwise, detailed feld notes were taken. Government reports, 
newspaper clippings as well as transect walks over the duration of diferent study 
periods were consulted in eforts to identify sites. 
Study sites 
Maximum city Mumbai 
Mumbai, formerly Bombay, sits mostly on reclaimed land, in building eforts that 
date back to the 18th century. The frst settlers in this area were fshers belonging 
to the Koli community who now reside in 45 Koliwadas (fshing villages) spread 
across the nooks and corners of the greater metropolitan area. Bombay city itself 
grew out of seven islets, Colaba, Old Woman’s Island, Bombay, Mazgaon, Parel, 
Mahim and Worli, which were connected over the years from inter-tidal zones 
to lay the physical foundation stone for the city. This process continued over two 
centuries and ended with the last major ofcial land reclamation in the 1970s 
at the southern tip of Mumbai at Nariman point (Perur 2016) with unofcial 
reclamation continuing even now. Today, the city is composed of a contiguous 
438 km2 landmass surrounded by the Arabian Sea, Harbour Bay and Thane 
creek on three sides. Administratively, Mumbai is composed of two parts, the 
island district to the south with the downtown area hosting the most densely 
populated parts and the suburban district reaching towards the inland. 
Most of the city’s landmass lies between 2 and 5 m “above” sea level, with some 
areas lying “below” the high tide mark (Hallegatte et al. 2010; Pramanik 2017). 
The most visible, “hard” manifestation of exponential, unregulated growth is 
the mushrooming of high-rise residential towers, transport infrastructure (e.g. 
fyovers, metro) which stand in contrast to poor public facilities, housing and 
deteriorating air and water quality – interspersed with spots of afuence found 
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international airport or the state-of-the-art Bandra–Worli sea link. Real estate in 
densely populated central Mumbai belongs to the most expensive in the world. An 
estimated 220 billion USD investment volume in civic infrastructure is required 
in the metropolitan area over the next 20 years alone to accommodate the needs 
of this growing city, according to global consultancy frm McKinsey (Thomas 
2018). Many mega projects including the Mumbai metro, Navi Mumbai airport, 
the trans-harbour link and coastal road project are already being constructed in 
fts and starts despite legal obstacles. 
Migration has historically played an important role in shaping the city’s
burgeoning informal economy, which provides for the bulk of employment.
Migration has also traditionally been a source of inexpensive labour and contributes
to the heterogeneous character of its population, attracting people from all states
of India and beyond. In recent years, however, population growth in the central
parts of the city has slowed, in part, because of overcrowding and higher rental
prices but also because of employment opportunities in the suburban areas and
changing demand for skills in response to established industries (such as tanning or
textiles) either becoming defunct or relocating (de Wit 2016). Economic prowess
combined with the diverse migrant community, relatively liberal culture and
colonial history has produced a uniquely wealthy and cosmopolitan city boasting
of the richest municipal body in India (de Wit 2016). 
Mumbai is a city of stark contradictions and inequality with immense wealth, 
corporate power and poverty co-existing side by side, with slums and modern 
high-rises jostling for space just a few metres apart. The intense mix of people, 
economics and politics over a confned, dense and contested space led to the 
popularised label of “maximum city” (Mehta 2004). The city also has the dubious 
distinction of having the highest proportion of slum dwellers relative to the total 
city population in India with an estimated 40–55% of the population residing in 
such areas (Census of India 2011; Alexander and Bhatia 2020). 
Population growth, land reclamation and economic development contributed 
to extensive alterations of the metropolitan region’s biophysical environment. 
Mangroves play a role in reducing wave strength, soil erosion and provide 
ecosystem services important to reduce the efects from climate extremes and sea-
level rise. They also play a crucial role in the livelihood strategies of vulnerable 
fshing communities in and around Mumbai, by providing safe sanctuaries and a 
breeding ground for fsh. According to Vijay et al. (2005: 310), 50,000 Koli fshers 
are active in the region. There is competing demand on mangroves for various 
land uses in the city, and this has led to a 40% decline in mangrove cover between 
1990 and 2005, despite protective legislation (Vijay et al. 2005: 310; Singhi 2015). 
Climate change in Mumbai 
Climate change is afecting the city in profound ways. As a low-lying coastal 
city built on reclaimed land, sea-level rise is one of the most notable threats and 
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Projections expect a further average rise of 30–80 cm by 2100 (TERI 2014) with 
a study (Larour et al. 2017) fnding that glacial melt alone could account for a 15 
cm rise in sea levels over the next century. Mangroves are specifcally vulnerable 
to sea-level rise because of their location at the interface of the sea as “between 
0.4–0.9 m ‘above’ mean sea level” (Ellison 1989 cf. Jagtap and Nagle 2007: 331; 
Vivekanandan 2011: 17). A recent study by McKinsey found that up to three 
million people will be severely threatened by a combination from sea-level rise, 
fooding and high tides by 2050 (Woetzel et al. 2020). Sea surface temperatures 
of the Arabian coast have already registered an increase of 0.32 °C per decade 
from 1985 to 1998 (Khan et al. 2004). Likewise, mean atmospheric temperatures 
have risen by 2.4 °C (from 1881 to 2015; NASA 2015) and are projected to rise 
to 1.5–1.8 °C by 2050 (TERI 2014). Heavy rainfall is a regular occurrence in this 
region during the south-west monsoon from June to September, with an average 
precipitation of 2420 mm per year. Changing climatic confgurations will likely 
intensify rainfall variability (18% rise in minimum and maximum precipitation) 
and tropical cyclones are expected to become more frequent (TERI 2014; 
D’Monte 2017). The occurrence of health efects ranging from an increase in 
vector-borne and communicable diseases to those related to heatwaves is also set 
to increase (TERI 2014). 
Politics and perspectives from the “above”,
“middle” and “below” 
Mumbai’s population is highly heterogeneous and comprised of varied, 
oftentimes competing interest groups. As one of the most densely populated 
cities in the world and with a high concentration of wealth and extreme poverty 
in the central and food-prone areas interspersed with fshing villages, the politics 
of the city are complex – even by the standards of a megacity. In the following 
section, we tease out some of the key experiences, perceptions and responses that 
respondents from the “above”, “middle” and “below” have voiced with regard 
to climate change, urban development and fooding in relation to intersecting 
uncertainties. 
Climate change and uncertainty from “below” 
“Climate change” emerges as a multifaceted term among the residents of
Mumbai. Its link to a global phenomenon is not always straightforward, with
considerable uncertainty regarding attribution in an urban environment. For some
respondents, it relates mostly to weather changes at a local level. According to a
taxi driver in Bandra: “Earlier there was a familiar pattern of rainfall in Mumbai,
but now it has become very erratic, for the last couple of years there has been very
poor rainfall” (Interview December 2017, Mumbai). As discussed in Chapter 2,
instead of perceiving climate change as a long-term phenomenon with distinct

















142 Hans Nicolai Adam et al. 
precipitation changes as a local outcome of development activities. Growing
population, urban mismanagement, a densely built-up environment, depletion
of natural resources or vehicular pollution are often reference points to attribute
environmental changes. Interviewed residents in most colonies along the Mithi
riverbank and closely adjacent areas perceive the weather to have become hotter
and less predictable. The intensity of monsoon showers was also observed to
have changed when we interviewed residents in the commercial hub of Saki
Naka (near the international airport). Additionally, people noted that ambient
temperatures increased alongside a reduction of cooling sea breeze. In other
densely populated and built-up areas, with few open spaces like Dharavi, these
perceptions on experiencing increasing heat were particularly pertinent. A
female shopkeeper in Dharavi highlighted how oppressive the heat has become
alongside a reduction in “cooling winds”. Yet, daily livelihood uncertainties
usually eclipse those from climate change. These include infation rates, access
to afordable housing, water and other basic services, job security and the threat
of communal confict. 
For upper-middle-class residents such as an elderly couple in Bhandra (West), 
the scientifc and global dimensions of climate change are more relatable. 
Climate change is perceived here as a distinct phenomenon. Temperature and 
precipitation changes, glacial melting, fash foods, urban heat island impact 
and the spread of diseases fnd recognition. Climate change is, thus, part of an 
established, global discourse in addition to local environmental changes. On the 
other hand, a stronger emphasis hinges upon divinity and less on “pollution” 
with other sections of society when discussing climatic changes, including with 
the Koli community. The role of diferent climatic patterns and extreme weather 
(e.g. thunderstorms, cyclones) is also associated with supernatural phenomenon, 
over which there is little or no human control and infuence. 
Koli fshers interviewed in Mahim, Versova and Cuf Parade are intimately 
dependent on marine and coastal ecological systems and articulate a nuanced 
understanding of environmental changes. According to the Koli respondents, 
climate change manifests itself in the form of depleting fsh catch and increasing 
uncertainty in interpreting weather signs. Nevertheless, the main reason cited for 
their livelihood uncertainty lies in Mumbai’s unbridled and expansive growth 
where Kolis and Koliwadas (urban fshing villages) are turning into sites of 
confict between powerful interests, including commercial trawlers, real-estate 
developers and conniving state actors. In addition, the immediate coast is sufering 
from pollution and depleting fsh stocks on account of the double stresses of 
ecological changes and overexploitation (Chouhan et al. 2016). Kolis dominantly 
fsh within an exclusive 12 km radius from the coastline, a zone reserved for 
small/artisanal fshers. Altered weather patterns and changed seasonal patterns 
have led to decline in the quantity of fsh available in this radius although it is 
not a uniform opinion across sites. Yet, unusual changes in temperature over 
the land surface impact wind patterns and most respondents insist that there 
is a direct connection between weather conditions and fsh stocks. The older 
 
 
Climate change and uncertainty in Mumbai 143 
generation reported that they had a good understanding of time and location 
of fsh breeds – without technological aids like modern GPS/sonar systems. 
These traditional knowledge systems rely on reading weather signals, where 
not only wind but also astronomic signals such as a star constellation or the 
moon position help in predicting weather patterns. However, environmental 
changes have considerably reduced predictability, contributing to a new type 
of radical uncertainty. Fish movements have changed, and some species entirely 
disappeared or are reduced to negligible numbers. Rainfall intensity and patterns 
have also shifted. Prolonged periods of rain lasting up to two weeks were regular 
earlier, but this has reduced to intense downpours within a shorter span of time – 
to days/hours – with reduced wind speeds. Over the last 15 years, the cooling 
efects from monsoon showers and wind have also decreased according to a fsher 
in Cuf Parade who reported that extreme and memorable weather events such as 
cyclones are becoming more frequent. 
The certainty of fooding and uncertainty from  
development planning 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, fooding is a common occurrence in the city 
during the monsoon. However, one event stands out. The massive rains and 
foods in the last week of July 2005 (bada paani in local slang and also referred 
to as the 26/7 event) that killed more than a thousand residents with nearly an 
entire years rainfall descended on the city within 24 hours. All respondents – 
cutting across class lines – who lived in Mumbai during that time, remember 
it as a traumatic event and as an “outlier”. While the livelihood loss was much 
more pronounced with poorer residents who lived in shacks and lost their entire 
livelihood, middle-class residents remember it as an event where they lost access 
to power, remained stuck in trafc, had to wade through water or escape from 
dangerous food waves and faced health hazards. Yet, beyond this “extreme 
event”, there exists a certainty around annual fooding and it is perceived as a not 
unusual event – despite damages and interruptions caused every year. In terms of 
impact, there is a diferentiation between wealthier/middle-class residents who 
live in fat complexes (on higher ground or in higher stories) versus those who 
live directly adjacent to Channels/along the Mithi river and in shacks that can 
get washed away. 
At the same time, while monsoonal rainfall is viewed to be natural and 
“certain”, waterlogging is socially, politically and economically constructed. 
Haphazard urban development – building over water bodies, failure to increase 
the capacity of stormwater drains, changes to nallahs and streams/creeks and 
poor solid waste management practices were cited as key reasons in addition to 
inequalities in social and economic status. As a result, not all people or localities 
face similar levels or impacts from fooding – the intensity and efect is usually 
a function of a diferentiated socio-economic status and location. Geography 
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power in maintaining or improving their immediate residential areas explain 
diferential experiences. There is more certainty in avoiding fooding in areas 
that are on higher ground, for instance – but are also more expensive to live in. 
In areas that experience regular inundation (e.g. in Saki Naka, Kurla or
Dharavi), the chronic nature of fooding has prompted residents to resort to
opportunistic coping measures. They told us that accumulated knowledge and
the drawing on “lived memory” helps tide over regular food events, with several
anticipatory steps taken to manage and limit uncertainty. Following the 26/7
event, interviewed residents along the Mithi and its tributaries display a higher
level of sensitivity to the river fow following heavy rainfall and undertake control
exercises themselves. Disaster preparedness and warning systems are community-
based. Once a visible danger mark is exceeded (marked through drawn lines along
walls or the fooding of key structures), residents quickly disseminate information
through informal networks and take precautionary steps. Adaptation measures,
that is, those that go beyond short-term coping, include the construction of double-
storied (popularly referred to as 1+1) structures – wherein valuables are stored and
sleeping spaces are made available on the upper stories of a building – including
for neighbours living in lower storied structures as documented in Indira pipeline
colony. The normal fooding level is defned by marks on walls that lie within
pre-defned uncertainty bounds. But were an “abnormal” fooding to re-occur
outside these bounds, the only option is temporary relocation or evacuation.
There exists little faith and expectation in early warning to have changed by state
agencies: “in the 2005 fooding we saw the police running away shouting for
others to follow…this was disaster warning at that time” (Interview March 2016,
Mumbai). Residents also mention that some structural measures including higher
boundary walls and the widening of channels have increased drainage capacities
but not enough to stave of heavy monsoonal rainfall. Similarly, it was reported
that increasing the boundary wall height in one area simply pushes the fooding
onwards to other low-lying locations. 
How do other residential areas fare? In pockets of middle-class and relatively 
wealthier areas, within Bandra (East) and adjoining Kurla Pipeline Road localities, 
low-lying areas are also food prone and interspersed by densely populated slums, 
where prolonged waterlogging is not unusual. Places like Airlines Colony in 
Kalina are not as prone to foods over regular rainfall periods because structural 
measures like concretisation such as boundary walls and small steps prevent 
fooding. Similarly, in Kherwadi locality of Bandra (East), fooding is more of a 
concern because it is densely populated with slums and middle-class residential 
fats lying adjacent. Many residents from posh Bandra (West) mentioned that 
post-2005, residential complexes took up concretisation autonomously around 
compounds and roads within their premises. We were shown around diferent 
stretches with new concretisation to prevent even minor water accumulation, 
where wealthier compounds attempted to insulate themselves from waterlogging. 
A side efect of these uncoordinated and autonomous activities was to increase 
uncertainty, vulnerability and food proneness for other colonies that might not 
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have resources to institute similar measures or are even lower lying. This efort 
also showcases the extent to which a lack of municipal involvement (from ward 
level upwards), co-ordination and structural socio-economic inequality increase 
uncertainties for some while reducing them for others. Concretisation eforts 
are in addition blamed to contribute to the urban heat island efect and limit 
groundwater percolation (Fernandes 2019). The failure to undertake similar 
interventions in other public spaces within Bandra (West) is problematic, but 
not exclusive to this area. In afuent south Mumbai, rare waterlogging was 
experienced in 2020 after intense rainfalls. A respondent mentioned that “At 
this point, even people in South Bombay know what fooding is like now after 
all this” (Interview October 2020, Mumbai) and attributed it to misguided and 
intrusive infrastructure development in connection with the metro and coastal 
road project, in addition to climatic changes. 
The contestation between mitigation and adaptation priorities, with the 
former dominating the city discourse, was evident during our feldwork in the 
poorer localities. The prospect of forced dislocation of unregulated residential 
colonies along the Mithi river – in the name of food mitigation – looms large and 
is one of the greatest uncertainties poorer residents face. Inextricably related to 
fooding is drainage and solid waste management, which is of common concern 
for all respondents. Respondents state that poorly managed drainage and callous 
mismanagement of solid waste creates serious problems for drainage fow, in 
addition to numerous health hazards. Muslim residents in colonies where they 
are in the majority expressed frustration that despite promises, the BMC does not 
collect garbage and they are in efect forced to use drainage channels to dispose of 
waste material/sewage – forcing the clogging up of channels as a result of neglect. 
In some of these areas, the household waste relates to the livelihoods they are 
involved in which are home based – for example, garment sweat shops. There is 
also uncertainty on which of these belong to household/industrial waste. 
The fooding of 2005 and Mithi river have a clear relationship in the minds 
of Mumbai’s residents. Yet, there is little uptake among those we interviewed 
(especially the middle-class) to stark warnings of academics and environmental 
activists with respect to the state’s plans and actions of concretising and taming the 
river. Respondents expressed that city authorities need to ensure that issues like 
desilting, preventing sewage and pollution from entering the river, channelising 
and widening of natural rivulets like the Mithi are a must to prepare for future 
extreme fooding events. For some wealthier interviewees, who have travelled 
widely, examples of other large, food-prone cities that draw on other solutions 
to mitigate food risk are used to contrast what is happening in Mumbai. The 
same respondents insist that mangroves must be preserved to bear with cyclone 
events in the future and also improve the air quality of the city. 
Flooding did not emerge as a main concern for the Koli fshers. Instead, their 
main livelihood uncertainties stem largely from the infrastructure projects that 
have encroached upon the coast, fshing grounds and mangrove land. At present, 
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are protesting against and which causes livelihood and ecological uncertainties. 
The project to construct a 29.2 km long freeway from north-south Mumbai on 
its eastern coastline has been mired in legal conficts and temporarily stalled 
before resuming work in 2020. A fsher we met at a public hearing on the project 
in Khar Dhanda in 2020 called the project out for “fnally putting an end to the 
remaining fshing in our Koliwada” (Interview January 2020, Mumbai) because
of the land reclamation along the coast, destruction of boat landing and fsh 
breeding grounds as well as efects on coastal currents through the building of 
giant stilts that support the freeway. At the same public hearing we attended, the 
coastal road project and its planning were cited by a group of female activist’s as 
emblematic of the lack of acknowledgement of Koli livelihood rights, sensitivities 
for coastal ecology and the top-down nature of project implementation. Despite 
petitions, protests and promises to take action on their behalf, construction on 
another mega project – the coastal road continues on core harbour and fshing 
grounds of the fshers along the eastern coast – creating immense livelihood 
uncertainties and also having implications for the city’s ecology. There is also a 
clear gender bias in the impacts and uncertainties, with women from the fshing 
community loosing space and income for their shore-based livelihood activities 
that include pre- and post-harvest preparations. 
Views from the “middle” 
No uncertainty here: the food-prone city 
Considerable uncertainty exists regarding why exactly the city is so food prone, 
how far climate change is responsible and what the way forward is. Many of the 
interviewees agree that cause and efect here are subject to complex interactions 
that include climate change but are not limited to it. One commentator employed 
at a prestigious social science institute when prompted on the uncertainty of 
fooding stated that: 
Mumbai is a city of seven islands, with 66 villages on either side. Mumbai 
was marshy land and all surrounded by water. Lot of land has been 
reclaimed. It was certain that fooding was going to happen, and it’s not an 
unexpected event. 
(Interview May 2016, Mumbai) 
The commentator elaborated, in line with other respondents, that activities to stem
fooding are mired in controversy, delayed and sufer from planning uncertainties.
Over the past 20 years, most planned activities (88% according to the respondent)
have never been implemented, which partly explains the city’s vulnerability to
fooding. The research director of an institute asserted that “basically the State
itself, in the case of Mumbai, gave up on the idea of planned development”
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and committees like the Chitale committee report2 (2005) have barely seen any or
only piecemeal implementation. Similarly, the BRIMSTOWAD (Brihanmumbai
Storm Water Drain System) project has seen the completion of only 38 out
of 58 planned projects in the past 14 years (Singh 2020). Several interviewed
academics attribute the lack of resolution in completing construction activities to
the lack of resolve on the part of the bureaucracy, red-tape, corruption and “vote
bank” politics that protect illegal settlements and structures, thereby obstructing
water discharge from stormwater drains and the Mithi river. The solutions to
stem fooding and uncertainty by controlling it through engineering mean, for
example, retainer walls, pump stations and the deepening of the Mithi river,
are not perceived as problematic, especially by academics who are infuential in
proposing and designing policy solutions. 
An academic working on disaster management mentioned that since the
2005 deluge, capacities to deal with fooding have increased and improved. The
expert noted that from 225 mm of rainfall that could be drained, the capacity has
now increased to 450 mm, increasing the uncertainty bounds – but not sufcient
for extreme events on the scale of 26 July 2005, where 946 mm of rainfall
was recorded over 24 hours. Disaster response mechanisms underwent similar
reform by improving response time, co-ordination between civic agencies
and expanded emergency capacities. The NDRF (National Disaster Response
Force) controls equipment (e.g. boats), manpower and other resources located
in Goregaon (suburb in Mumbai) that can be quickly deployed to respond to
severe fooding or other disaster events. Engineering solutions themselves are
not perceived as problematic by a section of “middle” respondents. However,
another expert, when prompted on the solution lying in techno-centric measures
emphasised with respect to giant pump stations being constructed at multiple
locations (e.g. Juhu) that “Pump stations…where do you take the water and
where do you put it? Tides push the water back into land!” (Interview May
2016, Mumbai). A recent study (Fernandes 2019) confrmed this assessment
which noted that only six of the 186 drainage outfalls to the sea are “above” the
high tide mark, which is when the worst fooding occurs. Mumbai’s geographic
features are not suitable and sustainable for this kind of intervention of forcing
drainage out to the sea. 
The confict between removing informal settlements – being a key livelihood 
uncertainty for the “below” – and “reclaiming” natural drainage space along the 
Mithi river as weak as other drainage channels and spaces is acknowledged but 
proves to be a contentious issue. What about these underlying root causes related 
to “encroachments”? The historic infux of poorer migrants and pressure on 
already scarce land is a reason cited for the proliferation of obstructive settlements 
and fooding. In contrast, a social scientist elaborated here that housing and the 
multi-generational nature of family units which requires long-term planning is 
totally ignored and contributes to the constitution of ofcially labelled “slums” 
or “encroachments”, including in sensitive wetland areas. Most people from the 
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with their location in the central areas essential to provide low-cost services. This 
is largely unacknowledged in the mainstream discourse. 
The middle class is reacting to an informalised settlement, with which 
they are not in sync. Their aspirations of the city is basically in terms of a 
city which services them… The middle class today, in a city like Mumbai 
survives on the poor. 
(Interview May 2016, Mumbai) 
The lack of concern to provide safe and afordable housing for economically 
marginalised people is an important but often ignored factor in food proofng 
and adaptation. Here, social justice and equality tie in with livelihood- and 
food-related uncertainties. From an urban perspective, the “invisibility” 
of the informal sector became “visible” in the aftermath of the COVID-19 
outbreak in 2020 when many migrants left urban areas. In the aftermath of 
this distress migration, labour for various services was lacking (from domestic 
workers to factory workers) and caused temporary supply chain disruptions. An 
environmental activist substantiated that while there are often complaints about 
informal settlements, residential towers for middle-class and upper-middle-class 
sections are aggressively built and encroach on fragile lands, including mangroves 
or wetlands and face much less opposition vis a vis informal settlements. 
Regarding the iniquitous development approach, the state has also reneged
on its obligation to allow for participatory planning and delimited opportunity
structures for shaping development discourses and imaginaries. Planning horizons
of government and state agencies tend to follow short cycles and are infuenced by
electoral considerations – creating signifcant institutional uncertainties (Interview
May 2016, Mumbai), in the words of a researcher in a leading academic institution. 
…since the 90s the government has really been engaged with project 
planning and keeping things away from the public, plan the way which was 
public but not participatory and in doing projects one is basically taking 
them out of the public space.3 
This stands contrary to the devolution of localised planning directives under 
the 73rd constitutional amendment (1992/1993). Another prominent activist 
working on environmental issue for more than two decades substantiated that 
the proposals by the respondent and likeminded people have been met with 
neglect and largely ignored. 
They call me anti-development… on every issue I have protested and raised
awareness [waste dumping, mangrove destruction] I have provided an alternative
solution…but no one listens or incorporates the alternatives. Instead, politicians
and bureaucrats are infuenced by the building mafa and money power 
(Interview April 2016, Mumbai) 
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The view of being labelled anti-development for providing alternative solutions 
or questioning certain projects was frequently cited by other social and 
environmental activists as well as critical academia. 
On institutional uncertainties and mangroves 
The lack of addressing basic, civic issues like sewage discharge fgures prominently 
in the discourse around food uncertainties. As a respondent noted, “Sixty per 
cent of the populations sewage comes straight into the river” (Interview May 
2016, Mumbai). Therefore, drainage channels are chocked up and prevent 
discharge of excess surface water. While eforts to clear possible chocking 
points exist, institutional infghting and uncertain jurisdiction pose challenges. 
“Contractors are only given contract to remove silt. There is an institutional issue 
as to who is responsible for clearing the nallahs. The Indian railways says that it 
is the BMC [Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation] and vice versa” (Interview
May 2016, Mumbai). This does not mean that no eforts have been undertaken, 
but jurisdictional overlaps and boundaries complicate planning and sustainable 
outcomes. As a governance researcher from a think tank noted: 
MMRDA [Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority] makes 
one plan, BMC makes another plan. MMRDA is with state and BMC with 
city…if there is diferent political parties in power with MMRDA/BMC 
blame game ensues. Other important stakeholders in the planning process 
that have confused co-ordination are Indian railways, Port trust, CPWD 
[Central Public Works Department]. 
(Interview May 2016, Mumbai) 
A simple measure like cleaning drainage channel does not happen regularly, what 
could and should be done every 15 days happens only once a year according to 
the same respondent. 
The responsibility for mangroves is characterised by a similar process of 
institutional uncertainty with several departments involved in their management 
(e.g. fsheries, forests, revenue). Some of this uncertainty ensues because of 
ecological uncertainties related to the dynamic nature of mangrove growth 
and expansion into areas where they were not found previously. Ecological 
knowledge and political-economic uncertainty intersect here at multiple scales 
and provide a backdrop for contentious debates. Most “middle” respondents 
agreed that mangroves play an important role in food mitigation and climate 
change adaptation. However, an engineering expert highlighted that mangroves 
are a controversial topic and questioned their role in food mitigation “they are 
more useful in protection against tsunamis…but obstruct tidal movement and 
water outfow”. Other respondents across academia and think tanks opposed 
this view and pointed towards the protective qualities they provide against a 
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coastal erosion, tidal bufers, ecosystem services) that they require conservation 
and protection. Mangrove conservation is also interlinked with questions around 
livelihoods and housing. 
Migrants and poorer sections of society settle on “open” wetlands because of 
the lack of alternative cheap housing. Mangroves are subsequently destroyed and 
displaced. As a social science researcher highlighted: “policy for low-cost housing 
should be implemented. Delhi has shelters, why not Mumbai? Also protects the 
forested/protected area”. Efective social policy becomes a harbinger of better 
ecosystem protection and food mitigation in this narrative. 
Some environmentalists tend to take a diferent view. For them, preserving 
mangrove ecosystems is essential if Mumbai is to survive in the long term. They 
emphasise the ecological value of mangroves and importance for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, citing scientifc studies for the same and see in it a 
struggle of “environment vs people”. The best food control measure is then 
to restore the Mithi river and surrounding wetlands to a “natural state” with 
inherent self-healing and regulating properties. 
The Mithi is the most important food control in the city and if the river is 
to be saved it needs restoration. look at it now and you don’t even recognize 
it as such’ and ‘walling the river is a nonsensical solution. 
(Interview April 2016, Mumbai)) 
What the environmental activists lament is a dilution of protective law and insufcient
enforcement of existing statutory wetland regulations. Quite contrary to the way,
other actors perceive the “biopolitical” creation/use of law and its anchoring in
a politics for control. Another prominent environmentalist substantiated that the
BMC, MMRDA and CIDCO (City and Industrial Development Corporation)4 
instrumentalise scientifc and institutional uncertainties around mangroves by
claiming that they are a cause of fooding and justify land conversion exercises
accordingly. Money power and greed are the driving forces for the strategic
capture of fragile lands according to many interviewed “middle” actors. Fighting
court cases to steer/shape development outcomes – especially by NGOs appears in
the short term to be the main avenue of resistance according to respondents. 
Transformative pathways and climate change 
How has the city so far dealt with the issue of climate change? Most respondents, 
especially NGO members, paint a rather stark picture of apathy and missed 
opportunities. According to a prominent social activist: 
I was part of the frst panel discussion on climate change… if we were to run
through some of the key decisions of the government in the past few years,
they do not align themselves with either adaptation or mitigation at all. 
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An NGO leader and lawyer, when talking about the Mumbai metro project,
questioned whether it will be able to operate once fooding aggravates due
to higher sea levels and more intense rain. Mega infrastructure projects of
this nature are also considered to contribute to fooding by obstructing the
outfow of water to drainage channels and the sea. Other interviewees did
not see evidence of an integrated planning approach that is climate friendly
and integrate climate risk into planning decisions. For instance, instead of
expanding a pedestrian and cycle friendly city with more green and public
spaces, the emphasis appears to promote mostly personalised, motorised
transport. A leading urban planning and transport expert, in the context of the
coastal road project, stated that there is a strategic efort to silence legitimate
concerns by afected communities, while increasing ecological uncertainties
of its fragile coast and accentuating socio-economic inequalities by promoting
transport for the wealthier middle-class (Interview January 2020, Mumbai). 
All respondents perceive adaptation activities following the 2005 fooding as
“incremental” and don’t see evidence of any kind of transformation. “In 2016 if
we’re still seeing fres, still seeing the same amount of waste going to dumping
grounds, clearly the system has not learned anything” (Interview May 2016,
Mumbai). However, the identifcation of causality for this vulnerability difers.
For one, underlying problems appear to lie in fundamentally skewed growth
trajectories that are at the heart of carbon-centric industrialisation, neo-liberal
growth paradigms and the climate crisis – all generating massive uncertainties
that the city is fnding increasingly difcult to manage “industrialisation and
urbanisation are false concepts…climate change is a symptom and we need to
return to a nature friendly, community based lifestyle” (Interview October
2017, Mumbai). This is a rather extreme view but supported by a person
employed in a major multinational company and active in the same NGO.
Other environmentalists also hinted at the same issue. Respondents said that
some climate change impacts are obvious and not so uncertain. Mumbai is
a sinking city, with climate change-induced sea-level rises likely to swallow
parts of it in future. Not acknowledging this “scientifc fact” and longer time
horizons in planning will be disastrous. A lawyer and activist at the forefront
of many legal struggles in the city added that a relocation of parts of Mumbai
further inland is a necessary transformative option in the long run and must be
explored. At present, however, few respondents saw transformative changes on
the anvil. Recourse to judicial mechanisms was, in contrast, often quoted by
respondents as more realistic option to galvanise or restrict projects, and there
is a need for “ judicially related reports to be fully implemented”. 
The head of a fsher’s co-operative society in Versova painted a stark picture 
of the prospects for the fshing community. According to him “in 10 years’ time, 
there will be no fshing community here” (Interview April 2016, Mumbai). The 
pressures from ecological (including climatic changes) and political economy 
uncertainties, such as climatic changes and changing aspirations among young 
people pose excessive stress and don’t leave enough opportunities for the 
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continued existence of the Kolis in the heart of Mumbai. Already today, out 
of 600 members in the co-operative, only 50–60 fshers regularly use their 12 
boats. Another fsher representative from Cufe Parade provided a more complex 
narrative. He mentioned that while young people face livelihood uncertainties 
and struggle for gainful employment in the fsheries sector, they are interested 
to take up rights and economic issues through new media and technology. 
Livelihood uncertainties stem mostly from development projects like the Shivaji 
statue, coastal road project and large trawlers that compete on unequal terms 
with local fshers. Within the dynamics of the city, the fshers have a sense of 
powerlessness against large corporate entities and conniving state power. Despite 
promises and protests, their concerns regarding infrastructure interventions 
have not been heard. Young people, because of the multiple uncertainties in 
traditional professions, seek alternative employment in the service sector that 
provide a more certain income…but still retain a “fsher identity”. 
Views from “above” 
Climate change is a certainty 
All the respondents from the “above” acknowledged that climate change is a 
reality, albeit with contested ideas on the infuence and role that climate science 
and modelling has at the local level and especially in a built-up urban space 
such as Mumbai. More details on the views of scientists interviewed will be 
covered in detail in Chapter 2. A senior ofcial with the MMRDA and MRDPA 
was clear in his assessment that today’s urbanisation and climate change pose 
unique challenges but added that the government is already taking responsive 
steps, especially on the mitigation side. Mitigation policy options that focus on 
reducing carbon intensity in industries, increasing energy efciency (e.g. LED 
lamps) and planting more trees on the lines of the “smart city” narrative was 
emphasised. The MMRDA is active in promoting green building codes and 
transport options, be it the new metro project, solar roofs on government, private 
buildings or water harvesting technologies. However, the “government can only 
do so much”, community-level involvement and behavioural change are key 
aspects to change in addition to private initiatives. Educational institutions are 
important to reach younger people, build awareness and motivate participation, 
that is, through cleaning their neighbourhoods and not throwing garbage into 
channels. This ties in with the need to anchor climate issues within an everyday 
context “everyday living is a priority not global change”. Another senior ofcial 
with the disaster management cell added that in response to a variety of natural 
hazard threats the government has initiated steps to increase disaster response 
capacities, including those stemming from global climatic changes. Low-cost 
technological options were also emphasised by a MSPCB ofcial as being 
pivotal to achieve mitigation targets. Specifcally, technology transfers from the 
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Controlling foods and the role of mangroves 
How does the “above” relate to uncertainties surrounding food control and 
mangroves management? With respect to fooding, a senior ofcial from the 
MRDPA added that “fooding in Mumbai is not an uncertainty, it is a certainty” 
(Interview April 2016, Mumbai). However, attributing rainfall as a causality is 
a key problem when framing the planning discourse around food proofng. It 
acts as a diversion from addressing real issues by a host of actors. Flooding “is a 
result of high tides, rainfall, encroachments, sedimentation, concretisation and 
the urban heat island afect as well as infrastructure projects such as the Mumbai 
airport” (Interview April 2016, Mumbai). However, the ofcial substantiated 
that since 2005, the BMC and MMRDA have undertaken a number of steps to 
protect the Mithi river and allow for greater food proofng. It was conceded that 
despite marginal improvements no transformative change has taken place. What 
solutions exist? There are “no soft solutions for hard problems, hard solutions 
are required”. This implied freeing adjacent land around the Mithi from illegal 
encroachments and strictly enforcing legal regulations around land usage. In 
connection, it was acknowledged that dilemmas and uncertainties exist; especially 
with trade-ofs that revolve around housing and jobs. Solutions need to be found 
nevertheless in conjunction with rehabilitation, and this can only be achieved 
with civil society participation. It was also noted that environmental variables 
still do not fgure actively in planning narratives, including with climate change 
policy, a point that needs improvement and a change in governance procedures. 
Actionable steps on how this can be achieved were, however, not forwarded. 
According to a respondent who was a senior engineering consultant to food
mitigation projects in Mumbai, “The Mithi food wall is based on experiences
from other cities”, pointing out that such interventions have worked elsewhere (i.e.
in Singapore). The consultant added that the “government comes to us [scientifc
institution] to seek advice on food mitigation however there is no continuity
in governance”. He added that “science itself is not at fault, however it is not
used for the people, we need good science and good scientists” (Interview April
2016, Mumbai). As to the inefectiveness of the engineering solutions to prevent
regularly occurring inundation, the engineering expert substantiated that “our
science is not at fault and the engineering structures work” (Interview April 2016,
Mumbai). Instead, the onus with respect to the lack of proper implementation
and outcomes is placed on governance and political uncertainties that prevent
a translation of knowledge into practice. Based on political exigencies (e.g.
bureaucratic appointment to key positions being a highly sensitive exercise), key
personnel in the urban planning sections of the BMC or MMRDA are shunted
out from ofce before their terms expire or are replaced by bureaucrats with very
diferent expertise and approaches. In turn, this prevents continuity in governance
and harms the implementation of food control and mitigation projects. 
An interviewee at the BMC disaster management cell highlighted that 
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now within a very short time”. While fooding on the scale of 2005 is not 
preventable, regular fooding does not pose a major hurdle in terms of disruptive 
potential.5 The BMC disaster management cell is well networked and makes 
extensive use of technology to quickly receive information, for example, from 
the IMD (Indian Metrological Institute), which is then processed, civic agencies 
alerted and response activities quickly levied to address any physical disruptions 
(fallen trees, electric shutdowns, rescue, etc.). These capacities did not exist 
in 2005 and signify a transformation within disaster management, combined 
with a better management of uncertainty. The use of modern information and 
communications technology, like smart phone apps also provide early warning 
and helpful tips to every citizen on how to behave during a disaster event. The 
caveat being that the respective app has been downloaded only a few thousand 
times. The ofcial also pointed out how important it is to be quick and efcient 
in disaster response in a city such as Mumbai. 
“If there is disruption in services it creates a political storm, even regular 
maintenance disruptions is a major issue”. He, however, conceded that food 
mitigation itself has not been very successful. “There is priority towards 
actionable, immediate interventions that allow the city to function [without any 
long term planning] … Mumbai is so complex, with so many interests it is very 
difcult to…take right steps” (Interview January 2017, Mumbai). 
On the matter of sewage and obstruction to the Mithi river fow, an ofcial 
from the MSPCB asserted that “The cleaning up of the river doesn’t require 
any rocket technology, it’s a very simple one, to prevent the sources, that is the 
minimum requirement” (Interview April 2016, Mumbai). He also asserted that 
most of the polluting industries have been shifted away and “Mumbai it doesn’t 
have a problem of the industry, it’s the problem of the residential solid waste”. 
This is on account of traditional industries such as textiles increasingly having 
shifted outside of central Mumbai. 
A departmental engineer at the BMC described the steps taking to install 
pumps, barriers and construct concrete walls in areas that were food prone. 
The engineer stated that these interventions were designed according to rainfall 
data, inundation areas and vulnerability maps and prevent recurrent fooding. All 
interviewed actors agreed that collaborative eforts at the community level are 
required for successful adaptation and better disaster preparedness to be achieved 
but did not provide concrete steps on how such participation and collaboration can 
be achieved that will improve on existing processes. The Mumbai Development 
Plan 2034 was referenced by some “above” and “middle” actors as a positive 
initiative, receiving widespread input from various civil society groups and 
citizens, yet it was also criticised by activists who pointed to the lack of location-
specifc food planning, a focus of the plan on maximising construction heavy 
built-up environments and ignoring climate change concerns ( Joshi 2019). 
A bureaucrat with the mangrove cell explains that the strategic capture of 
mangroves by the building mafa and “slumlords” remains an issue. Also, debris 
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has been active to fulfl its mandate to prevent encroachments and “4000 
illegal hutments in Mumbai were demolished on encroached land” (Interview
January 2017, Mumbai). The mangrove cell, constituted in 2012 to consolidate 
governance among diferent departments (forest, revenue, fsheries), has emerged 
as a model for combining livelihood/community and conservation activities 
according to the respondent. In the Mumbai region, 5,400 hectares alone are 
classifed as mangroves and they have increased in coverage over the past few 
years. In the Thane creek (around Uran), there is no threat to mangroves, and in 
general, “the situation is better than reported now a days”, with increased public 
education, awareness and protection. Only 12 hectares of mangrove patches are 
under imminent threat. In Navi Mumbai (airport development) and the trans-
harbour link in Mumbai, where mangroves had to make way for development 
projects, “blood money” had to be paid by the actors involved, those funds 
(186 INR crore) fowed into the establishment of a mangrove trust that pays 
for compensation, conservation and rehabilitation of people and forests across 
the region. Similarly, for small farmers, “mangroves are a curse”, as their land
become valueless, don’t allow for agrarian activities and invite state involvement. 
This private–public partnership could be a model for the future. At the same 
time, the ofcial remains sceptical of other infrastructure interventions and 
expresses a sense of powerlessness against interests that push giant infrastructure 
projects like the coastal road project. 
Concluding thoughts 
In this chapter, we engaged with the narratives, understandings and approaches 
of the “below”, “middle” and “above” in the urban context of Mumbai and 
the various interlinked uncertainties that the city and its people confront. 
As we illustrate, substantial diferences exist in the way that actors from the 
diferent heuristic categories (and sometimes within) understand, experience and 
respond to uncertainties arising from fooding, climate change and development 
interventions. We uncovered the deeply unequal nature in which these 
uncertainties are distributed, with poorer and marginalised sections of the “below” 
being the worst afected people in the city, having to confront a confuence of 
livelihood and ecological uncertainties. These include, in particular, Koli fshers 
facing existential threats from the construction of exclusionary development 
projects such as the coastal road zone project and sufering from dwindling fsh 
stocks as well as migrants and poorer people residing in informality along the 
Mithi river and similar areas living in constant fear of eventual displacement and 
fooding. We also highlighted the complexities and uncertainties that exist in 
Mumbai when tackling issues of fooding and climatic change. 
Climate change as well as issues around its attribution emerge as a nuanced 
and socio-economically diferentiated phenomenon. For most interviewed 
respondents, climate change manifests itself through changing rainfall patterns, 
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a tenuous connection to the scientifc conceptualisation of “climate change”, 
this is not so much the case for poorer residents living in informal settlements in 
central Mumbai. They also point to pollution, the built-up environment, loss of 
green spaces and divinity for the more extreme weather and climate shifts. For 
marginalised Koli fshers, on the other hand, the efects are most pronounced with 
their traditional knowledge systems increasingly becoming obsolete, unable to 
adapt within short time spans to climatic and ecological alterations. Fish grounds 
have also shifted or are depleted although this is mostly linked with pollution, 
damage to marine ecology and unsustainable fshing practices by large trawlers. 
Repeat fooding events over recent years illustrate how endemic the nature
of fooding remains and is likely to aggravate in future with climatic change
becoming ever more pronounced – be it through sea-level rise or extreme
variations in rainfall. In 2020, even the wealthiest parts in south Mumbai,
which mostly escapes fooding, were hit. Flooding in low-lying areas around
the Mithi river has come to be expected and normal, especially during the
monsoon season, but constitutes a source of episodic uncertainty for the
“below”, which has been met with local and autonomous adaptation action that
is usually not coordinated with state planners or institutions (e.g. concretisation
around fat complexes) and hits the poorest people the hardest. While disaster
response efciency appears to have improved, little progress has been made on
food mitigation. Much of this lack of progress was also attributed to insufcient
long-term planning, where climate and food risks are actively considered in
planning prerogatives and incorporate local realities (geographic and socio-
economic). The increasing incidence of extreme weather events also signals the
emergence of an era of radical uncertainties that urban planners will have to
confront. Existing policy frameworks, including the Maharashtra State Action
Plan on Climate Change, Mumbai’s National Disaster Management Plan or
Mumbai’s Development Plan 2034, have fallen short to incorporate long-term
climate risks, focusing instead on mitigation action, short-term responses or
economic growth maximisation. 
Adaptation interventions are heavily informed by “above” actors and
overwhelmingly directed at structural improvements that are more amenable
to dominant pathways of decision-making, embedded in the political
economy of the city, its governance regime and rely on technical measures.
These are interventions that seek to control fooding through concretisation
and various engineering solutions. The “middle”, civil society activists and
some academics feel sidelined in deliberations around food control planning
and highlight how their alternative suggestions are routinely bypassed. This
does not mean that no improvements have taken place. Retainer walls have
been built, drainage capacity increased and pump stations built. Yet, all these
interventions fall only within the coping realm, in fact, often creating new spots
for food uncertainties to emerge as “below” respondents reported. Structural
interventions, including the construction of pump stations, also fail to take into
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highlighting the tenuous physiography, low-lying city and sensitive ecology
that surrounds Mumbai. Governance approaches in Mumbai remain fractured
with central, state, urban and local agencies unable to efectively coordinate,
network or jointly create more inclusive and long-term planning alternatives.
This institutional uncertainty was pointed out by all heuristic categories as a
key issue that prevents planning and proper execution of urban development
projects, including for food mitigation. 
We, thus, see that urban governance and development modes in Mumbai
are driven by a desire to control and follow universalist planning modes, with
insufcient capacities to acknowledge and incorporate uncertainties, plural
perspectives or incorporate the concerns of its most vulnerable residents. What
could be a way forward? A shift towards a plural perspective is a precondition
for the city to transform from its current state of vulnerability and address
multiple, intersecting uncertainties in a more sustainable and equitable
manner. This would also allow for more communicative planning that draws
on multiple knowledge regimes and actors, involves participatory planning
exercises, better integrated and coordinated city and regional planning, a
prioritising of public goods and services, and a continued sensitising of the
public and ofcials towards ecological and civic realities. As Edelenbos et al.
(2017: 15) observe, urban development “cannot be controlled and steered from
one point … and needs eforts to collaborate rather than eforts to control”. A
shift in Mumbai’s exclusionary approach of urban governance and development
is, thus, much needed and key when addressing the multiple, intersecting
uncertainties, including from climate change, that confront the city and its
most vulnerable residents. 
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Introduction 
There is a “globalising instinct” in knowledge-making about environmental 
change, in general, and climate change more specifcally (Hulme, 2010: 559). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, climate change as an object of research and action 
is structured globally – measurements such as temperature, precipitation and 
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and projections (see e.g. Edwards, 2010; Hastrup & Skrydstrup, 2012; Schneider 
& Walsh, 2019). At the same time, the impacts of climate change are largely 
felt locally and understandings of climate change and climate change-related 
uncertainties are shaped by local contexts and experiences (Heymann, 2019; 
Hulme, 2012). However, it has been argued that this global synoptic, which 
could be likened to a “God’s eye view” of climate change, is so ingrained that 
local perspectives and historical contingencies are easily sidelined (see e.g. 
Dyson, 2015). Moreover, this tendency towards global abstraction can serve to 
marginalise and exclude the experiences of those living with climate change, in 
what is described as the “loss of the human scale” (Heymann, 2019: 1549). 
How, then, can we build bridges between the ways in which climate change 
and climate-related uncertainties – both epistemic and ontological (cf. Walker
et al., 2003; Walker, Lempert, & Kwakkel, 2012) – are understood and 
perceived at the global and local levels? Chapter 2 in this volume explored how 
uncertainty is understood by scientists and policymakers, collectively referred 
to as the “above”. This chapter puts emphasis on how diverse actors perceive 
and relate to each other’s understandings and knowledges and how bridging 
gaps in understandings and perceptions can be used to inform policymaking 
to better refect how realities are understood and experienced on the ground. 
When we talk about “bridging gaps”, we are not merely talking about translating 
knowledges from “above” for those “below” or vice versa, rather the notion of 
bridging covers a more comprehensive confuence of understandings between 
the “above”, “middle” and “below”. 
To address this question, we focus on the various actors who are involved in 
bridging knowledges as well as the spaces and practices used for experimenting 
with bridging, such as roundtables and techniques for co-producing knowledge, 
such as participatory methodologies, including photovoice. We explore how 
stakeholder dialogues and roundtables that seek to break down political power 
and disciplinary divides can provide diverse actors with opportunities to engage 
with and learn from diferent perspectives (AIDMI, 2018; Bhatt et al., 2018). 
Such emerging dialogues stress the importance of bringing to the fore often 
hidden and varied perspectives and solutions, while highlighting the need to 
address epistemic diversity and the power imbalances that suppress alternative 
knowledges and ways of valuing. To facilitate the experiment of bridging through 
roundtables, we organised four distinct roundtables in three diferent socio-
ecological settings in India (Mumbai, Kolkata, Gandhinagar, all organised by 
the All India Disaster Mitigation Institute) and one in Norway (Oslo, organised 
by the Norwegian Institute for Water Research).1 The purpose was to bring 
together government ofcials, academics, scientists, practitioners and activists 
to share their perspectives and experiences and to explore how discourses on 
uncertainty from “below” and “above” are contested, accommodated and/or 
hybridised in these politically charged spaces. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the often abstract and supposedly “objective” 
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methodologies and more specifcally, climate modelling, which tends to neglect 
the subjective and political dimensions of uncertainty (cf. Jasanof, 2010). The 
global/local paradigm is, moreover, characterised by a distinctive diference in 
ways of viewing suggests the anthropologist Tim Ingold (Ingold, 2003; see also 
Schneider & Walsh, 2019). Global, two-dimensional views tend to be opaque, 
massive, objective, detached and distant, to mention a few distinguishing features, 
whereas what Ingold terms spherical views are transparent, soft, subjective, close 
and experienced. All living beings, due to their sensory limitations, experience 
their environments – including climate change – in a spherical fashion. This 
spherical view is retained in many traditional societies and the knowledge and 
experience that these societies possess about aspects of environmental change 
have come to be increasingly appreciated and recognised (see e.g. Mahony & 
Hulme, 2016; Rudiak-Gould, 2013). 
The practice of bridging should involve an understanding of how knowledge
and climate-related uncertainty are conceived at the diferent levels of
“below”, “middle”, and “above”. The experiences, knowledges and efects
of climate change are local, felt by people in their daily lives, through the
efects of increasing frequency of extreme weather events such as storms and
cyclones, heatwaves, droughts, foods and sea-level rise (see e.g. Mehta, Adam,
& Srivastava, 2019). The globalising instincts towards knowledge-making
are, therefore, “psychologically sterile” as it is beyond the horizon of people’s
individual experience (Hulme, 2010: 560). Local people have developed practices
and strategies to deal with variability in weather and ecological uncertainty,
such as seasonal migration and crop diversifcation (Hastrup & Skrydstrup,
2012). Climate change radically reinforces these uncertainties. While there
may be clear diferential power relations between the “above”, “middle” and
“below”, as shown in the previous chapters, we do, however, need to tease out
how conceptions and understandings are translated across diferent domains, to
explore the potential for negotiating and bridging knowledge practices (see e.g.
Hulme, 2010; also Mehta et al., 2019). 
For example, through his anthropological work on how climate change is 
experienced on the Marshall Islands, Rudiak-Gould (2012) points to the need to 
appreciate how climate change is being translated. He notes that 
public knowledge of global warming depends on the translation of 
climate science from specialist communities to citizens and from scientifc 
language to the vernacular; yet, no two cultures or languages being 
perfectly commensurable, this process of translation necessarily entails a 
transformation of the climate change concept 
and teases out the implications for local understandings of climate change (Rudiak-
Gould, 2012: 46). Further, as argued in the Introduction, the ways in which 
the “above” and “below” conceptualise uncertainty difer markedly in terms of 
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from “above” are culturally and socially embedded in local institutions, practices 
and power relations. While various forms of climate-related uncertainty have 
been identifed and explored within the context of science (e.g. Smith & Stern, 
2011; Stirling, 2010), diferences in the sources and culture of knowledge 
across perspectives will entail forms of uncertainty not captured by scientifc 
terminology. Understanding and reducing these forms of meta-uncertainty, 
arising from the interaction of perspective-specifc uncertainties, must be one of 
the goals of the bridging discussed here. 
Gaps in knowledge and understanding between science and local perspectives
are also linked to communication within the “above”. The history of modern
science has pointed out the dangers of extending isolated lessons across both
time and space and the folly of letting elegant but inappropriate scientifc ideas
take root in bureaucracies and extension services (Barrett & Wittgenstein,
1978; Li, 2007). The interrelated models of ecology, resource management and
property rights used to stigmatise mobile pastoralism as inherently inefcient
and environmentally destructive represent a widespread and persistent example
(e.g. Fairhead & Leach, 1996; also see Chapters 3 and 4, this volume). The
conficts and abuse that attend such panaceas are attributable to the failure of
science to sufciently absorb local feedback but also to the complexity of the
science–policy interface (see Chapter 2); and they thus serve to undermine faith
in both policymaking and the science that informs it. Climate change science,
with its globalising tendency and reliance on educated guesswork, is surely not
immune to these hazards. 
In this chapter, we highlight how, in historical terms, subjective accounts, 
stories and narratives formed important parts of scientifc practices more generally, 
later to be eclipsed by approaches that focused more narrowly on models and 
objectivity. While practices of knowledge-making are again opening up more 
generally, with calls for more democratised ways of knowledge-making (e.g. 
Lidskog, 2008; Stirling, 2006) and with traditional or indigenous knowledge 
gaining greater appreciation (see e.g. Huntington, 2011; Masinde, 2012; 
Masinde, 2014; Nakashima, Krupnik, & Rubis, 2018; Nakashima, McLean, 
Thulstrup, Castillo, & Rubis, 2012; Nyong, Adesina, & Elasha, 2007; Speranza, 
Kiteme, Ambenje, Wiesmann, & Makali, 2010; Williams & Hardison, 2013), 
there are issues of how climate change science is being framed, translated and 
understood. While co-production ofers a potentially fruitful basis on which 
to bridge knowledge gaps, the concept and how it is employed needs careful 
consideration. We then go on to describe attempts at bridging in the Indian 
context in more detail, relating how roundtables that sought to bring together 
experts and laypeople, representatives from the “above”, “middle” and “below”, 
engaged with one another in dialogues and exchanges of ideas and perspectives 
in eforts to bridge the gaps in understandings and perceptions across the 
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Climate change and the practices of knowledge-making 
The ebbs and fows of opening and closing down plural  
practices of knowledge-making 
The tendency towards abstractions and generalisations in current climate 
science is, in part, intrinsic. As scientists working with big data are the only 
ones “able to identify, defne and characterise climate change”, they indirectly 
shape what counts as the human dimensions of climate change (Goldman, 
Turner, & Daly, 2018: 2). Another aspect relates to the fact that climate 
science is intrinsically transdisciplinary, drawing from atmospheric physics and 
chemistry, environmental science, chemical engineering, chemistry, mechanical 
engineering and hydrology, among other felds and sub-disciplines. Many 
scholars have criticised such abstractions, calling for more nuanced approaches 
and understandings of what counts as climate change, how it is known and 
unevenly experienced and highlighting the power dynamics at play (Eriksen, 
Nightingale, & Eakin, 2015; Nightingale, 2016; Watts et al., 2017). 
This tendency towards abstraction manifests itself in other felds of scientifc 
inquiry too, as refected in the work of Mazel-Cabasse (2017: 343) for seismology: 
Yet, in seismology, like in many other scientifc domains, progress of 
research over the last century has favoured the movement from subjective 
accounts to instrument-produced data, allowing for the development of predictive 
models and probabilistic conceptions of earthquake risk. In the process, 
earthquakes have become more abstract objects of science, defned mainly 
by complex mathematical operations and modelling. 
The historian Deborah Coen (2012) relates how, in the 19th century, “scientifc 
description of an earthquake was built of stories – stories from as many people, 
in as many diferent situations, as possible”. Coen examines seismology’s history 
as a form of “citizen science”. In the 19th century, standing networks of seismic 
observers transformed earthquakes into natural experiments at the nexus of 
human behaviour and planetary physics (ibid.). There are similar experiences 
from volcanology, for example, how the eruptions of Krakatoa and its efects 
on global climate have been studied through paintings of clouds.2 In another 
example of historical analysis of knowledge practices, Carey (2010) provides 
an account of glacial melting in the Peruvian Andes, elucidating the complex 
climate–society interactions underlying glacier environmental change and 
emphasising how economics, power relations and cultural perceptions all form 
part of the story. Further, the spatial turn (Agar & Smith, 2016; Ophir & Shapin, 
1991) invited geographers into the discussion of scientifc knowledge-making 
about the environment, which emphasised taking “place” and “space” seriously 
in environmental knowledge-making and appreciating the complexity of 
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social–ecological interactions (Grevsmühl, 2016). The scientifc discipline at the 
forefront of the global scientifc efort to document climate change – climatology 
– has undergone an evolution from one of a “clearly on humans-oriented 
climatology” (Flohn, 1954: 11) towards “globalising reductionism” that operates 
only at scales (global) outside the graspable human realm (Heymann, 2019). 
Such historical accounts and the more recent eforts to pay attention to space 
and place bring to the fore the role of subjectivity, political economy and power 
in shaping knowledge production practices that help inform understandings 
of society–nature relations. This demonstrates how the contemporary call to 
open up for a broader understanding of knowledge production practices is 
not necessarily novel, as past practices of scientifc inquiry encompassed more 
comprehensive conceptions of what constituted knowledge. 
Constructing bridges – appreciating plural practices of knowledge-
making and valuation 
Thinking about bridges between the “below”, “middle” and “above” involves 
thinking about multiple forms of “local” knowledges and understandings of 
uncertainty and change and how these can speak to scientists and policymakers 
– and vice versa. The notion of bridging, then, does not merely refer to a simple 
construct between one set of knowledges or epistemologies and another, but 
rather refers to the fuid and dynamic linkages across disciplinary and sectoral 
boundaries and across multiple scales and actors at the “above”, “middle” and 
“below” or “local”. What, then, is “local” knowledge? One defnition of local 
knowledge, drawn from the policy sciences, states that local knowledge is 
“knowledge that does not owe its origin, testing, degree of verifcation, truth, 
status, or currency to distinctive professional techniques, but rather to common 
sense, casual empiricism, or thoughtful speculation and analysis” (Lindblom and 
Cohen, 1979: 12, cited in Corburn, 2003: 421). The anthropologist Cliford 
Geertz defned local knowledge as “practical, collective and strongly rooted in 
a particular place”, which constitutes an “organised body of thought based on 
immediacy of experience” (Geertz, 1983: 75, cited in Corburn, 2003, p. 421). 
There is, however, a need to avoid reifying local and expert, or professional, 
knowledge as monolithic entities (Agrawal, 1995; Wynne, 1996; cited in Corburn, 
2003). Further, local knowledge is often “held by members of a community that 
can be both geographically located and contextual to specifc identity groups” 
(ibid.: 421). 
One issue that emerges when discussing diferent types of knowledge at 
diferent levels is what might be termed the politics of valuation. A certain 
politics of knowledge and valuation results in particular domains (especially 
so-called hard science) gaining authority over the others. Yet, all forms of 
knowledge (including so-called expert knowledge) are culturally and socially 
embedded and moulded by particular social, power and gender relations. Models 
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assumptions (Hajer, 1995; Roe, 1994) but through a range of political practices 
and boundary-ordering devices gain authority over other forms of knowledge 
(Heymann, 2019; Shackley & Wynne, 1996; Wynne, 1996). 
Framings of climate change and the question of 
visibility and attribution 
As alluded to above, the gap between expert and local knowledge stems, in part, 
from the fact that climate change is understood predominantly as an intrinsically 
global and long-term phenomenon. The “gulf between brute, visible reality 
and climate change is crowded with arcane mathematics, high-tech measuring 
devices and inhumanly large temporal and spatial scales” (Rudiak-Gould, 2014: 
121). However, if one instead labels it “long-term weather change”, this is not 
inaccurate and it narrows down the gap, as “weather” is something everyone can 
relate to, as we noted in the chapter on Kutch (Chapter 4). As argued by Rudiak-
Gould “the words ‘long-term’ and ‘change’ spread the word ‘weather’ out over 
a period of time, rendering the climate/weather distinction moot” (Rudiak-
Gould, 2013: 123). Moreover, one could have considered using concepts such as 
“pervasive” or “multi-sited” to substitute for the “global” (Rudiak-Gould, 2013:
123). The tendency has been towards understanding climate as a globalised, 
abstract, invisible phenomenon – a statistical and technical concept described 
by distributions of variables as temperature and precipitation – in contrast to 
weather, which is immediate, visible and subjectively experienced. Another 
reason for globalised conceptions of climate is also the interconnectedness of, 
and interactions between, regional weather phenomena such as El Niño and 
the Indian Summer Monsoon (as discussed in chapter 2). The issue of whether 
climate change is visible brings to the fore the deep divisions between diferent 
disciplinary felds (Rudiak-Gould, 2013). The “invisibility” camp argues that 
“anthropogenic tampering with the atmosphere does not result in specifc 
weather events but merely ‘loads the dice’ in a stochastic system; no individual 
(visible) event can be attributed with certainty to climate change” (Allen, 2011; 
quoted in Rudiak-Gould, 2013: 121). While some have softened their stance 
somewhat, conceding that individual events can, indeed, be attributed to climate 
change, the confict stems from a larger battle of authority and politics. Scientists’ 
“insistence on describing the phenomenon with the terms ‘global’ and ‘climate’ 
does not stem merely from a desire for terminological exactitude but from a 
particular political outlook in which scientifc authority is central” (Rudiak-
Gould, 2013: 121). 
There are challenges with visibility too, though, for example, that climate 
change is what Rudiak-Gould terms a “promiscuously corroborable” concept, it 
can be used to explain all sorts of phenomena experienced by local communities 
(Rudiak-Gould, 2012: 52). “A middle way between understanding climate 
change as abstract and invisible and as local and visible, is to render it visible 
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the (seeable) realm of local narratives” (Marx, 2017; cited in Rudiak-Gould, 
2013: 128) and vice versa: “sensory experience on the ground breathes life and 
urgency into desiccated expert assessments, while scientifc generality serves to 
unite disparate communities around the travelable concept of climate change and 
methodological scepticism provides a cautionary counterpoint to over-exuberant 
local attribution” (Rudiak-Gould, 2013: 129). This tension also came out in our 
roundtables where policymakers often characterise these sensory experiences as 
anecdotal and not something that is driven by generalisable facts (see Chapter 3). 
Co-production and bridging 
Thus, there is a need to bring together these sensory experiences and scientifc
generality. One promising avenue is the concept of co-production. The increasing
appreciation of the existence of multiple epistemologies has led to eforts that aim
towards co-producing knowledge (e.g. Goldman et al., 2018; Jasanof, 2004b;
Lane et al., 2011) which plays an essential part in eforts to bridge knowledge gaps.
The concept of co-production emerged from diverse theoretical and disciplinary
perspectives across the social sciences and humanities (Bremer & Meisch, 2017).
One way of defning co-production, espoused by many science and technology
studies scholars, is through using it to capture the interdependencies and mutual
constitution of nature and society. In science and technology studies (STS) terms,
co-production can either be interactional, that is, concerned with epistemic debates
around scientifc authority and expertise and the interface between science and
politics or constitutive. Constitutive co-production raises more profound issues
about how knowledge production shapes social order and science–society and
politics–nature relations (cf. Jasanof, 2004b). It could be helpful to distinguish
between what Goldman et al. term “instrumental co-production” (Goldman et al., 
2018: 1) and other forms of co-production. Instrumental co-production basically
refers to projects where attempts are made to ft local knowledge into existing
schemes of conventional science and draws on the early usages of co-production
from the 1970s, which was largely associated with the idea of “co-producing”
public services (e.g. Ostrom, Parks, Whitaker, & Percy, 1978). 
Some scholars prefer the term joint knowledge production (e.g. Hegger & 
Dieperink, 2015) to avoid the potential elision of processes that aim to engage in 
bottom-up collaborative knowledge-making, that is, where there is no attempt 
to mesh local knowledge with pre-defned sets of categories or typologies. Other 
terms include hybrid knowledges (e.g. Benessia et al., 2012; Reid, Williams, & 
Paine, 2011; Thomas & Twyman, 2004), hybrid epistemologies (e.g. Burnham, 
Ma, & Zhang, 2016) and polysemic epistemologies (Mazel-Cabasse, 2017). While 
these approaches are promising, there are obvious challenges. How does one 
assess the salience, validity and legitimacy of coproduced, or hybrid, knowledge? 
Integrating diferent types of knowledge is inherently complex, “with no single 
optimum approach for integrating local and scientifc knowledge” (see also 
Jasanof, 2004a; Raymond et al., 2010: 1775). 
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Moving beyond the appreciation of multiple epistemologies, Goldman et al. 
(2018) draw our attention to the notion that people engage in world-making 
through particular practices and thus there are not only multiple epistemologies – 
ways of knowing the world – but also multiple ontologies or practices of world-
making. Maasai pastoralists might not necessarily experience climate change frst 
and foremost as temperature and precipitation change, but as changes in the 
ability to predict the weather and changes in vegetation and animal behaviour 
(Goldman, Daly, & Lovell, 2016). Similarly, in Kutch (Chapter 4), the impacts 
of climate change are being experienced by the local pastoralists as a cascade of 
uncertainties that is making their livelihoods increasingly precarious. Appreciating 
multiple forms of world-making challenges an assumption that “most of us hold 
dear: that there is one reality out there, about which we can explore diferent 
perspectives” (Goldman et al., 2018: 3). But if reality is understood as enacted in 
practice, then there are multiple ontologies brought into being simultaneously 
(Mol, 2002: 6), not just multiple epistemologies. Therefore, a comprehensive 
engagement with knowledge and attempts at bridging knowledge gaps needs to 
deal with both multiple epistemologies and multiple ontologies. 
The project drew on various methodologies of co-production, such as 
transect walks, participatory mapping and – importantly – photovoice. These 
methodologies allowed the voices of the local people themselves to be heard 
and to bring into view often tacit and ignored forms of knowledge. Such co-
production eforts formed a necessary basis for building bridges, as they were a 
means to shed light on marginalised perspectives. 
Building bridges: The role of roundtables 
Uncertainties in the Indian context – Mumbai, Kutch and 
the Sundarbans 
Other chapters in this volume have provided detailed descriptions of the ways in 
which uncertainty has been conceptualised by the “above” (Chapters 2 and 3) 
and the “below” (Chapters 4–6). In the following, we recap some of the main 
uncertainties of the three research sites, before going on to explore the role of 
roundtables in bridging divides in understandings and perceptions of uncertainty 
and climate change. 
The coastal megacity of Mumbai is one of the largest and most densely 
populated urban agglomerations in India, with a population of around 20 million 
people. It is home to a burgeoning service and manufacturing sector as well as 
the fnancial heart of India’s economy. It is also a city characterised by deep social 
inequalities and exclusions. Mumbai has a unique coastal ecological identity, 
with mangroves, marshlands, salt pans and wetlands that function as potential 
bufers against foods and extreme weather events but that are increasingly 
coming under threat from urban development projects and pollution (cf. Chapter 
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Islanders in the Sundarbans in West Bengal have had to contend with shocks 
such as cyclones and foods, sea-level rise, changes in its deltaic ecology and socio-
economic marginalisation. Climate change is causing frequent embankment 
breaching; loss of land, homesteads and other assets and salinity intrusion, 
leading to the depletion of the traditional agro-fshing economy and straining 
the islanders’ coping capacities (cf. Chapter 5 on the Sundarbans). 
The semi-arid district of Kutch in north-western Gujarat faces multiple 
climate-related challenges, such as more frequent droughts and prolonged periods 
of high temperatures as well as increasingly erratic rainfall patterns. Such changes 
are heavily afecting local people’s livelihoods, including agriculture, livestock 
and fshing. Climate change-related challenges are exacerbated by pressures from 
industrial development in some of the most eco-sensitive zones, leading to a 
cascade of uncertainties for local people as their livelihoods become increasingly 
precarious (cf. Chapter 4 on Kutch). 
Emerging issues from the roundtables 
Climate change is like an elephant in the story, and while people see 
diferent things (ear, tail, trunk), we need to look at it as one whole animal. 
( January 2018, Gandhinagar Roundtable) 
This quote from an NGO participant nicely summarises the many ways in 
which climate and its associated uncertainties are characterised by actors from 
the “above”, “middle” and “below”. 
As part of the project, we organised four roundtables, one in Norway and three 
in India. Roundtables were organised in Mumbai, Gandhinagar (for Gujarat 
and Kutch) and Kolkata (for Sundarbans) in January 2018, bringing together 
perspectives and experiences of government ofcials, academics, practitioners 
and activists. These were built on an earlier roundtable organised in Oslo in 
August 2017. The aim was to understand the way climate change and uncertainty 
are experienced and understood by diverse stakeholders in order to explore ways 
to foster transformative, socially just and inclusive development to cope with the 
challenges of climate-related uncertainty. The three roundtables in India were 
rooted in their site-specifc contexts (the rapidly urbanising coastal metropolis of 
Mumbai, the deltaic islands of the Indian Sundarbans and the dryland dynamics 
of Kutch in Gujarat). The roundtables were quite distinct in both orientation and 
scope, due to the diferent locations (e.g. whether at a university, government 
institute or a neutral seminar venue) and the role played by the local partners 
and co-hosts. In Mumbai, the audience at the Indian Institute of Technology 
(IIT-Bombay) largely comprised natural and social scientists, with some NGOs 
and local fsher activists and the discussions revolved around academic discourses 
on uncertainty. By contrast, the Gujarat meeting, perhaps due to its location 
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policymakers from diferent departments, who welcomed the opportunity to 
engage with each other’s work, alongside many researchers and NGOs. Similarly, 
in Kolkata, the meeting had a good mix of diferent scientists, researchers and 
NGOs as well as government ofcials. Power diferentials were evident in all the 
roundtables but refected in diferent ways (Mehta & Srivastava, 2020). 
The roundtables played a key role in highlighting diverse understandings 
of uncertainty, while simultaneously opening up opportunities for sharing 
and learning. For some participants, the roundtable was a new experience, 
and they appreciated the opportunity to engage with and learn from diferent 
perspectives. For others, the roundtable rehearsed well-known diverse views and 
brought to the fore the challenge of reconciling these plural perspectives (Mehta 
& Srivastava, 2020). 
All the roundtables began with a powerful photovoice presentation highlighting 
the precariousness of ordinary people to climate-related uncertainties (e.g. erosion 
of lands in the Sundarbans due to sea-level rise or the changing nature of rainfall 
and droughts and their impacts on livelihoods in Kutch) and how they make sense 
of, live with and adapt. The photovoice presentations from the three sites helped 
bring the voices of the communities to the policymakers through capturing their 
understandings of coping and adapting with livelihood hazards in the remote 
sites and through showcasing their indigenous understanding and insights related 
to climate change uncertainties, which are intrinsically geographical and place-
based. These alternate views ofered policymakers a valuable window into the 
community’s understanding of issues related to mild and extreme uncertainties. 
These uncertainties are further compounded by wider socio-economic changes, 
which often destroy key ecological resources such as mangroves (on the Mumbai 
and Kutchi coast) that both protect the vulnerable coastline and are also key to 
the livelihoods and well-being of the local communities. 
The presentations facilitated roundtable participants’ understanding of how
people living with climate change make meaning themselves, and construct
what matters to them through refecting on their own community portraits and 
voices and on what questions can be linked into making inclusive policies
and importance of convergence and interrelation between the diferent state-
and private-led adaptation interventions. By bringing in the communities’ lived
experience, the roundtables advocated for a more integrative process consisting of
bottom-up and top-down actions, local and scientifc knowledge and a vast array
of stakeholders that would help bridge the separation of knowledge and action. 
Diverse epistemologies and framings 
One characteristic that clearly came out was the diversity of epistemologies and 
framings. People with diferent disciplinary backgrounds were framing climate-
related uncertainties in distinctly diferent ways. Yet there appears to be an 
increasing consensus that interdisciplinary research is important in connecting 
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such as climate/hydrology. A participant with a natural science background 
describes the trend within meteorological/climate research as follows: 
(…) I have been working as meteorologist for 40 years, and there is 
signifcant change in our behaviour (…) when I started, we were the kings 
(…) we decided what people should know. Now we provide forecasts 
and projections and people have a lot of sources (…) we need IT people/ 
meteorologists, communication experts and social scientists; now it’s 
a multidisciplinary task. There is scope for cross-learning too, between 
sociological perspectives and policy action. 
( January 2018, Mumbai roundtable) 
While information sharing is key in mediating such processes, it was pointed 
out that training exercises for bureaucrats/policymakers can lead to better 
interpretation of information and more efcient decision-making. This was re-
afrmed by participants from “above”, “middle” and “below”. 
Diferent participants had diferent entry points in this discussion and looked 
at climate change through the lens of their sector/departments or epistemological 
positions. For the scientists in Gujarat, climate change is real and certain and is 
measured through key variables such as temperature, rainfall, sea-level rise and 
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere (see Chapter 4). One scientist referred 
to a recent study suggesting that there would be drastic changes in the summer 
and winter temperatures in Gujarat and this would have signifcant impacts on 
agriculture, livestock and water resources. He argued that the “most important 
thing to bridge gaps on climate change and uncertainty is to focus on local 
scenarios of climate change” (Interview January 2018, Mumbai). Whereas for 
another scientist (IIT-Bombay) in Mumbai, the most important issue was that 
“hybrid knowledge is required to solve the problem (…) for example, hydrological 
as well as climate models should be combined to give overall results.” 
In the Mumbai roundtable, a civil society representative emphasised
the need to understand the city as a fuid space, rather than a static entity.
Understanding the city as an integrated urban space, paying attention to its
geography and multiple constituents highlights how climate change and climate
science are framed. Such an imagining of the city as greater than the sum of its
constituent parts is also important for engendering social transformations that
are emancipatory in nature. For instance, in imagining cities as fuid spaces, a
neighbourhood can be viewed as the basic unit of transformation. In the Mumbai
roundtable, the neighbourhood approach came up as an important concept for
the fshing community that was dealing with climate-related uncertainties (see
Chapter 6). The neighbourhood approach, which begins with empowering
neighbourhoods where specifc communities (like the fshing community of
Mumbai) are concentrated, can then be replicated, contextualised and scaled
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Similarly, vulnerable environments like the Sundarbans require pro-poor 
adaptation as well as the strengthening and protection of local ecosystems and 
biodiversity, especially mangroves, in a people-centric way. At the roundtable 
in Kolkata, it was discussed that various knowledge regimes and experiences, 
including scientifc, technical, administrative and everyday practices, need 
to come together to plan for alternative solutions to the problems this region 
faces. In this regard, the state should facilitate spaces to enable sharing between 
policymakers and local-level policy implementers, NGOs and community-
based organisations (CBOs) as well as local communities’ own experiences and 
responses (see Chapter 5). For example, the Sundarbans Afairs Department may 
need to take leadership in the facilitation of such a platform. 
Politics of valuation 
Another key theme was the politics of valuation. Several participants emphasised 
the need to appreciate the importance of ecological elements, such as mangroves. 
A community leader, from the Koli community in Mumbai, emphasised that port 
development activities in their area on the outskirts of Mumbai lead to a “loss 
of livelihoods for future generations” and “mangroves play a highly signifcant 
role for fshing and acts as the breeding site for fshing” but that “authorities 
and policymakers do not have local or indigenous knowledge about seawater 
pathways, and inter-tidal fows”. This, in turn, leads to faulty attributions, 
wherein the government attributes overfshing as the major reason for decreasing 
fsh catch ( January 2018, Mumbai Roundtable). It was also pointed out that 
comparatively little attention had been given to food proofng in planning, 
largely due to a lack of understanding of the importance of ecological elements 
such as mangroves in food risk mitigation. An atmospheric and climate scientist 
substantiated that when it comes to ecosystem services ofered by mangroves, 
continuous evaluation is needed, even though quantitative monitoring remains 
difcult. The question was raised in response to the emphasis on the need to 
quantify value, whether one should not fnd alternatives to monetary valuation? 
This is not so much a question of economic value, as a question of political 
priority – it should be the local authorities’ primary task to protect and prioritise 
local livelihoods. It is also a question of culture – cultural values, anchored in 
livelihood practices, exist, but do not fnd their way into standardised assessments 
as pointed out by the Koli community leader. Such assessments, framed as they are 
by political economy actors (corporate actors, contractors, state), are not geared 
towards acknowledging uncertainties, diverging valuations, livelihoods or long-
term ecosystem dynamics. Traditional and hybrid forms of knowledge can be of 
importance in eforts to achieve more balanced and sustainable development, yet 
is usually ignored. 
Often, such exercises tend to be opaque and closed and eforts are needed 
to open these exercises up, to make them more transparent and accountable. 
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and transformation actions are needed. These include standard assessments 
such as environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and social impact assessments 
(SIAs) which need to be reframed along more inclusive terms and become more 
participatory, to broaden up their epistemic base. A participant in Mumbai asked
“(…) can EIAs and SIAs be impartial when funded through the project?”. The 
major challenge is bringing in transparency to mandatory exercises like public 
hearings in EIA, which take place as closed and opaque exercises. Returning 
to the issue of food proofng, it is important to look at past disaster response 
mechanisms with respect to fooding and what scope for learning exists and what 
opportunities there are for incorporating a wide range of perspectives, including 
that of the general public. Thus, all the three roundtables had discussions on 
qualitative approaches to understand the extent of climate-related uncertainties 
and the scope of transformation. Roundtables with a diversity of actors across 
diferent levels can be a way to achieve this. 
Attribution, causality and (defection of) responsibility 
Another issue that was frequently discussed was the question of attribution
and, aligned with this, the question of responsibility, or rather, the defection of
responsibility. According to a scientist from IIT-Bombay, attribution science (i.e.
can the cause of extreme weather events be clearly traced to climate change) is
not very advanced and sufers from serious limitations. However, as discussed
by Mehta et al. (Chapter 2), policymakers are not concerned about whether a
phenomenon can be attributable or not to climate change. What matters to them is
response, not cause. The problem is, however, that limited knowledge on dynamics
of various systems, as well as the sensitivity of certain information, prevents the
creation of more confdent projections and creates uncertainty. Attribution, thus,
becomes an important question when seeking to comprehend causality to risk
and vulnerability. Policymakers, disaster mitigation ofcials and politicians tend
to blame “outside forces”, thereby defecting responsibility and accountability. 
Knowledge and integration of lived experience 
The need to integrate knowledge of lived experience of impacts was acknowledged 
across the roundtables. Translating this acknowledgement into existing research 
methodologies can prove to be a challenge, especially for modellers, as noted 
by one of the participants in the Oslo roundtable. In the Gujarat roundtable, 
policymakers viewed themselves as making up the “middle”, as being the ones 
whose task it was to communicate climate science to local people. Participants 
acknowledged that climate change impacts are most vigorously felt at the local 
level, especially in terms of the changes in water supply and resources, health, 
livelihoods, forests and biodiversity. There was, however, a sense that local 
people were a form of “black box”, policymakers knew very little about how 
they were afected by climate changes. This reiterated the standard top-down 
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understanding of policymaking and implementation where local people are 
framed as benefciaries rather than equal partners. 
An example of how to engage local communities and local knowledge was 
ofered by an NGO in Gujarat. In the projects, local community consultations 
are being organised around water, livelihood and ecosystem restoration, and they 
pointed out that more eforts are required to work on stakeholder perceptions 
related to climate change and uncertainty. An academic talked about vernacular 
architecture to understand ways of dealing with uncertainty (how people live, 
eat, sleep, experience and recover from trauma). There was also a suggestion 
that children are also important stakeholders when it comes to uncertainty and 
projects with a decided focus on children and uncertainty can be very useful 
( January 2018, Gandhinagar Roundtable). 
Another concrete example that came up in the Gujarat workshop focused on 
health, and how changes in humidity has health impacts. This is not recognised 
at all by policymakers, demonstrating how more knowledge about the impacts 
of climate change on local people can be integrated into policymaking to 
make it more targeted and efective. For instance, it was pointed out by one 
of the participants at the Gandhinagar roundtable how climate and humidity, 
as variables for climate change, may not make a lot of sense to policymakers 
but impacts on health are more tangible and can gain policy traction. Policy 
practitioners are still trying to understand the impacts of new diseases and how 
adaptation to climate change requires behaviour change, which is quite complex. 
This links up to the earlier discussion around the visibility/invisibility of climate 
change. This insight was surprisingly prescient, given that such problems have 
come to the fore during the current COVID-19 pandemic. 
There was also discussion about factors that exacerbate the lived experiences 
of climate-related uncertainty. For instance, in the Mumbai roundtable, several 
participants pointed out how informality reinforces the lived uncertainty, 
relating how small businesses in the informal sector were hardest hit during 
fooding. They keep limited stocks of inventory and obstruction in supply chains 
and production facilities have immediate cascading efects that dent income and 
employment opportunities. In the absence of baseline data, it is difcult to make 
accurate assessments of costs, damages and vulnerabilities. Insurance coverage is 
not available to cover losses for these small enterprises. In the formal sector, on 
the other hand, losses from natural disasters are often covered – displaying an 
unequal adaptive capacity and recovery. This demonstrates how informality and 
uncertainty are closely linked. 
Clearly, the lived experiences of the people engaged in the informal sector 
are not always accounted for in framings of climate-related uncertainties by the 
“above” and “middle” levels. The disruption to business continuity faced by 
informal enterprises in the wake of climate stresses and shocks can have a lasting 
impact on the lives of people employed in such enterprises. This disruption 
and loss of livelihood opportunities represent the local-level imaginings and 
understandings of climate-related uncertainty that is often not integrated into 
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policymaking. For instance, India has one of the largest informal workforces 
in the world. The 2018–2019 Economic Survey of India estimates that almost 
93% of the country’s total workforce works in the informal sector. This large 
chunk of the working population does not have access to insurance or other 
risk pooling mechanism, leaving them extremely vulnerable the adverse impacts 
of climate change uncertainties (see also Patankar & Patwardhan, 2016). In the 
Mumbai and Kolkata roundtables, insurance for informal enterprises came up as 
a potent method for them to deal with uncertainty. Similarly, piloting large-scale 
insurance and other risk-pooling options can also have large-scale implications 
on the future of work in a largely informal economy like India. This represents 
a possible pathway to social transformation. 
There was more controversy, however, relating to how people’s perceptions of 
climate change could be integrated more directly into projections and modelling 
(see Chapter 2). In the Mumbai roundtable, one theme that was explored was 
the possibility of incorporating social perspectives into modelling practices. 
According to a citizen scientist, it is a question of “what skills can tolerate other 
skills” and models require re-examination with respect to incorporating feedback. 
Some eforts are already emerging, for example, people mark places of local 
importance/vulnerability (curves, ditches, etc.) not captured in other modelling 
exercises through smartphone apps or other means, which subsequently feed into 
models and projections. Several academics and civil society actors in the Gujarat 
roundtable agreed that communities do have a wealth of information and that 
there is a need to have a local decentralised information centre, which could act 
as the connecting point between the “below” and “above”. It was suggested that 
“capacity building” is not just required at the level of the community but also at 
the level of decision-makers who need to be sensitised to local understandings and 
lived experiences of climate change and appreciate the multiple interconnections 
of climate-related uncertainties at the local level. Therefore, policymakers and 
scientists need to understand the local languages or representations of climate 
change. 
Another issue related to the integration of lived experience is the notion that 
landscapes are heterogeneous. Policymakers’ signifcant lack of knowledge of the 
Sundarbans, for instance, is, in part due to the heterogeneity of the Sundarbans. 
As one researcher pointed out, the Sundarbans is not one place, but many. The 
“many Sundarbans” refers to various geographical locations, such as the coastal 
pockets, the deltaic Sundarbans, and the mainland part. Impacts from climate 
change are, therefore, highly localised and people are responding to the varied 
manifestations of climate change at the micro-scale, which must be appreciated, 
acknowledged and accommodated by policymakers. 
Institutional complexity and fragmentation 
Uncertainty due to heterogeneous landscapes and institutional complexity/ 
fragmentation was a theme generating much discussion. The case of mangroves 
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and fsheries provided a peculiar case of natural resource management that has 
fallen between the cracks of various government departments. In Uran, near 
Mumbai, fshing predominantly takes place in mangrove areas during low 
tide. However, the land in question is mainly under the purview of the forest/ 
revenue department. The Fisheries Department has little infuence, as its primary 
responsibility lies beyond the shoreline. This problematic interface between land 
and sea areas in the inter-tidal zone has created uncertainty that complicates 
governance eforts and institutional support of traditional fsherfolk. The Mumbai 
roundtable highlighted the possible benefts of collaboration between researchers 
and fshers by consistent knowledge generation to back up their legal and other 
struggles, a process that is not easily amenable to quick decision-making. As one 
participant expressed, there is a “need to spend time with the community to 
understand their issues.” 
Heterogeneity and fragmentation were key issues in the Sundarbans too. The 
“above” has many conficting views depending on how they utilise resources and 
how they understand “development”. This is refected mostly in the divergence 
between goals and strategies of the line departments. Similarly, the “above” is also 
constrained by the government’s prerogative to control resources and funding 
sources for the development of the Sundarbans. This acts as an obstacle in eforts 
to promote collective action  on the part of actors in the “middle”. For instance, 
at the Kolkata roundtable, a researcher working in the Sundarbans’ health system 
for several years pointed out: 
When we started working in the Sundarbans, we asked the Department 
of Sundarbans Afairs about their plans for people’s health. They stated 
that it is the responsibility of health department. Again, when we further 
probed to the social developmental aspects of health to the State Health 
department, they said it is not their area of concern.
 ( January 18, Kolkata roundtable also see Chapter 5) 
Such obstacles are also debilitating to the agency of “below” actors to participate 
in making decisions in situations of uncertainty. As has already been established, 
the actors from “below” seldom have their voices captured or heeded by “above” 
actors when it comes to taking decisions regarding uncertainty. This lack of 
agency is exacerbated by institutional complexity and overlaps. Institutional 
fragmentation of responsibility can easily lead to a sense of apathy, as is the case 
in the Sundarbans (see also Parthasarathy’s work on the issue of institutional and 
epistemological “balkanization” (Parthasarathy, 2016)). 
One theme that did not directly come from any of the roundtables, but 
which was indirectly raised in all of them, was the issue of asking the right 
questions about uncertainty and its concomitant impacts on society, economy 
and environment. More importantly, there needs to be consideration about who
asks these questions. The agency of “above”, “middle” and “below” actors is 
skewed in raising questions about uncertainty and ceding some space to actors 
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from “below” in raising such questions would lead to a more integrated and 
holistic understanding of uncertainty. 
Lack of knowledge/insuffcient communication 
The roundtables also highlighted how uncertainty was grounded in a lack 
of knowledge and insufcient communication, which was, for instance, the 
experience in Gujarat. Some argued that decision-makers need to be sensitised 
to the local understandings and lived experiences of climate change and to the 
multiple interconnections of climate-related uncertainties at the local level. The 
participants agreed that “understanding of climate change across the three levels 
has to improve. Even I do not understand enough about it (…) we need to speak 
to those who do and understand the limitations. This is why this [bringing people 
together] is on the dot” ( January 2018, Gandhinagar Roundtable). A number of 
participants agreed that there exists an information gap between the “above” and 
“below”, with poor communication between departments, between local people 
and the policymakers, and between scientists and policymakers. 
Several participants in the Mumbai roundtable also emphasised how there was 
a need to improve communication, while also conveying problems relating to 
uncertainty and attribution. Lack of knowledge and communication issues came 
out as highly salient issues in the Sundarbans case as well. For instance, a climate 
scientist working in the area noted that Bangladesh has well-researched local-
level scientifc data on sea-level rise, salinity levels and subsidence or erosion rates. 
The Indian side does not have the same level of detail. While climate scientists 
based in West Bengal have worked on climate modelling of the Sundarbans, they 
agree that data gaps prevent better and more accurate projections. Data gaps also 
persist in identifying people’s coping strategies. An example pertains to whether 
migration is a seasonal coping or permanent adaptation strategy, as there is scant 
ofcial data on the actual number of migrants. As discussed in Chapter 4 on 
Kutch, policymakers usually like to be certain about the course of action that 
they can work, such as likely scenarios, but not with “something that is highly 
uncertain” ( January 2018, Gandhinagar Roundtable). To a decision-maker, or 
at least from an economist’s viewpoint, the question would be “what can I do to 
limit losses in case my expectations fail?” so that is the fnancial risk, that is the 
risk of poor women in India as well, and there is no correspondence between 
these two ways of understanding risk. Because, to a decision-maker, you cannot 
separate risk from decisions, meaning also that risk cannot be expressed in 
terms of one measure. It is a question of how are you controlling, who are you 
asking, and what is the objective of that person? For policymakers, the types of 
uncertainty could be summed up as situations where one can address uncertainty 
through improving information and communication (epistemological) and 
where one cannot fx uncertainty (ontological). Policymakers may be able to 
address the frst level of uncertainty. An interesting observation was that many of 
the policymakers considered themselves as the “middle” in bridging the divide 
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between the scientists and local people. A senior policymaker stated: “We can 
act as a bridge, we understand below and top and thus can help bridge [the gap].” 
In the Gujarat roundtable, it was highlighted that there is a tendency towards 
an elite bias in climate change, with most of the information being in English 
and there is a need for more vernacular representations of climate change. As a 
participant highlighted: 
When we work with grassroots (…) they say things, but it is not very 
well articulated. There is lot of literature in English but not disseminated 
in Gujarat (…) we need to involve below and also build capacity of local 
institutions. 
( January 2018, Gandhinagar Roundtable) 
Discussion and concluding refections 
This chapter has focused on the potential of roundtables to bridge the gap between 
what policymakers do and the experiences and understandings of local people 
regarding climate change and uncertainty. The roundtables brought together 
experts in diverse felds, representatives from civil society and other actors, in 
an attempt to foster dialogue and deepen our understanding of the plurality of 
perceptions and how one can work towards bridging the gaps in understandings 
and perspectives. 
The brief historical overview at the beginning of this chapter emphasised how 
knowledge-making practices in environmental realms were once potentially open 
to being broad and inclusive through incorporating a range of diverse narratives 
and stories. Subsequently, however, this openness was narrowed down to being 
more concentrated to a specifc or relatively more closed form of knowledge-
making. In recent times, there has been a re-opening of ideas and framings 
around knowledge-making, acknowledging the multiple forms of knowing. 
This is, in part, refected through the increasing appreciation of local, indigenous 
or traditional forms of knowledge in much of the environmental science and 
governance literature. This is, to some extent, true for climate science as well. 
However, as discussed by Mehta et al. in Chapter 2, there still is a long way 
to go and part of the reason for this is, as pointed out, the “global” nature of 
climate science and how it tends towards knowledge-making that is not aligned 
with on-the-ground understandings, vulnerabilities and realities. Added to this 
is the often siloed nature of governance which is a barrier to bringing diverse 
knowledge into conversation Policymakers tend to base their decisions on datasets 
that draw on the probability of precipitation and temperature changes but have 
little knowledge of ground-level realities, how people themselves understand and 
experience climate change and climate-related uncertainties. 
While there is an implicit assumption that policymakers are responsible for 
acting and responding to local-level realities and experiences of climate impacts, 
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assumptions. The degree of uncertainty around causal linkages may, in some 
instances, lead to policy paralysis. Such inertia may be compounded by the 
heterogeneity of landscapes where impacts are experienced and the fragmentation 
of institutional ambits of responsibility. This was clearly illustrated in the case of 
Mumbai’s coastal zone, where it is the Forestry Department that has the mandate 
for mangroves, but the Fisheries Department that claims authority over the coastal 
zones of which mangroves form an important element. Who should ultimately 
be responsible and how can such institutional barriers to action be overcome? 
We have highlighted the usefulness of bringing together diferent perspectives 
and knowledges and exploring the potential role of roundtables, together 
with visual approaches such as photovoice, in elucidating the challenges and 
opportunities in doing so. However, there are multiple challenges associated 
with such eforts. While there was widespread appreciation of the importance 
of including social science perspectives, there was also concern about how to 
best incorporate local knowledges. What emerged from the roundtables was a 
rich set of issues that participants feel need to be addressed in order to foster 
more constructive dialogue and bridging practices across disciplinary and 
sectoral divides. Participants across the board agreed that greater awareness is 
needed around how multiple and diverse epistemologies and framings shape our 
perceptions of climate science and what counts as “knowledge”. While there 
were useful suggestions as to how “scientifc” facts about climate change could 
be better communicated to local communities – for example, through translating 
information into local languages – there was less clarity on how local people’s 
knowledges and perceptions could be brought into knowledge-making and 
policymaking, especially when they are often characterised as anecdotal evidence 
(see also Chapter 2). While there were several examples of ongoing projects that 
explore more participatory approaches to knowledge-making and integration 
of local understandings and perceptions, there was also a prevalent scepticism 
among some scientists and policymakers about the credibility and validity of 
drawing on local people’s knowledges because such knowledge was perceived as 
being “less scientifc” and more anecdotal. This points to the need to open up 
understandings of historical practices in knowledge-making, as highlighted in the 
historical overview section and improving ways to understand and incorporate 
stories and narratives about change into the wider body of knowledge of climate 
science. In order words, how to make “invisible” knowledges of climate change 
visible. Another important issue linked to knowledge and knowledge-making 
concerned the politics of valuation. Critical valuation exercises of the economic, 
ecological and social impacts of climate change, extreme events and uncertainty 
from multiple perspectives are necessary to avoid the pitfalls of simplistic neo-
classical models which are often used to justify environment-unfriendly and 
socially destructive infrastructure projects that dispossess local people and their 
livelihoods. 
Realising that knowledge-making in the past was a broader, more
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to focus on models could help make policymakers and the “above” realise the
value of bringing in more diverse, local perspectives and understandings from the
“below”. Thus, encouraging more qualitative approaches and refecting on the
challenges of integrating local knowledge can help deepen refections around what
knowledge is and how to think about knowledge in new ways. Key to such eforts
is the realisation that spaces must be opened for local people to communicate their
knowledge and uncertainties. As Jasanof (2009) argues, the political and subjective
dimensions of uncertainty at the scale of the local have to be recognised in order to
achieve more efective bridging of understandings, knowledges and action. Bridging
is not simply about translating knowledge, but rather it involves the generating of
a vibrant trafc in understanding between the “above”, “middle” and “below”.
In this way the global and abstract as well as local and grounded experiences are
brought into meaningful conversations to create appropriate responses to climate
change, while simultaneously acknowledging the limitations inherent in existing
power relations and hierarchies. Through bridging gaps, we can explore possibilities
for producing “hybrid knowledge spheres” in which the “below”, “middle” and
“above” are reoriented through thick interactions and work collectively towards
transformative strategies in response to climate-related uncertainties. 
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Notes 
1 The Oslo roundtable brought together researchers, policymakers and funders to 
discuss uncertainty and climate change. This was the frst in the series of roundtables, 
where the subsequent sessions would focus more on the context and challenges of the 
specifc sites. The frst roundtable in the series addressed the overarching notion of 
‘uncertainty’ as it permeates the project work throughout. 
2 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MrEIT66oPqU] (accessed 15 March 2020). 
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FIGURE 8.1 Recognising the multiple values of mangroves is important to sustain 
lives, livelihoods and adaptation pathways (Photo credit: Shibaji Bose). 
This volume has explored the diferent ways in which climate-related uncertainties
are understood, conceptualised and mediated by diferent actors in India, one of
the most climatically vulnerable countries in the world. It covered case studies from
coastal Mumbai to dryland Kutch and the Sundarbans delta in West Bengal and













perspective. The book introduced the three heuristic categories of the “above”,
“middle” and “below” to study diverse conceptions and experiences of climate
change and uncertainty, with the caveat that this heuristic is fuid and marked by
power imbalances between the “above”, “middle” and “below” (Figure 8.1). 
The importance of embracing uncertainty and its political nature are the key
messages of this volume. Attempts to “control” or “tame” uncertainty in the
context of climate change remain the primary response strategy, mostly driven by
state actors and usually in the form of technocentric and top-down interventions.
However, these largely falter on the ground due to dynamic and variable local
systems and intersecting uncertainties. These “decontextualised” top-down policies
can often hamper eforts to support locally appropriate and socially just adaptation. 
Several chapters in this book have shown that predominant deliberations 
and knowledge production from the powerful “above” have largely failed to 
acknowledge fner-grained local-level realities. Instead, deterministic tools 
and approaches have tended to bypass or undervalue the more qualitative lived 
experience and conceptualisations of uncertainty from the “below”. This 
exclusionary framing by the “above” not only faces epistemic tensions but also 
sidelines and dilutes valuable “experiential” knowledge and perspectives from the 
“below” who live at the forefront of climate change, and whose perspectives and 
realities are key to developing more inclusive and diverse adaptation pathways. 
In this regard, this volume has highlighted the critical role of the “middle” as 
translators who play an active role in facilitating plural approaches and act as a 
mediator between “above” and “below”. 
Climate-related uncertainties are not new. Climate extremes, variability and 
seasonality in the Indian subcontinent have been part and parcel of everyday 
life for generations, and a wide repertoire of knowledge and practices have been 
developed by the “below” to cope and adapt to them. However, the timing, scale 
and intensity of climatic patterns have changed, sometimes drastically, signalling 
the anvil of a new age of radical uncertainty that increasingly falls outside the 
coping range, which communities have traditionally relied on. 
The often devastating impacts of climate change are not the only sources of 
anxiety and uncertainty for local communities. As we described in this book, 
dominant concerns for poor and marginalised people relate to daily, existential 
threats that revolve around livelihoods, access to resources or land that interact 
with climate-related uncertainties. Uncertainties are being accentuated or re-
enforced when people are left disenfranchised and disempowered through forced 
displacement (Mumbai), state neglect (Indian Sundarbans) and progressive 
marginalisation of traditional livelihoods (Kutch), leaving them with token 
livelihood alternatives. For example, the case of chronic fooding and retainer 
wall construction in Mumbai is an obvious case of maladaptation (Chapter 6). 
Similar examples are discussed across the volume, which outline the socially 
diferentiated impacts of climate-related uncertainties that often exacerbate the 
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example, the empirical fndings have demonstrated the gendered implications of 
increasing vulnerabilities linked to climate-related uncertainties and how these 
add to women’s existing daily burdens. 
What could be the way forward for concept, policy and praxis? Multi-
sectoral and interdisciplinary approaches are required to understand the impacts
and manifestations of uncertainty. It is important to challenge the positivist
understanding of uncertainty that dominates science and policymaking. Social
science aspects concerning socio-political issues, gender dynamics and site-
specifc vulnerabilities of diferent social groups and how these interact with
climate-related uncertainties also need to be included in mainstream debates
(Bhatt et al. 2018). It is also important for actors from “above”, “middle” and
“below” to see diferent aspects of climate change while recognising the values
(and opportunities/limitations) of diverse knowledge regimes. The book has
highlighted that a power re-confguration through epistemic and cognitive justice
for vulnerable people is a key component to develop transformative pathways. 
For this, one needs to recognise and embrace the perspectives from the 
“below” and bring their voices and concerns to the centre stage of climate 
action. While policymakers often fnd it uncomfortable to work with high 
degrees of uncertainty at the local level, ignoring it is no solution either. There 
is a need to factor uncertainty into decision-making and scientists also need to 
efectively communicate the role of uncertainty in their forecasts and models. 
Instead of paralysing decision-making, efective communication of uncertainty 
confgurations across all heuristic categories can facilitate inclusive change 
(Bhatt et al. 2018). The building of “hybrid alliances” that allow multiple actors 
(researchers, NGOs, activists, state, ordinary people), disciplines (humanities, 
natural and social sciences) and perspectives on climate change to come together 
promises to enable the sharing of knowledge and expertise. 
Drawing on creative methodological experiments such as roundtables, we 
argued that there is a potential to harness this diversity to facilitate practices 
of engagement and co-production between diverse stakeholders. For example, 
the use of visual methods such as photovoice and photo stories can efectively 
capture the lived and tacit experiences of uncertainty. Besides providing agency 
to the “below”, who have often been categorised as “subjects” of research, such 
approaches provide a voice to vulnerable and marginalised communities, making 
them active participants in research and the creation of knowledge. Such co-
produced research requires sustained engagement but can potentially empower 
people to shape the conditions of their lives, creating spaces to produce and 
disseminate knowledge and actively shape development and research processes 
(see Mehta and Srivastava 2020). 
Hence, co-production of climate knowledge will require altering the modernist
and homogenising frame of knowledge production and dissemination that has for
long colonised practices through target-oriented top-down framings. This means
embracing more decentralised and plural ways of knowing with an aim to co-



























We have also outlined the challenges in such processes in tackling existing
power relations and existing social and gender inequities. We, thus, argue for a
more granular, localised, participatory and place-based understanding of climate-
related uncertainty to provide entry points to enable a bottom-up transformation
that pushes social justice, equity and more inclusive adaptation. This must go hand
in hand with a radical re-structing of power relationships that puts the concerns of
the most vulnerable people centerstage (O’Brien 2012; Ribot 2014; Taylor 2014;
see the Introduction chapter). Climate action and policy will have little meaning
or could even be counterproductive unless they are mobilised to question deep-
seated inequalities and unjust framings that feed into epistemic closures and deny
possibilities of having plural pathways (Scoones et al. 2015; Newell et al. 2021). 
Bottom-up approaches to transformation may, in fact, provide an entry point to
challenge precisely such incumbent power structures. In such spaces or “patches”,1 
specifc processes (alliances, initiatives) are challenging dominant trajectories of
development, and where relations of power and knowledge are being reconfgured
in more heterogeneous and deliberative ways to challenge dominant framings
of nature–society relations and create spaces in which new practice emerge (see
Mehta et al. 2021). It is also at this “local level” where climate impacts ultimately
materialise and complementary responses to market or state directives are
formulated. In order to nurture such transformative pathways, new discourses
and stories are required to guide our actions. This can be through challenging
dominant narratives around what unproductive landscapes are (Kutch) or support
diferent narratives and storylines that emerge from small and incremental changes,
experiments and mobilisations and percolate into giving birth to new ideas, values
and social norms that are more adept at addressing climate-related uncertainties.
However, one needs to remain attentive to structural political economy factors and
ensure that the burden of responsibility for adaptation is not shifted “downwards”
to the most vulnerable people (Taylor 2014; Blythe et al. 2018). 
The ongoing pandemic has laid bare problems with local to global inequalities, 
unequal access to public goods such as health, water and sanitation as well as the 
unsustainable nature of human–nature relations, all of which underpin the global 
climate crisis. The pandemic has also intersected with ongoing crises of food, 
water and climate, thus threatening already fragile livelihoods, especially in 
marginal environments creating compounded uncertainties and vulnerabilities 
for marginalised people. In most countries, the responses from “above” have 
been inadequate, too late, or even failed. In India, the right-wing authoritarian 
government has used the pandemic to “other” and victimise minorities and 
marginalised groups, while using the pandemic time to push through controversial 
and unsustainable projects bypassing social and environmental concerns. Despite 
inadequate responses from “above”, in many cases – even in our research sites – 
there has been a burst of local forms of mutual aid and solidarity as well as civic 
action. There are also many examples of resilience at the local level, especially 
amongst communities that have largely relied on subsistence production (Pickard 
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Lastly, the injustices of the pandemic, especially India’s deadly second wave, 
have called for fairer and more just futures, including the need for investment 
in public goods and to address issues concerning climate justice. The post-
COVID recovery period should, thus, build on refections, trends and lessons 
and hopefully bring about the systemic shifts badly needed to address locally 
appropriate and socially just transformations to sustainability in an increasingly 
uncertain world. 
Note 
1 The concept of patches and praxis is investigated in a follow-up project TAPESTRY. 
For more information, see https://steps-centre.org/project/tapestry/. 
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